Opposing Bushy

BREAKING NEWS : George Washington Tapped Phones! - Yahoo! News

2006-02-09T05:06:00.000-08:00

BREAKING news: George Washington Tapped Phones! - Yahoo! News
I have long suspected that Bush gets all his information from WEEKLY WORLD NEWS. The clincher for me was when he vowed to opposed those most unholy of medical experiments, animal-human hybrids. Weekly World News, has an ongoing feature about the BATBOY, clearly, from the depiction, a human-animal hybrid.

Now, apparently his pet monkey Alberto Gonzales, is saying that George Washington and Abe Lincoln authorized electronic surveillance on a broader scale than King George the Cowardly.

I guess Condi Rice will next announce Elvis will be appointed as the Ambassador to Lower Slobovia!

Watching The Watchers || President got it wrong on budget cuts for school loans

2006-01-28T04:59:00.000-08:00

Watching The Watchers President got it wrong on budget cuts for school loans

On Monday, the President spoke at Kansas State University, and, unlike in most of his public appearances, he actually let people in the audience ask questions. The White House is, as usual, sufficiently proud of its chief occupant that it put a transcripts of the event on its web site.
You can read through the questions yourself and see that vast majority were of the extremely "soft" type that makes one (me) wonder if they came from people planted in the audience.
Mr. Bush did get one kind of touchy question from the audience on how the government was helping students' futures by cutting the student loan program by $12.7 billion. Unfortunately, it looks like he got his answer wrong.
Here's the full exchange:
Q Hi, I just want to get your comments about education. Recently, $12.7 billion was cut from education, and I was just wondering how that's supposed to help our futures? (Applause.)
THE PRESIDENT: Education budget was cut -- say it again. What was cut?
Q Twelve point seven billion dollars was cut from education, and I was just wondering how is that supposed to help our --
THE PRESIDENT: At the federal level?
Q Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think that -- I don't think we've actually -- for higher education? Student loans?
Q Yes, student loans.
THE PRESIDENT: Actually, I think what we did was reform the student loan program. We're not cutting money out of it. In other words, people aren't going to be cut off the program. We're just making sure it works better. Part of the reconciliation package, I think she's talking about. Yes, it's a reform of the program to make sure it functions better. It is -- in other words, we're not taking people off student loans, we're saving money in the student loan program because it's inefficient. And so I think the thing to look at is whether or not there will be fewer people getting student loans. I don't think so. And, secondly, on Pell grants, we're actually expanding the number of Pell grants through our budget.
But, great question. I think that the key on education is to make sure that we stay focused on how do we stay competitive into the 21st century. And I plan on doing some talking about math and science and engineering programs, so that people who graduate out of college will have the skills necessary to compete in this competitive world.
But I'm -- I think I'm right on this. I'll check when I get back to Washington. But thank you for your question. (Applause.)
Well, here's a little insight on what the budget reconciliation legislation does to student loans, from The Duke University Chronicle, published about 10 days before the President's Kansas speech:
"As one of its first legislative acts of the new year, Congress passed a resolution to slow the growth of federal spending. It aims to do so in part through the reconciliation bill, which will cut government-backed student-loan programs by $12.7 billion. At the same time, however, new student grant programs will be created."...."'Students will pay a slightly higher level of interest [to lenders], but I don't see that as putting additional pressure on the University,' Director of Financial Aid Jim Belvin said. 'I'm not sounding an alarm.'"
"The federal loan cut makes up a third of the total spending-reduction plan, the goal of which is to decrease national deficits by $40 billion.
"Though $21 billion was initially cut from the loan programs, $8 billion was then designated to be reinvested in financial aid."[End Excerpt]
So what happened was they cut about $21 billion from student loans, then transferred about $8 billion of that to other student aid programs, leaving a cut of....$12.7 billion.
Of course, Bush can always hang his hat on his qualification that "I think the thing to look at is whether or not there will be fewer people getting student loans. I don't think so."
That may be true, although it will undoubtedly cost them more to get and to pay back the loans. But that really doesn't answer what the person in the audience asked:
"Recently, $12.7 billion was cut from education, and I was just wondering how that's supposed to help our futures?"
As the president said, it is a good question. He didn't answer it. Let's hope the President took the name of the student who asked the question, so he can correct his answer after he looks it up back in Washington.
If he has time, maybe he can also address why the Senate-House Republican confrerees managed to restore funding that will save an estimated $22 billion for the pharmaceutical industry over the next several years (see the post "Republicans use one-party rule to parcel out the billions").

FOR SOME REASON, BUSH'S HEARING GOES BAD WHEN HE GETS A TOUGH QUESTION

2006-01-28T04:57:00.000-08:00

Cowardly King George seems to suffer from an as yet, unrecognized acoustic disorder. Apparently, when people say positive things about him or his policies, or ask softball questions, he hears just fine, but when asked a question pointing out the utter failure of his policies, or potential legal problems about what he is doing, or his association with Ken Lay, he actually goes legally deaf, or his hearing becomes so poor, he has to ask for a repeat of the question.

A perfect example occurred recently.

From
http://www.nriinternet.com/NRI_EDUCATION/USA/StudentLoan/1_0627.htm
We read :
"During a question-and-answer session with students at Kansas State University, sophomore Tiffany Cooper asked, "Recently, $12.7 billion was cut from education, and I was just wondering, you know, how is that supposed to help our futures?"
"The education budget was cut?" Bush responded. "Say it again. What was cut? At the federal level?"
She repeated the question and clarified that she was referring to student loans.
"Actually," Bush finally said, "I think what we did was reform the student-loan program.
"We're not cutting money out of it. In other words, people aren't going to be cut off the program. We're just making sure it works better."

Hey "Resident Evil" Bush, you might have stepped in a fresh cow pattie on your ranch, because I sure smell a strong scent of BULLSHIT!

Fight them THERE so we don't have to fight them here? BULLSHIT

2005-07-07T04:51:00.000-07:00

For those who advocate the Iraqi War by saying that we need to "Fight Them There So We Don't Have to Fight Them Here"...the attacks in London seem to prove you wrong, don't they!

What is it with Bush and Bicycles...did he fall off the wagon again?

2005-07-07T03:24:00.000-07:00

Bush Says He's Fine After Bike Accident

Thursday July 7, 2005 10:31 AM

AP Photo XGLE102

By TOM RAUM

Associated Press Writer

GLENEAGLES, Scotland (AP) - Fresh bandages on his left hand from a mountain biking accident, President Bush said Thursday he's doing well - and so apparently is the Scottish police officer with whom he collided.

``It just goes to show I should act my age,'' Bush, who turned 59 on Wednesday, joked with reporters.

Bush lost control of his bike Wednesday on a slick stretch of pavement and ran into the local officer, who was on foot, knocking him over.

``When you ride hard on a mountain bike, sometimes you fall. Otherwise, you're not riding hard,'' Bush said.

The spill occurred as Bush was exercising after arriving here to attend a summit of the Group of Eight nations.

Bush, who was wearing a helmet, suffered minor scrapes and bruises to his left hand and arm that required bandages by the White House physician, White House spokesman Scott McClellan said. The officer, a member of the police department of Strathclyde who was on a security detail, was briefly taken to the hospital and suffered a minor ankle injury.

The president said he called the officer's cell phone later Wednesday and talked to him as he was on his way home from the hospital. ``He's doing fine,'' Bush said.

``I was less concerned about myself and more concerned about him,'' Bush said.

Bush said the accident happened after he had been riding for about an hour on the grounds of the golf resort here that is the site of the summit. Bush said he was ``flying'' on his bike. ``The pavement was slick...The bike came out from under me,'' he said.

Bush's bike was damaged, requiring him to ride back to the hotel in a Secret Service vehicle.

But the fall didn't affect the president's schedule. Dressed in a tuxedo and showing no signs of distress, he attended the summit's opening dinner hosted by Queen Elizabeth on Wednesday night.

On Thursday morning, Bush appeared alongside British Prime Minister Tony Blair with flesh-colored bandages on two fingers of his left hand.

``I think I found my limitation,'' the president said.

A year ago, Bush was cut and bruised when he sailed over the handlebars while riding a mountain bike at his Texas ranch.

========Snip===========
And..taking a trip down memory lane..here's another story from
CodeWarriorz Thoughts about another of his bicycle crashes..

Bush's "Accident Proneness" Goes back a while
"Bush Bruised Diving To Avoid Truck "

Now, more recently we remember poor little Georgy almost choking to death on a pretzel, falling off the couch and hitting this head...he fell off his bike and scraped his face and hands up....
and looking back to 1999...
"AUSTIN, Texas –– Gov. George W. Bush, the Republican presidential front-runner, sustained minor injuries to his right leg and hip Monday when he dived to avoid a truck trailer that overturned near his jogging path.
Bush was treated at the scene and later traveled to New Hampshire for a scheduled campaign swing, said Linda Edwards, Bush's press secretary.
Staff Sgt. Roscoe Hughey, a 39-year-old Texas Department of Public Safety agent who was accompanying Bush on a bicycle, received bruises to his left side, DPS spokeswoman Tela Mange said. He was treated at the Brackenridge Hospital emergency room and released about four hours later, said hospital spokeswoman Stephanie Elsea.
Bush was running on the hike-and-bike trail around Town Lake in downtown Austin when the accident occurred about 12:06 p.m, according to Ms. Edwards and the Austin Police Department,
A truck pulling a dumpster-like trailer was traveling on the street that parallels the jogging trail when the trailer overturned. Debris – including chunks of concrete and wood – were dumped across the jogging path.
"We're not clear what made it lose control, but the truck was out of control," Ms. Edwards said.
She said Bush told her the injuries to his right leg and right hip were suffered when he dived to get out of the way. "
============SNIP=================
For a non-drunk, he sures does have a lot of accidents.

Rogues Gallery

2005-07-07T03:11:00.000-07:00

Hit By Friendly Fire

2005-06-28T18:28:00.000-07:00

Hit by friendly fire
With his polls down, Bush takes flak on Iraq from a host of critics--including some in his own party
By Kevin Whitelaw

Nebraska Republican Sen. Chuck Hagel is angry. He's upset about the more than 1,700 U.S. soldiers killed and nearly 13,000 wounded in Iraq. He's also aggravated by the continued string of sunny assessments from the Bush administration, such as Vice President Dick Cheney's recent remark that the insurgency is in its "last throes." "Things aren't getting better; they're getting worse. The White House is completely disconnected from reality," Hagel tells U.S. News. "It's like they're just making it up as they go along. The reality is that we're losing in Iraq."

That's strikingly blunt talk from a member of the president's party, even one cast as something of a pariah in the GOP because of his early skepticism about the war. "I got beat up pretty good by my own party and the White House that I was not a loyal Republican," he says. Today, he notes, things are changing: "More and more of my colleagues up here are concerned."

Indeed, there are signs that the politics of the Iraq war are being reshaped by the continuing tide of bad news. Take this month in Iraq, with 47 U.S. troops killed in the first 15 days. That's already five more than the toll for the entire month of June last year. With the rate of insurgent attacks near an all-time high and the war's cost set to top $230 billion, more politicians on both sides of the aisle are responding to opinion polls that show a growing number of Americans favoring a withdrawal from Iraq. Republican Sens. Lincoln Chafee and Lindsey Graham have voiced their concerns. And two Republicans, including the congressman who brought "freedom fries" to the Capitol, even joined a pair of Democratic colleagues in sponsoring a bill calling for a troop withdrawal plan to be drawn up by year's end. "I feel confident that the opposition is going to build," says Rep. Ron Paul, the other Republican sponsor and a longtime opponent of the war.

Sagging polls. The measure is not likely to go anywhere, but Hagel calls it "a major crack in the dike." Whether or not that's so, the White House has reason to worry that the assortment of critiques of Bush's wartime performance may be approaching a tipping point. Only 41 percent of Americans now support Bush's handling of the Iraq war, the lowest mark ever in the Associated Press-Ipsos poll. And the Iraq news has combined with a lethargic economy and doubts about the president's Social Security proposals to push Bush's overall approval ratings near all-time lows. For now, most Republicans remain publicly loyal to the White House. "Why would you give your enemies a timetable?" asks House Majority Leader Tom DeLay. "[Bush] doesn't fight the war on news articles or television or on polls."

Still, the Bush administration is planning to hit back, starting this week, with a renewed public-relations push by the president. Bush will host Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari and has scheduled a major speech for June 28, the anniversary of the handover of power to an Iraqi government from U.S. authorities. But Congress's patience could wear very thin going into an election year. "If things don't start to turn around in six months, then it may be too late," says Hagel. "I think it's that serious."

Bush's exit strategy--which depends on a successful Iraqi political process--got a boost last week when Sunni and Shiite politicians ended weeks of wrangling over how to increase Sunni representation on the constitution-writing committee. Now, however, committee members have less than two months before their mid-August deadline. And given how long it took to resolve who gets to draft the document, it's hard to imagine a quick accord on the politically explosive issues they face.

Congressman Gets U.S. Document Subpoena

2005-06-28T17:12:00.000-07:00

Congressman Gets U.S. Document Subpoena
==SNIP-------
Na Na Na Na Boo Boo!

Plane Crash Kills Wal-Mart Heir - GOD HAS SPOKEN

2005-06-27T20:37:00.000-07:00

Plane Crash Kills Wal-Mart Heir - New York Times
John Walton, a son of the Wal-Mart Stores Inc. founder, Sam Walton, died in a plane crash near Jackson Hole Airport in Wyoming yesterday.

Mr. Walton, 58, was the only person aboard an ultralight aircraft when it crashed about 1:20 p.m., Wal-Mart said in a statement.

Mr. Walton, listed in Forbes magazine in March as the world's 11th-richest person, with a net worth of $18.2 billion, had been a Wal-Mart board member since 1992 and was chairman of the holding company True North Partners, based in Bentonville, Ark., Wal-Mart said in the statement.

Mr. Walton was also chairman of the Walton Family Foundation, which donated at least $700 million to education-related causes from 1998 to 2004, USA Today reported last year.

In 1998, Mr. Walton; Ted Forstmann, a co-founder of Forstmann Little & Company; and Michael Ovitz, former president of the Walt Disney Company, created a $200 million scholarship fund to help low-income students attend private and parochial schools in New York, Los Angeles, Washington and Chicago.

A member of the Green Berets during the Vietnam War, Mr. Walton was awarded the Silver Star for saving members of his unit, Wal-Mart said.

Mr. Walton, Sam Walton's second-oldest son, worked as a crop duster and a boat builder before founding True North, Wal-Mart said. He was married and had one son, the company said.

The cause of the crash has not been determined, Wal-Mart said in the statement. A Wal-Mart spokesman, Marty Heires, declined to comment beyond the statement.

CBC Arts: Geldof defends Bush's Africa policy

2005-06-26T07:47:00.000-07:00

CBC Arts: Geldof defends Bush's Africa policy
George W. Bush has done more to help Africa than other U.S. presidents, says Live 8 organizer Bob Geldof.

Geldof made the comment in an interview in the current issue of Time magazine. The Irish rocker was relating how he had to defend Bush while he was in France.

Bob Geldof (AP photo)
"[The French] refuse to accept, because of their political ideology, that he has actually done more than any American president for Africa. But it's empirically so," Geldof said.

The interview, which also included U2 lead singer Bono and Four Weddings and a Funeral screenwriter Richard Curtis, appears as organizers rush to finalize the details of Live 8, a series of concerts being held around the world on July 2.

The goal of the event is to put pressure on the leaders of the G8 nations, who are meeting in Scotland from July 6 to 8, to help poor African nations.

The lineup and venue for the Canadian edition of Live 8 will be unveiled at a press conference on Tuesday.

RELATED STORY: Venue for Canada's Live 8 concert still unconfirmed

Geldof reveals in the interview that he was initially reluctant to help spearhead Live 8 because he thinks 1985's Live Aid can't be topped.

"Not to be immodest, but the first one was perfect in almost every sense," he said.

"Artistically, people seemed to up the ante, and the performances were pretty great across the board. Huge amounts of money were raised, not a penny lost, and politically it elevated the issue onto the global table. The whole thing just worked, unbelievably."

FROM THE ARCHIVES: Banding Together: Singing Out for Disaster Relief

However, the former leader of the Boomtown Rats says he finally gave in and agreed to stage the concerts after being pressured by Bono and Curtis, two close friends.

Geldof was also asked how he is paying for the concerts, to which admittance is free.

"The funding? It's a massive risk. In the U.K. we raised a lot of it from a text-message ticket lottery. I raised $5 million through an underwriting loan. We did an auction of the DVD rights. You find a way," he explained.

Time asked Geldof about the criticism from some corners about the predominantly white lineup for the concerts. Geldof defended his decision to recruit the likes of Pink Floyd, Coldplay, Paul McCartney, Joss Stone and Madonna, saying he picks performers based on how many fans they have.

Geldof said he is also campaigning to have Pope Benedict involved in some way in Live 8, and Bono added that he thinks Bush can make a huge contribution.

"He feels he's already doubled and tripled aid to Africa, which he has. But he started from far too low a place," the U2 frontman said.

"He can stand there and say he paid at the office already. He shouldn't, because he'll be left out of the history books. But it's hard for him because of the expense of the war and the debts. But I have a hunch that he will step forward with something."

Alaska Native and Native American Issues - ENewsBlog

2005-06-26T07:18:00.000-07:00

Alaska Native and Native American Issues - ENewsBlog
All Tribes Energy Alliance2005-06-26 06:24:37
Link

WHEREAS, we, the members of the National Congress of American Indians of the United States, invoking the divine blessing of the Creator upon our efforts and purposes, in order to preserve for ourselves and our descendants the inherent sovereign rights of our Indian nations, all rights secured under Indian treaties and agreements with the United States, and all other rights and benefits to which we are entitled under the laws and Constitution of the United States to enlighten the public toward a better understanding of the Indian people, to preserve Indian cultural values, and otherwise promote the welfare of the Indian people, do hereby establish and submit the following resolution; and

WHEREAS, the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) is the oldest and largest national organization established in 1944 and comprised of representatives of and advocates for national, regional, and local Tribal concerns; and

WHEREAS, the health, safety, welfare, education, economic and employment opportunity, and preservation of cultural and natural resources are primary goals and objectives of NCAI; and

WHEREAS, that all of the Tribes across America combine their efforts in alternative energy and regionalize opportunities to become the next energy supplier for all of America; an

Whereas, the Tribes fully exploit all the technologies available in the Alternative Energy Field including: solar, wind, wave, falling water, and/or biomass waste resources for all of the Tribes to achieve sustainable energy independence; and

Whereas, the Tribes give full consideration in establishing All Tribes Energy Alliance regionalizing by different areas of Indian Country; pooling their resources available exploiting solar, wind, wave, falling water, and/or biomass waste resources to not only met Tribes’ energy needs but have the ability to supply neighbors surrounding the reservations; and

Whereas, the Tribes rapidly become educated on the declining fossil fuel of America which uses 25% of the world’s oil and America’s current economy drains their natural resources and pollutes the environment. Tribes can be in the center of commerce of America and every Tribe has solar ability, wind power, some tribes near the ocean, tribes have falling water and/or have available biomass waste that can convert into energy; and

Whereas, the Tribes realize that the future of Energy can be the future of a new tribal economy and combing forming regional setting of developing energy it can and will bring prosperity and in our life time we can eliminate poverty, improve our quality of life and bring us into prosperity; and

Whereas, the Tribes form the All Tribes Energy Alliance, partnership with their Tribal Colleges and high schools to establish curriculum that full addresses energy needs and start on the path of developing tribal expertise within the Alternative Energy fields; and

Whereas, the Tribes launch this endeavor at the earliest possible time for America’s Energy Crisis can become a prosperous opportunity for Tribes to launch new tribal energy economy for America is busy at war and opportune time to establish the Tribes in becoming Energy Suppliers to all of America and their energy needs.

NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, NCAI supports this resolution for it addresses the national, regional and local goals and objectives of the Tribes and it brings great prosperity becoming and establishing Alternative Energy projects across all of Indian Country.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that NCAI requests unanimous support for this resolution for it brings new tribal economies that meet and exceed our tribal goals and fulfills tribal self-determination to a new level of empowering Tribes.

BE IT FINALLY RESOLVED, NCAI calls upon the Tribes to become more aware of the Energy Crisis of America and how the Tribes through alternative energy projects by can become major Energy Supplier for America. Also, readily available technology in this Alternative Energy Field with such opportunities as transfer of knowledge and know-how with potential to form Tribal International Renewable Resource Centers which can provide Tribes with Technical Assistance, Training, with capacity to have business incubator with recommendations on potential industrial opportunities with by-products and durable goods that replaces steel, aluminum and copper.

CERTIFICATION

The foregoing resolution was adopted at ___________________________________the National Congress of American Indians, held at ________________________________________________with a quorum present.

_____________________________________

President

ATTEST:

_________________________Recording Secretary

Adopted by ______________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

All Tribes Alternative Energy Alliance

Mission Statement

All Tribes Alternative Energy’s vision is to be recognized, both nationally and worldwide, as a center of excellence providing support for the development and growth of The Tribes renewable and sustainable energy industries.

Mission

To assist the development of the Tribal sustainable energy industry through standards development, equipment testing, research and development, demonstration, education, training and policy analysis. Educating on the availability of existing technologies in the alternative energy field. Create more awareness of the opportunities to become major energy suppliers for all of America. Work with existing Native Organizations in the Energy field or friend non-native companies already established and willing to work with the Tribes.

All Tribes Energy Alliance Education and Policy

Overview

Through the Tribal International Renewable Resource Centers - All Tribes Energy Alliance Education and Policy program provides education and training in renewable energy and sustainable energy at all levels, including short courses, award courses, and information dissemination. It also provides policy analysis and market research services.

The program seeks to continue and expand on the nationally and internationally recognized work that was previously undertaken by the Tribal International Renewable Resource Center in the areas of education and policy, complimentary to the covered by the training and professional development activities of the Center. A wide range of areas related to sustainable energy and greenhouse gas abatement are covered by the Energy program and include:

grid integrated/connected renewable energy systems, devices, components and related issues;

energy efficiency and energy management in industry, transport and residential and commercial buildings;

greenhouse gas auditing, abatement and trading, as related to energy;

stationary and transport uses of fuel cells, alternative transport fuels, hydrogen-energy systems and the Hydrogen Economy; and

implementation of sustainable energy solutions in developing countries.

Tribal economic feasibility demonstrations of energy and materials production from renewable resources;

Establish regional Tribal Renewable Resource Centers across all of Indian Country with capabilities of establishing regional Renewable Resource Parks on tribal lands.

Establish regional technology transfer centers of the Tribal International Renewable Resources Centers with ability to launch new tribal ventures that provide goods and services to support tribal achievements of sustainable-resources with tribal wealth-expanding, economies.

Education Program

The Education component of the All Tribes Energy Alliance Program has four areas of work/activity:

Short courses and professional development;

Partnership with Tribal Schools and community outreach;

Partnership with Tribal Schools and Education; and

Provide Tribes Technical Assistance and Further Education in the Alternative Energy field.

Policy Program

The Policy component of the All Tribes Energy Alliance program seeks to provide independent tribal policies formulation and analysis, as well as tribal market research in the areas covered by All Tribes Energy Alliance , with emphasis on all of Indian Country perspectives. It will provide support, as resources permit, to Tribal industries, Tribal communities and different levels of partnerships and launching new Tribal Ventures.. It will actively seek to be part of, and interact with, other interstate and national policy initiatives and groups as required.

Technical and Further Education

As interest in renewable energy technologies increases, both nationally and internationally, there is a need for a strong network of trained installers to meet the demand from customers.

All Tribes Energy Alliance , in conjunction with leading Technical and Further Education tribal colleges institutions and other universities willing to establish a partnership with this endeavor, is seeking to address this issue through the development and delivery of materials and of courses at level related to the areas covered by the All Tribes Energy Alliance programs and future programs developed as need arises.

Community Education

All Tribes Energy Alliance has a strong commitment to school & community education. Schools can access free of charge teaching resources as well as information on renewable energy sources & technologies at the dedicated schools website. All Tribes Energy Alliance also presents workshops for schools and community groups on renewable energy, energy efficiency and greenhouse issues. Some of the activities in this area include:

Development of web-based and printed information related to the areas covered by the All Tribes Energy programs;

Regular, ad hoc, seminars in areas covered by the All Tribes Energy Alliance programs;

Development of resources for use in all Native American schools on renewable energy, energy efficiency, the hydrogen economy/fuel cells and greenhouse gas issues;

Development and offering of Schools workshops and activities on renewable energy, energy efficiency and greenhouse gas issues;

Assist the implementation of the Certificate I in Renewable Energy in High School in All of Indian Country Schools.

"AND WE WON'T BE B ACK 'TIL IT''S OVER, OVER THERE"

2005-06-26T06:48:00.000-07:00

During World War II, there was a song that was song by Americans, that had as part of its lyrics, the refrain "...And, we won't be back 'til it's over over there."

I pray that people in this country DO NOT feel that this is the mission we will impose on our proud sons and daughters, husbands and wives, brothers and sisters who currently are "in country" in Afghanistan and Iraq. WHY?

Because, when you are dealing with relgions as old as Christianity, and Islam, we are talking ahout centuries of discord that trace their history back before the Crusades.

This article/ editorial was generated by a man who called into the Washington Journal program put on by C-Span, in which he said that part of the problem was letting troops rotate in and out of Iraq. His solution was to put them there and not let them come back until it is over, echoing the "We won't be back 'til it's over over there." He also said we must resume the draft.

He must not actually KNOW anyone who has been in Iraq. I know guys that have been there, one has been two times...they beleive it is time to bring ALL the troops home, NOW, as do I.

Bush and his cadre say there is no timetable to bring people home.

That is an openended commitment to continue the slaughter of our young men and women, and FOR NO REASON.

This is NOT WWII, and there is no flag to take. This is a religious, fundamentalist war, and involves people who are stirred up by rhetoric similar to the rhetoric that inspired us during WWII , and ironically, also spurred the Nazi troops...i.e.,
"For God and Country". Xenophobia, patriotism, and religion are volatile components of a mixture that is emotion driven, and not logical.

It is a mutually accepted race to destruction.

Bring the Troops Home, NOW!

~CodeWarriorz Thoughts

With our economy in the trash, and our men and women dying in Iraq...why is this ASSHOLE laughing?

2005-06-25T07:56:00.000-07:00

Doing the "Gavel Walk"- by Sensen Baby

2005-06-18T08:29:00.000-07:00

Big F'ing BABY Sensenbrenner takes his toy gavel and runs home to cry to Mommy that the big bad Democrats asked to many "hard questions".

BIG F'ING BABY

police state

2005-05-24T18:10:00.000-07:00

Capitol Hill Blue: Police State

Police State
By DAN K. THOMASSON
May 24, 2005, 07:12
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Some really scary things are happening around here these days.
Congress has become a place of great incivility and rancor, which threaten to undermine any hope of legislative remedy to a myriad of problems, from Social Security to soaring health-care costs to immigration to a steadily crumbling manufacturing base once the envy of the world.

But perhaps the most frightening prospect for Americans is an unfettered national police force with the sole discretion to determine who can be investigated as a potential terrorist. That's the impact of little-known proposals to greatly expand the powers of the FBI, permitting its agents to seize business records without a warrant and to track the mail of those in terrorist inquiries without regard to Postal Service concerns.

Because the government can label almost any group or individual a terrorist threat, the potential for abuse by not having to show probable cause is enormous, prompting civil libertarians to correctly speculate about who will guard against the guardians. Up until now the answer was the Constitution as interpreted by the judiciary. But it is clear that sidestepping any such restriction is the real and present danger of the post-9-11 era.

A wise man, the late Sen. John Williams of Delaware, once counseled that any proposed legislation should be regarded in the light of its worst potential consequence, particularly when it came to laws that enhance the investigative and prosecutorial powers of the government at the expense of civil rights. This is most likely to occur in times of national stress, when the Constitution is always vulnerable to assault _ i.e., the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. The scenario Williams warned about runs something like this.

You are innocently standing on a street corner waiting to cross when you are approached by a complete stranger who politely, but in a low voice, asks directions to a certain address or area. You, of course, are utterly unaware that the person is under surveillance in a terrorist investigation. You respond in a friendly manner. And although the exchange takes only a few seconds, it is enough to make those following the suspect curious about you. You are identified and a background check reveals that you or your spouse has a relative of Middle Eastern extraction or that you recently traveled to a Middle Eastern country or that you contributed to a charity bazaar sponsored by a church or group under suspicion of passing money through to a terrorist cause.

Suddenly, you are caught in a major inquiry, your personal business records are seized and your mail is tracked. It doesn't take long for your friends and neighbors to learn that you are being investigated, and the result of that is predictable. You and your family are shunned. Your business begins to dwindle and before the nightmare has ended, which can take months, your life is in shambles. The truth never catches up with the fiction and the bureau, which has difficulty in saying the word "sorry," leaves you high and dry, twisting slowly in the wind.

Think it can't happen that way? Well, it does all the time. Ask the lawyer in Oregon whom the FBI misidentified as having taken part in the terrorist bombing of the Spanish railway. Ask any number of persons since Sept. 11, 2001, arrested and detained for months without charges or counsel before they were released.

If that isn't enough to satisfy you about the inadvisability of these proposals, think back to the Cold War days when the most casual acquaintance with a group or person on J. Edgar Hoover's anti-communist watch list could land one in water hot enough to make life miserable for a long time _ maybe even put him or her on one of the infamous blacklists.

If you weren't around in those times, read about them. One thing you will learn quickly is that the sole determination of who or what had communist inclinations belonged to the FBI. Even then, however, Congress was smart enough not to rescind the checks and balances that protect our civil liberties. Federal law-enforcement officers outside the FBI have complained of late about the bureau's penchant for seizing jurisdiction over almost any crime by relating it to terrorism.

Both of these over-reactive proposals are as fearsome as the threat of another al Qaeda attack, for they accomplish the same thing: the intrusion on and disruption of the rights of Americans. Like portions of the Patriot Act, which are rightly being challenged by conservatives as well as liberals, they are medicine worse than the cancer.

Lemme Get this Straight- Scientists say the South Korean stem cell research will help folks and Bush condemns it?

2005-05-21T22:56:00.000-07:00

OK..JUST WANTED TO BE CLEAR ON THAT...SCIENCE IS "BAD...BAD"...ACCORDING TO THAT ASS CLOWN BUSHY....AND IF IT HELPS PEOPLE...HE MUST CONDEMN IT. OK...I JUST WANTED TO GET ALL THIS STRAIGHT FOR THE RECORD.

BILL MOYERS SPEAKS OUT

2005-05-21T07:24:00.000-07:00

Moyers Addresses PBS Coup

By Bill Moyers, AlterNet. Posted May 17, 2005.

In this highly anticipated speech the veteran public broadcaster takes on the PBS coup and its right-wing engineers who are 'squealing like a stuck pig.'

I can't imagine better company on this beautiful Sunday morning in St. Louis. You're church for me today, and there's no congregation in the country where I would be more likely to find more kindred souls than are gathered here.

There are so many different vocations and callings in this room -- so many different interests and aspirations of people who want to reform the media -- that only a presiding bishop like Bob McChesney with his great ecumenical heart could bring us together for a weekend like this.

What joins us all under Bob's embracing welcome is our commitment to public media. Pat Aufderheide got it right, I think, in the recent issue of In These Times when she wrote: "This is a moment when public media outlets can make a powerful case for themselves. Public radio, public TV, cable access, public DBS channels, media arts centers, youth media projects, nonprofit Internet news services ... low-power radio and webcasting are all part of a nearly invisible feature of today's media map: the public media sector. They exist not to make a profit, not to push an ideology, not to serve customers, but to create a public -- a group of people who can talk productively with those who don't share their views, and defend the interests of the people who have to live with the consequences of corporate and governmental power."

She gives examples of the possibilities. "Look at what happened," she said, "when thousands of people who watched Stanley Nelson's The Murder of Emmett Till on their public television channels joined a postcard campaign that re-opened the murder case after more than half a century. Look at NPR's courageous coverage of the Iraq war, an expensive endeavor that wins no points from this administration. Look at Chicago Access Network's Community Forum, where nonprofits throughout the region can showcase their issues and find volunteers."

The public media, she argues, for all our flaws, are a very important resource in a noisy and polluted information environment.

You can also take wings reading Jason Miller's May 4 article on Z Net about the mainstream media. While it is true that much of the mainstream media is corrupted by the influence of government and corporate interests, Miller writes, there are still men and women in the mainstream who practice a high degree of journalistic integrity and who do challenge us with their stories and analysis.

But the real hope "lies within the internet with its 2 billion or more Web sites providing a wealth of information drawn from almost unlimited resources that span the globe. ... If knowledge is power, one's capacity to increase that power increases exponentially through navigation of the Internet for news and information."

Surely this is one issue that unites us as we leave here today. The fight to preserve the web from corporate gatekeepers joins media, reformers, producers and educators -- and it's a fight that has only just begun.

I want to tell you about another fight we're in today. The story I've come to share with you goes to the core of our belief that the quality of democracy and the quality of journalism are deeply entwined. I can tell this story because I've been living it. It's been in the news this week, including reports of more attacks on a single journalist -- yours truly -- by the right-wing media and their allies at the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.

As some of you know, CPB was established almost 40 years ago to set broad policy for public broadcasting and to be a firewall between political influence and program content. What some on this board are now doing today -- led by its chairman, Kenneth Tomlinson -- is too important, too disturbing and yes, even too dangerous for a gathering like this not to address.

We're seeing unfold a contemporary example of the age-old ambition of power and ideology to squelch and punish journalists who tell the stories that make princes and priests uncomfortable.

Let me assure you that I take in stride attacks by the radical right-wingers who have not given up demonizing me although I retired over six months ago. They've been after me for years now, and I suspect they will be stomping on my grave to make sure I don't come back from the dead.

I should remind them, however, that one of our boys pulled it off some 2,000 years ago -- after the Pharisees, Sadducees and Caesar's surrogates thought they had shut him up for good. Of course I won't be expecting that kind of miracle, but I should put my detractors on notice: They might just compel me out of the rocking chair and back into the anchor chair.

Who are they? I mean the people obsessed with control, using the government to threaten and intimidate. I mean the people who are hollowing out middle-class security even as they enlist the sons and daughters of the working class in a war to make sure Ahmed Chalabi winds up controlling Iraq's oil. I mean the people who turn faith-based initiatives into a slush fund and who encourage the pious to look heavenward and pray so as not to see the long arm of privilege and power picking their pockets. I mean the people who squelch free speech in an effort to obliterate dissent and consolidate their orthodoxy into the official view of reality from which any deviation becomes unpatriotic heresy.

That's who I mean. And if that's editorializing, so be it. A free press is one where it's OK to state the conclusion you're led to by the evidence.

One reason I'm in hot water is because my colleagues and I at NOW didn't play by the conventional rules of Beltway journalism. Those rules divide the world into Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, and allow journalists to pretend they have done their job if, instead of reporting the truth behind the news, they merely give each side an opportunity to spin the news.

Jonathan Mermin writes about this in a recent essay in World Policy Journal. (You'll also want to read his book Debating War and Peace, Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era.)

Mermin quotes David Ignatius of The Washington Post on why the deep interests of the American public are so poorly served by Beltway journalism. The "rules of our game," says Ignatius, "make it hard for us to tee up an issue ... without a news peg." He offers a case in point: the debacle of America's occupation of Iraq. "If senator so and so hasn't criticized postwar planning for Iraq," says Ignatius, "then it's hard for a reporter to write a story about that."

Mermin also quotes public television's Jim Lehrer acknowledging that unless an official says something is so, it isn't news. Why were journalists not discussing the occupation of Iraq? Because, says Lehrer, "the word occupation ... was never mentioned in the run-up to the war." Washington talked about the invasion as "a war of liberation, not a war of occupation, so as a consequence, "those of us in journalism never even looked at the issue of occupation."

"In other words," says Jonathan Mermin, "if the government isn't talking about it, we don't report it." He concludes: "[Lehrer's] somewhat jarring declaration, one of many recent admissions by journalists that their reporting failed to prepare the public for the calamitous occupation that has followed the 'liberation' of Iraq, reveals just how far the actual practice of American journalism has deviated from the First Amendment ideal of a press that is independent of the government."

Take the example (also cited by Mermin) of Charles J. Hanley. Hanley is a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for the Associated Press, whose fall 2003 story on the torture of Iraqis in American prisons -- before a U.S. Army report and photographs documenting the abuse surfaced -- was ignored by major American newspapers. Hanley attributes this lack of interest to the fact that "it was not an officially sanctioned story that begins with a handout from an official source."

Furthermore, Iraqis recounting their own personal experience of Abu Ghraib simply did not have the credibility with Beltway journalists of American officials denying that such things happened. Judith Miller of The New York Times, among others, relied on the credibility of official but unnamed sources when she served essentially as the government stenographer for claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.

These "rules of the game" permit Washington officials to set the agenda for journalism, leaving the press all too often simply to recount what officials say instead of subjecting their words and deeds to critical scrutiny. Instead of acting as filters for readers and viewers, sifting the truth from the propaganda, reporters and anchors attentively transcribe both sides of the spin invariably failing to provide context, background or any sense of which claims hold up and which are misleading.

I decided long ago that this wasn't healthy for democracy. I came to see that "news is what people want to keep hidden and everything else is publicity." In my documentaries -- whether on the Watergate scandals 30 years ago or the Iran-Contra conspiracy 20 years ago or Bill Clinton's fundraising scandals 10 years ago or, five years ago, the chemical industry's long and despicable cover-up of its cynical and unspeakable withholding of critical data about its toxic products from its workers, I realized that investigative journalism could not be a collaboration between the journalist and the subject. Objectivity is not satisfied by two opposing people offering competing opinions, leaving the viewer to split the difference.

I came to believe that objective journalism means describing the object being reported on, including the little fibs and fantasies as well as the Big Lie of the people in power. In no way does this permit journalists to make accusations and allegations. It means, instead, making sure that your reporting and your conclusions can be nailed to the post with confirming evidence.

This is always hard to do, but it has never been harder than today. Without a trace of irony, the powers-that-be have appropriated the newspeak vernacular of George Orwell's 1984. They give us a program vowing "No Child Left Behind," while cutting funds for educating disadvantaged kids. They give us legislation cheerily calling for "Clear Skies" and "Healthy Forests" that give us neither. And that's just for starters.

In Orwell's 1984, the character Syme, one of the writers of that totalitarian society's dictionary, explains to the protagonist Winston, "Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought? Has it ever occurred to you, Winston, that by the year 2050, at the very latest, not a single human being will be alive who could understand such a conversation as we are having now? The whole climate of thought will be different. In fact there will be no thought, as we understand it now. Orthodoxy means not thinking -- not needing to think. Orthodoxy is unconsciousness."

An unconscious people, an indoctrinated people, a people fed only on partisan information and opinion that confirm their own bias, a people made morbidly obese in mind and spirit by the junk food of propaganda, is less inclined to put up a fight, to ask questions and be skeptical. That kind of orthodoxy can kill a democracy -- or worse.

I learned about this the hard way. I grew up in the South, where the truth about slavery, race, and segregation had been driven from the pulpits, driven from the classrooms and driven from the newsrooms. It took a bloody Civil War to bring the truth home, and then it took another hundred years for the truth to make us free.

Then I served in the Johnson administration. Imbued with Cold War orthodoxy and confident that "might makes right," we circled the wagons, listened only to each other, and pursued policies the evidence couldn't carry. The results were devastating for Vietnamese and Americans.

I brought all of this to the task when PBS asked me after 9/11 to start a new weekly broadcast. They wanted us to make it different from anything else on the air -- commercial or public broadcasting. They asked us to tell stories no one else was reporting and to offer a venue to people who might not otherwise be heard.

That wasn't a hard sell. I had been deeply impressed by studies published in leading peer-reviewed scholarly journals by a team of researchers led by Vassar College sociologist William Hoynes. Extensive research on the content of public television over a decade found that political discussions on our public affairs programs generally included a limited set of voices that offer a narrow range of perspectives on current issues and events.

Instead of far-ranging discussions and debates, the kind that might engage viewers as citizens, not simply as audiences, this research found that public affairs programs on PBS stations were populated by the standard set of elite news sources. Whether government officials and Washington journalists (talking about political strategy) or corporate sources (talking about stock prices or the economy from the investor's viewpoint), public television, unfortunately, all too often was offering the same kind of discussions, and a similar brand of insider discourse, that is featured regularly on commercial television.

Who didn't appear was also revealing. Hoynes and his team found that in contrast to the conservative mantra that public television routinely featured the voices of anti-establishment critics, "alternative perspectives were rare on public television and were effectively drowned out by the stream of government and corporate views that represented the vast majority of sources on our broadcasts."

The so-called experts who got most of the face time came primarily from mainstream news organizations and Washington think tanks rather than diverse interests. Economic news, for example, was almost entirely refracted through the views of business people, investors and business journalists. Voices outside the corporate/Wall Street universe -- nonprofessional workers, labor representatives, consumer advocates and the general public were rarely heard. In sum, these two studies concluded, the economic coverage was so narrow that the views and the activities of most citizens became irrelevant.

All this went against the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 that created the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. I know. I was there. As a young policy assistant to President Johnson, I attended my first meeting to discuss the future of public broadcasting in 1964 in the office of the Commissioner of Education. I know firsthand that the Public Broadcasting Act was meant to provide an alternative to commercial television and to reflect the diversity of the American people.

This, too, was on my mind when we assembled the team for NOW. It was just after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. We agreed on two priorities. First, we wanted to do our part to keep the conversation of democracy going. That meant talking to a wide range of people across the spectrum -- left, right and center.

It meant poets, philosophers, politicians, scientists, sages and scribblers. It meant Isabel Allende, the novelist, and Amity Shlaes, the columnist for the Financial Times. It meant the former nun and best-selling author Karen Armstrong, and it meant the right-wing evangelical columnist Cal Thomas. It meant Arundhati Roy from India, Doris Lessing from London, David Suzuki from Canada, and Bernard Henry-Levi from Paris. It also meant two successive editors of the Wall Street Journal, Robert Bartley and Paul Gigot, the editor of The Economist, Bill Emmott, The Nation's Katrina vanden Heuvel and the L.A. Weekly's John Powers.

It means liberals like Frank Wu, Ossie Davis and Gregory Nava, and conservatives like Frank Gaffney, Grover Norquist, and Richard Viguerie. It meant Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Bishop Wilton Gregory of the Catholic Bishops conference in this country. It meant the conservative Christian activist and lobbyist, Ralph Reed, and the dissident Catholic Sister Joan Chittister. We threw the conversation of democracy open to all comers.

Most of those who came responded the same way that Ron Paul, the Republican and Libertarian congressman from Texas, did when he wrote me after his appearance, "I have received hundreds of positive e-mails from your viewers. I appreciate the format of your program, which allows time for a full discussion of ideas. ... I'm tired of political shows featuring two guests shouting over each other and offering the same arguments. ... NOW was truly refreshing."

Hold your applause because that's not the point of the story. We had a second priority. We intended to do strong, honest and accurate reporting, telling stories we knew people in high places wouldn't like.

I told our producers and correspondents that in our field reporting our job was to get as close as possible to the verifiable truth. This was all the more imperative in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. America could be entering a long war against an elusive and stateless enemy with no definable measure of victory and no limit to its duration, cost or foreboding fear. The rise of a homeland security state meant government could justify extraordinary measures in exchange for protecting citizens against unnamed, even unproven, threats.

Furthermore, increased spending during a national emergency can produce a spectacle of corruption behind a smokescreen of secrecy. I reminded our team of the words of the news photographer in Tom Stoppard's play who said, "People do terrible things to each other, but it's worse when everyone is kept in the dark."

I also reminded them of how the correspondent and historian Richard Reeves answered a student who asked him to define real news. "Real news," Reeves responded, "is the news you and I need to keep our freedoms."

For these reasons and in that spirit, we went about reporting on Washington as no one else in broadcasting -- except occasionally 60 Minutes -- was doing. We reported on the expansion of the Justice Department's power of surveillance. We reported on the escalating Pentagon budget and expensive weapons that didn't work. We reported on how campaign contributions influenced legislation and policy to skew resources to the comfortable and well-connected while our troops were fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq with inadequate training and armor. We reported on how the Bush administration was shredding the Freedom of Information Act. We went around the country to report on how closed-door, backroom deals in Washington were costing ordinary workers and tax payers their livelihood and security. We reported on offshore tax havens that enable wealthy and powerful Americans to avoid their fair share of national security and the social contract.

And always -- because what people know depends on who owns the press -- we kept coming back to the media business itself, to how mega media corporations were pushing journalism further and further down the hierarchy of values, how giant radio cartels were silencing critics while shutting communities off from essential information, and how the mega media companies were lobbying the FCC for the right to grow ever more powerful.

The broadcast caught on. Our ratings grew every year. There was even a spell when we were the only public affairs broadcast on PBS whose audience was going up instead of down.

Our journalistic peers took notice. The Los Angeles Times said, "NOW's team of reporters has regularly put the rest of the media to shame, pursuing stories few others bother to touch."

The Philadelphia Inquirer said our segments on the sciences, the arts, politics and the economy were "provocative public television at its best."

The Austin American-Statesman called NOW, "the perfect antidote to today's high pitched decibel level, a smart, calm, timely news program."

Frazier Moore of the Associated Press said we were hard-edged when appropriate but never "Hardball." "Don't expect combat. Civility reigns."

And the Baton Rouge Advocate said, "NOW invites viewers to consider the deeper implication of the daily headlines," drawing on "a wide range of viewpoints which transcend the typical labels of the political left or right."

Let me repeat that: NOW draws on "a wide range of viewpoints which transcend the typical labels of the political left or right."

The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 had been prophetic. Open public television to the American people -- offer diverse interests, ideas and voices ... be fearless in your belief in democracy -- and they will come.

Hold your applause -- that's not the point of the story.

The point of the story is something only a handful of our team, including my wife and partner Judith Davidson Moyers, and I knew at the time -- that the success of NOW's journalism was creating a backlash in Washington.

The more compelling our journalism, the angrier the radical right of the Republican Party became. That's because the one thing they loathe more than liberals is the truth. And the quickest way to be damned by them as liberal is to tell the truth.

This is the point of my story: Ideologues don't want you to go beyond the typical labels of left and right. They embrace a world view that can't be proven wrong because they will admit no evidence to the contrary. They want your reporting to validate their belief system and when it doesn't, God forbid.

Never mind that their own stars were getting a fair shake on NOW: Gigot, Viguerie, David Keene of the American Conservative Union, Stephen Moore, then with the Club for Growth, and others. No, our reporting was giving the radical right fits because it wasn't the party line. It wasn't that we were getting it wrong. Only three times in three years did we err factually, and in each case we corrected those errors as soon as we confirmed their inaccuracy. The problem was that we were telling stories that partisans in power didn't want told ... we were getting it right, not right-wing.

I've always thought the American eagle needed a left wing and a right wing. The right wing would see to it that economic interests had their legitimate concerns addressed. The left wing would see to it that ordinary people were included in the bargain. Both would keep the great bird on course. But with two right wings or two left wings, it's no longer an eagle and it's going to crash.

My occasional commentaries got to them as well. Although apparently he never watched the broadcast (I guess he couldn't take the diversity), Sen. Trent Lott came out squealing like a stuck pig when after the midterm elections in 2002 I described what was likely to happen now that all three branches of government were about to be controlled by one party dominated by the religious, corporate and political right.

Instead of congratulating the winners for their election victory as some network broadcasters had done -- or celebrating their victory as Fox, the Washington Times, The Weekly Standard, talk radio and other partisan Republican journalists had done -- I provided a little independent analysis of what the victory meant. And I did it the old-fashioned way: I looked at the record, took the winners at their word, and drew the logical conclusion that they would use power as they always said they would. And I set forth this conclusion in my usual modest Texas way.

Events since then have confirmed the accuracy of what I said, but, to repeat, being right is exactly what the right doesn't want journalists to be.

Strange things began to happen. Friends in Washington called to say that they had heard of muttered threats that the PBS reauthorization would be held off "unless Moyers is dealt with." The chairman of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Kenneth Tomlinson, was said to be quite agitated. Apparently there was apoplexy in the right-wing aerie when I closed the broadcast one Friday night by putting an American flag in my lapel and said - well, here's exactly what I said:

"I wore my flag tonight. First time. Until now I haven't thought it necessary to display a little metallic icon of patriotism for everyone to see. It was enough to vote, pay my taxes, perform my civic duties, speak my mind, and do my best to raise our kids to be good Americans.

"Sometimes I would offer a small prayer of gratitude that I had been born in a country whose institutions sustained me, whose armed forces protected me, and whose ideals inspired me; I offered my heart's affections in return. It no more occurred to me to flaunt the flag on my chest than it did to pin my mother's picture on my lapel to prove her son's love. Mother knew where I stood; so does my country. I even tuck a valentine in my tax returns on April 15.

"So what's this doing here? Well, I put it on to take it back. The flag's been hijacked and turned into a logo -- the trademark of a monopoly on patriotism. On those Sunday morning talk shows, official chests appear adorned with the flag as if it is the good housekeeping seal of approval. During the State of the Union, did you notice Bush and Cheney wearing the flag? How come? No administration's patriotism is ever in doubt, only its policies. And the flag bestows no immunity from error. When I see flags sprouting on official lapels, I think of the time in China when I saw Mao's little red book on every official's desk, omnipresent and unread.

"But more galling than anything are all those moralistic ideologues in Washington sporting the flag in their lapels while writing books and running Web sites and publishing magazines attacking dissenters as un-American. They are people whose ardor for war grows disproportionately to their distance from the fighting. They're in the same league as those swarms of corporate lobbyists wearing flags and prowling Capitol Hill for tax breaks even as they call for more spending on war.

"So I put this on as a modest riposte to men with flags in their lapels who shoot missiles from the safety of Washington think tanks, or argue that sacrifice is good as long as they don't have to make it, or approve of bribing governments to join the coalition of the willing (after they first stash the cash). I put it on to remind myself that not every patriot thinks we should do to the people of Baghdad what Bin Laden did to us. The flag belongs to the country, not to the government. And it reminds me that it's not un-American to think that war -- except in self-defense -- is a failure of moral imagination, political nerve, and diplomacy. Come to think of it, standing up to your government can mean standing up for your country."

That did it. That -- and our continuing reporting on overpricing at Haliburton, chicanery on K Street, and the heavy, if divinely guided hand, of Tom DeLay.

When Sen. Lott protested that the Corporation for Public Broadcasting "has not seemed willing to deal with Bill Moyers," a new member of the board, a Republican fundraiser named Cheryl Halperin, who had been appointed by President Bush, agreed that CPB needed more power to do just that sort of thing. She left no doubt about the kind of penalty she would like to see imposed on malefactors like Moyers.

As rumors circulated about all this, I asked to meet with the CPB board to hear for myself what was being said. I thought it would be helpful for someone like me, who had been present at the creation and part of the system for almost 40 years, to talk about how CPB had been intended to be a heat shield to protect public broadcasters from exactly this kind of intimidation.

After all, I'd been there at the time of Richard Nixon's attempted coup. In those days, public television had been really feisty and independent, and often targeted for attacks. A Woody Allen special that poked fun at Henry Kissinger in the Nixon administration had actually been cancelled. The White House had been so outraged over a documentary called the "Banks and the Poor" that PBS was driven to adopt new guidelines. That didn't satisfy Nixon, and when public television hired two NBC reporters -- Robert McNeil and Sander Vanoucur to co-anchor some new broadcasts, it was, for Nixon, the last straw. According to White House memos at the time, he was determined to "get the left-wing commentators who are cutting us up off public television at once -- indeed, yesterday if possible."

Sound familiar?

Nixon vetoed the authorization for CPB with a message written in part by his sidekick Pat Buchanan, who in a private memo had castigated Vanocur, MacNeil, Washington Week in Review, Black Journal and Bill Moyers as "unbalanced against the administration."

It does sound familiar.

I always knew Nixon would be back. I just didn't know this time he would be the chairman of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.

Buchanan and Nixon succeeded in cutting CPB funding for all public affairs programming except for Black Journal. They knocked out multiyear funding for the National Public Affairs Center for Television, otherwise known as NPACT. And they voted to take away from the PBS staff the ultimate responsibility for the production of programming.

But in those days -- and this is what I wanted to share with Kenneth Tomlinson and his colleagues on the CPB board -- there were still Republicans in America who did not march in ideological lockstep and who stood on principle against politicizing public television. The chairman of the public station in Dallas was an industrialist named Ralph Rogers, a Republican but no party hack, who saw the White House intimidation as an assault on freedom of the press and led a nationwide effort to stop it.

The chairman of CPB was former Republican Congressman Thomas Curtis, who was also a principled man. He resigned, claiming White House interference. Within a few months, the crisis was over. CPB maintained its independence, PBS grew in strength, and Richard Nixon would soon face impeachment and resign for violating the public trust, not just public broadcasting.

Paradoxically, the very National Public Affairs Center for Television that Nixon had tried to kill -- NPACT -- put PBS on the map by rebroadcasting in primetime each day's Watergate hearings, drawing huge ratings night after night and establishing PBS as an ally of democracy. We should still be doing that sort of thing.

That was 33 years ago. I thought the current CPB board would like to hear and talk about the importance of standing up to political interference. I was wrong. They wouldn't meet with me. I tried three times. And it was all downhill after that.

I was na've, I guess. I simply never imagined that any CPB chairman, Democrat or Republican, would cross the line from resisting White House pressure to carrying it out for the White House. But that's what Kenneth Tomlinson has done.

On Fox News this week he denied that he's carrying out a White House mandate or that he's ever had any conversations with any Bush administration official about PBS. But the New York Times reported that he enlisted Karl Rove to help kill a proposal that would have put on the CPB board people with experience in local radio and television. The Times also reported that "on the recommendation of administration officials" Tomlinson hired a White House flack (I know the genre) named Mary Catherine Andrews as a senior CPB staff member. While she was still reporting to Karl Rove at the White House, Andrews set up CPB's new ombudsman's office and had a hand in hiring the two people who will fill it, one of whom once worked for ... you guessed it ... Kenneth Tomlinson.

I would like to give Mr. Tomlinson the benefit of the doubt, but I can't. According to a book written about the Reader's Digest when he was its editor-in-chief, he surrounded himself with other right-wingers -- a pattern he's now following at the Corporation for Public Broadcasting.

There is Ms. Andrews from the White House. For acting president, he hired Ken Ferree from the FCC, who was Michael Powell's enforcer when Powell was deciding how to go about allowing the big media companies to get even bigger. According to a forthcoming book, one of Ferree's jobs was to engage in tactics designed to dismiss any serious objection to media monopolies. And, according to Eric Alterman, Ferree was even more contemptuous than Michael Powell of public participation in the process of determining media ownership. Alterman identifies Ferree as the FCC staffer who decided to issue a "protective order" designed to keep secret the market research on which the Republican majority on the commission based their vote to permit greater media consolidation.

It's not likely that with guys like this running the CPB some public television producer is going to say, "Hey, let's do something on how big media is affecting democracy."

Call it preventive capitulation.

As everyone knows, Mr. Tomlinson also put up a considerable sum of money, reportedly over $5 million, for a new weekly broadcast featuring Paul Gigot and the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal. Gigot is a smart journalist, a sharp editor, and a fine fellow. I had him on NOW several times and even proposed that he become a regular contributor. The conversation of democracy -- remember? All stripes.

But I confess to some puzzlement that the Wall Street Journal, which in the past editorialized to cut PBS off the public tap, is now being subsidized by American taxpayers although its parent company, Dow Jones, had revenues in just the first quarter of this year of $400 million. I thought public television was supposed to be an alternative to commercial media, not a funder of it.

But in this weird deal, you get a glimpse of the kind of programming Mr. Tomlinson apparently seems to prefer. Alone of the big major newspapers, the Wall Street Journal has no op-ed page where different opinions can compete with its right-wing editorials. The Journal's PBS broadcast is just as homogenous -- right-wingers talking to each other. Why not $5 million to put the editors of The Nation on PBS? Or Amy Goodman's Democracy Now! You balance right-wing talk with left-wing talk.

There's more. Only two weeks ago did we learn that Mr. Tomlinson had spent $10,000 last year to hire a contractor who would watch my show and report on political bias. That's right. Kenneth Y. Tomlinson spent $10,000 of your money to hire a guy to watch NOW to find out who my guests were and what my stories were. Ten thousand dollars.

Gee, Ken, for $2.50 a week, you could pick up a copy of TV Guide on the newsstand. A subscription is even cheaper, and I would have sent you a coupon that can save you up to 62 percent.

For that matter, Ken, all you had to do was watch the show yourself. You could have made it easier with a double Jim Beam, your favorite. Or you could have gone online where the listings are posted. Hell, you could have called me -- collect -- and I would have told you.

Ten thousand dollars. That would have bought five tables at Thursday night's "Conservative Salute for Tom DeLay." Better yet, that ten grand would pay for the books in an elementary school classroom or an upgrade of its computer lab.

But having sent that cash, what did he find? Only Mr. Tomlinson knows. He's apparently decided not to share the results with his staff, or his board or leak it to Robert Novak. The public paid for it -- but Ken Tomlinson acts as if he owns it.

In a May 10 op-ed piece, in Rev. Moon's conservative Washington Times, Tomlinson maintained he had not released the findings because public broadcasting is such a delicate institution that he did not want to "damage public broadcasting's image with controversy." Where I come from in Texas, we shovel that kind of stuff every day.

As we learned only this week, that's not the only news Mr. Tomlinson tried to keep to himself. As reported by Jeff Chester's Center for Digital Democracy (of which I am a supporter), there were two public opinion surveys commissioned by CPB but not released to the media -- not even to PBS and NPR. According to a source who talked to Salon.com, "The first results were too good and [Tomlinson] didn't believe them. After the Iraq War, the board commissioned another round of polling, and they thought they'd get worse results."

But they didn't. The data revealed that, in reality, public broadcasting has an 80 percent favorable rating and that "the majority of the U.S. adult population does not believe that the news and information programming on public broadcasting is biased." In fact, more than half believed PBS provided more in-depth and trustworthy news and information than the networks and 55 percent said PBS was "fair and balanced."

Tomlinson is the man, by the way, who was running Voice of America back in 1984 when a partisan named Charlie Wick was politicizing the United States Information Agency of which Voice of America was a part. It turned out there was a blacklist of people who had been removed from the list of prominent Americans sent abroad to lecture on behalf of America and the USIA. What's more, it was discovered that evidence as to how those people were chosen to be on the blacklist, more than 700 documents had been shredded. Among those on the blacklists of journalists, writers, scholars and politicians were dangerous left-wing subversives like Walter Cronkite, James Baldwin, Gary Hart, Ralph Nader, Ben Bradlee, Coretta Scott King and David Brinkley.

The person who took the fall for the blacklist was another right-winger. He resigned. Shortly thereafter, so did Kenneth Tomlinson, who had been one of the people in the agency with the authority to see the lists of potential speakers and allowed to strike people's names. Let me be clear about this: There is no record, apparently, of what Ken Tomlinson did. We don't know whether he supported or protested the blacklisting of so many American liberals. Or what he thinks of it now.

But I had hoped Bill O'Reilly would have asked him about it when he appeared on The O'Reilly Factor this week. He didn't. Instead, Tomlinson went on attacking me with O'Reilly egging him on, and he went on denying he was carrying out a partisan mandate despite published reports to the contrary. The only time you could be sure he was telling the truth was at the end of the broadcast when he said to O'Reilly, "We love your show."

We love your show.

I wrote Kenneth Tomlinson on Friday and asked him to sit down with me for one hour on PBS and talk about all this. I suggested that he choose the moderator and the guidelines.

There is one other thing in particular I would like to ask him about. In his op-ed essay this week in Washington Times, Ken Tomlinson tells of a phone call from an old friend complaining about my bias. Wrote Mr. Tomlinson: "The friend explained that the foundation he heads made a six-figure contribution to his local television station for digital conversion. But he declared there would be no more contributions until something was done about the network's bias."

Apparently that's Kenneth Tomlinson's method of governance. Money talks and buys the influence it wants.

I would like to ask him to listen to a different voice.

This letter came to me last year from a woman in New York, five pages of handwriting. She said, among other things, that "after the worst sneak attack in our history, there's not been a moment to reflect, a moment to let the horror resonate, a moment to feel the pain and regroup as humans. No, since I lost my husband on 9/11, not only our family's world, but the whole world seems to have gotten even worse than that tragic day."

She wanted me to know that on 9/11 her husband was not on duty. "He was home with me having coffee. My daughter and grandson, living only five blocks from the Towers, had to be evacuated with masks -- terror all around. ... My other daughter, near the Brooklyn Bridge ... my son in high school. But my Charlie took off like a lightning bolt to be with his men from the Special Operations Command. 'Bring my gear to the plaza,' he told his aide immediately after the first plane struck the North Tower. ... He took action based on the responsibility he felt for his job and his men and for those Towers that he loved."

In the FDNY, she said, chain-of- command rules extend to every captain of every fire house in the city. If anything happens in the firehouse -- at any time -- even if the captain isn't on duty or on vacation -- that captain is responsible for everything that goes on there 24/7."

So she asked: "Why is this administration responsible for nothing? All that they do is pass the blame. This is not leadership. ... Watch everyone pass the blame again in this recent torture case [Abu Ghraib] of Iraqi prisons ..."

And then she wrote: "We need more programs like yours to wake America up. ... Such programs must continue amidst the sea of false images and name-calling that divide America now. ... Such programs give us hope that search will continue to get this imperfect human condition on to a higher plane. So thank you and all of those who work with you. Without public broadcasting, all we would call news would be merely carefully controlled propaganda."

Enclosed with the letter was a check made out to "Channel 13 -- NOW" for $500. I keep a copy of that check above my desk to remind me of what journalism is about. Kenneth Tomlinson has his demanding donors. I'll take the widow's mite any day.

Someone has said recently that the great raucous mob that is democracy is rarely heard and that it's not just the fault of the current residents of the White House and the capital. There's too great a chasm between those of us in this business and those who depend on TV and radio as their window to the world. We treat them too much as an audience and not enough as citizens. They're invited to look through the window but too infrequently to come through the door and to participate, to make public broadcasting truly public."

To that end, five public interest groups including Common Cause and Consumers Union will be holding informational sessions around the country to "take public broadcasting back" -- to take it back from threats, from interference, from those who would tell us we can only think what they command us to think.

It's a worthy goal.

We're big kids; we can handle controversy and diversity, whether it's political or religious points of view or two loving lesbian moms and their kids, visited by a cartoon rabbit. We are not too fragile or insecure to see America and the world entire for all their magnificent and sometimes violent confusion. There used to be a thing or a commodity we put great store by," John Steinbeck wrote. "It was called the people."

MAKES YOU PROUD TO BE AN AMERICAN....OR DOES IT?

2005-05-20T04:28:00.000-07:00

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/20/international/asia/20abuse.html?hp&ex=1116561600&en=8701738ac057aebe&ei=5094&partner=homepage
In U.S. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates' Deaths

By TIM GOLDEN
Published: May 20, 2005
Even as the young Afghan man was dying before them, his American jailers continued to torment him.

The prisoner, a slight, 22-year-old taxi driver known only as Dilawar, was hauled from his cell at the detention center in Bagram, Afghanistan, at around 2 a.m. to answer questions about a rocket attack on an American base. When he arrived in the interrogation room, an interpreter who was present said, his legs were bouncing uncontrollably in the plastic chair and his hands were numb. He had been chained by the wrists to the top of his cell for much of the previous four days.

Mr. Dilawar asked for a drink of water, and one of the two interrogators, Specialist Joshua R. Claus, 21, picked up a large plastic bottle. But first he punched a hole in the bottom, the interpreter said, so as the prisoner fumbled weakly with the cap, the water poured out over his orange prison scrubs. The soldier then grabbed the bottle back and began squirting the water forcefully into Mr. Dilawar's face.

"Come on, drink!" the interpreter said Specialist Claus had shouted, as the prisoner gagged on the spray. "Drink!"

At the interrogators' behest, a guard tried to force the young man to his knees. But his legs, which had been pummeled by guards for several days, could no longer bend. An interrogator told Mr. Dilawar that he could see a doctor after they finished with him. When he was finally sent back to his cell, though, the guards were instructed only to chain the prisoner back to the ceiling.

"Leave him up," one of the guards quoted Specialist Claus as saying.

Several hours passed before an emergency room doctor finally saw Mr. Dilawar. By then he was dead, his body beginning to stiffen. It would be many months before Army investigators learned a final horrific detail: Most of the interrogators had believed Mr. Dilawar was an innocent man who simply drove his taxi past the American base at the wrong time.

The story of Mr. Dilawar's brutal death at the Bagram Collection Point - and that of another detainee, Habibullah, who died there six days earlier in December 2002 - emerge from a nearly 2,000-page confidential file of the Army's criminal investigation into the case, a copy of which was obtained by The New York Times.

Like a narrative counterpart to the digital images from Abu Ghraib, the Bagram file depicts young, poorly trained soldiers in repeated incidents of abuse. The harsh treatment, which has resulted in criminal charges against seven soldiers, went well beyond the two deaths.

In some instances, testimony shows, it was directed or carried out by interrogators to extract information. In others, it was punishment meted out by military police guards. Sometimes, the torment seems to have been driven by little more than boredom or cruelty, or both.

In sworn statements to Army investigators, soldiers describe one female interrogator with a taste for humiliation stepping on the neck of one prostrate detainee and kicking another in the genitals. They tell of a shackled prisoner being forced to roll back and forth on the floor of a cell, kissing the boots of his two interrogators as he went. Yet another prisoner is made to pick plastic bottle caps out of a drum mixed with excrement and water as part of a strategy to soften him up for questioning.

The Times obtained a copy of the file from a person involved in the investigation who was critical of the methods used at Bagram and the military's response to the deaths.

Although incidents of prisoner abuse at Bagram in 2002, including some details of the two men's deaths, have been previously reported, American officials have characterized them as isolated problems that were thoroughly investigated. And many of the officers and soldiers interviewed in the Dilawar investigation said the large majority of detainees at Bagram were compliant and reasonably well treated.

"What we have learned through the course of all these investigations is that there were people who clearly violated anyone's standard for humane treatment," said the Pentagon's chief spokesman, Larry Di Rita. "We're finding some cases that were not close calls."

(Page 2 of 8)

Yet the Bagram file includes ample testimony that harsh treatment by some interrogators was routine and that guards could strike shackled detainees with virtual impunity. Prisoners considered important or troublesome were also handcuffed and chained to the ceilings and doors of their cells, sometimes for long periods, an action Army prosecutors recently classified as criminal assault.

Some of the mistreatment was quite obvious, the file suggests. Senior officers frequently toured the detention center, and several of them acknowledged seeing prisoners chained up for punishment or to deprive them of sleep. Shortly before the two deaths, observers from the International Committee of the Red Cross specifically complained to the military authorities at Bagram about the shackling of prisoners in "fixed positions," documents show.

Even though military investigators learned soon after Mr. Dilawar's death that he had been abused by at least two interrogators, the Army's criminal inquiry moved slowly. Meanwhile, many of the Bagram interrogators, led by the same operations officer, Capt. Carolyn A. Wood, were redeployed to Iraq and in July 2003 took charge of interrogations at the Abu Ghraib prison. According to a high-level Army inquiry last year, Captain Wood applied techniques there that were "remarkably similar" to those used at Bagram.

Last October, the Army's Criminal Investigation Command concluded that there was probable cause to charge 27 officers and enlisted personnel with criminal offenses in the Dilawar case ranging from dereliction of duty to maiming and involuntary manslaughter. Fifteen of the same soldiers were also cited for probable criminal responsibility in the Habibullah case.

So far, only the seven soldiers have been charged, including four last week. No one has been convicted in either death. Two Army interrogators were also reprimanded, a military spokesman said. Most of those who could still face legal action have denied wrongdoing, either in statements to investigators or in comments to a reporter.

"The whole situation is unfair," Sgt. Selena M. Salcedo, a former Bagram interrogator who was charged with assaulting Mr. Dilawar, dereliction of duty and lying to investigators, said in a telephone interview. "It's all going to come out when everything is said and done."

With most of the legal action pending, the story of abuses at Bagram remains incomplete. But documents and interviews reveal a striking disparity between the findings of Army investigators and what military officials said in the aftermath of the deaths.

Military spokesmen maintained that both men had died of natural causes, even after military coroners had ruled the deaths homicides. Two months after those autopsies, the American commander in Afghanistan, then-Lt. Gen. Daniel K. McNeill, said he had no indication that abuse by soldiers had contributed to the two deaths. The methods used at Bagram, he said, were "in accordance with what is generally accepted as interrogation techniques."

The Interrogators

In the summer of 2002, the military detention center at Bagram, about 40 miles north of Kabul, stood as a hulking reminder of the Americans' improvised hold over Afghanistan.

Built by the Soviets as an aircraft machine shop for the operations base they established after their intervention in the country in 1979, the building had survived the ensuing wars as a battered relic - a long, squat, concrete block with rusted metal sheets where the windows had once been.

Retrofitted with five large wire pens and a half dozen plywood isolation cells, the building became the Bagram Collection Point, a clearinghouse for prisoners captured in Afghanistan and elsewhere. The B.C.P., as soldiers called it, typically held between 40 and 80 detainees while they were interrogated and screened for possible shipment to the Pentagon's longer-term detention center at Guant�namo Bay, Cuba.

The new interrogation unit that arrived in July 2002 had been improvised as well. Captain Wood, then a 32-year-old lieutenant, came with 13 soldiers from the 525th Military Intelligence Brigade at Fort Bragg, N.C.; six Arabic-speaking reservists were added from the Utah National Guard.

(Page 3 of 8)

Part of the new group, which was consolidated under Company A of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion, was made up of counterintelligence specialists with no background in interrogation. Only two of the soldiers had ever questioned actual prisoners.

What specialized training the unit received came on the job, in sessions with two interrogators who had worked in the prison for a few months. "There was nothing that prepared us for running an interrogation operation" like the one at Bagram, the noncommissioned officer in charge of the interrogators, Staff Sgt. Steven W. Loring, later told investigators.

Nor were the rules of engagement very clear. The platoon had the standard interrogations guide, Army Field Manual 34-52, and an order from the secretary of defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, to treat prisoners "humanely," and when possible, in accordance with the Geneva Conventions. But with President Bush's final determination in February 2002 that the Conventions did not apply to the conflict with Al Qaeda and that Taliban fighters would not be accorded the rights of prisoners of war, the interrogators believed they "could deviate slightly from the rules," said one of the Utah reservists, Sgt. James A. Leahy.

"There was the Geneva Conventions for enemy prisoners of war, but nothing for terrorists," Sergeant Leahy told Army investigators. And the detainees, senior intelligence officers said, were to be considered terrorists until proved otherwise.

The deviations included the use of "safety positions" or "stress positions" that would make the detainees uncomfortable but not necessarily hurt them - kneeling on the ground, for instance, or sitting in a "chair" position against the wall. The new platoon was also trained in sleep deprivation, which the previous unit had generally limited to 24 hours or less, insisting that the interrogator remain awake with the prisoner to avoid pushing the limits of humane treatment.

But as the 519th interrogators settled into their jobs, they set their own procedures for sleep deprivation. They decided on 32 to 36 hours as the optimal time to keep prisoners awake and eliminated the practice of staying up themselves, one former interrogator, Eric LaHammer, said in an interview.

The interrogators worked from a menu of basic tactics to gain a prisoner's cooperation, from the "friendly" approach, to good cop-bad cop routines, to the threat of long-term imprisonment. But some less-experienced interrogators came to rely on the method known in the military as "Fear Up Harsh," or what one soldier referred to as "the screaming technique."

Sergeant Loring, then 27, tried with limited success to wean those interrogators off that approach, which typically involved yelling and throwing chairs. Mr. Leahy said the sergeant "put the brakes on when certain approaches got out of hand." But he could also be dismissive of tactics he considered too soft, several soldiers told investigators, and gave some of the most aggressive interrogators wide latitude. (Efforts to locate Mr. Loring, who has left the military, were unsuccessful.)

"We sometimes developed a rapport with detainees, and Sergeant Loring would sit us down and remind us that these were evil people and talk about 9/11 and they weren't our friends and could not be trusted," Mr. Leahy said.

Specialist Damien M. Corsetti, a tall, bearded interrogator sometimes called "Monster" -he had the nickname tattooed in Italian across his stomach, other soldiers said - was often chosen to intimidate new detainees. Specialist Corsetti, they said, would glower and yell at the arrivals as they stood chained to an overhead pole or lay face down on the floor of a holding room. (A military police K-9 unit often brought growling dogs to walk among the new prisoners for similar effect, documents show.)

"The other interrogators would use his reputation," said one interrogator, Specialist Eric H. Barclais. "They would tell the detainee, 'If you don't cooperate, we'll have to get Monster, and he won't be as nice.' " Another soldier told investigators that Sergeant Loring lightheartedly referred to Specialist Corsetti, then 23, as "the King of Torture."

(Page 4 of 8)

A Saudi detainee who was interviewed by Army investigators last June at Guant�namo said Specialist Corsetti had pulled out his penis during an interrogation at Bagram, held it against the prisoner's face and threatened to rape him, excerpts from the man's statement show.

Last fall, the investigators cited probable cause to charge Specialist Corsetti with assault, maltreatment of a prisoner and indecent acts in the incident; he has not been charged. At Abu Ghraib, he was also one of three members of the 519th who were fined and demoted for forcing an Iraqi woman to strip during questioning, another interrogator said. A spokesman at Fort Bragg said Specialist Corsetti would not comment.

In late August of 2002, the Bagram interrogators were joined by a new military police unit that was assigned to guard the detainees. The soldiers, mostly reservists from the 377th Military Police Company based in Cincinnati and Bloomington, Ind., were similarly unprepared for their mission, members of the unit said.

The company received basic lessons in handling prisoners at Fort Dix, N.J., and some police and corrections officers in its ranks provided further training. That instruction included an overview of "pressure-point control tactics" and notably the "common peroneal strike" - a potentially disabling blow to the side of the leg, just above the knee.

The M.P.'s said they were never told that peroneal strikes were not part of Army doctrine. Nor did most of them hear one of the former police officers tell a fellow soldier during the training that he would never use such strikes because they would "tear up" a prisoner's legs.

But once in Afghanistan, members of the 377th found that the usual rules did not seem to apply. The peroneal strike quickly became a basic weapon of the M.P. arsenal. "That was kind of like an accepted thing; you could knee somebody in the leg," former Sgt. Thomas V. Curtis told the investigators.

A few weeks into the company's tour, Specialist Jeremy M. Callaway overheard another guard boasting about having beaten a detainee who had spit on him. Specialist Callaway also told investigators that other soldiers had congratulated the guard "for not taking any" from a detainee.

One captain nicknamed members of the Third Platoon "the Testosterone Gang." Several were devout bodybuilders. Upon arriving in Afghanistan, a group of the soldiers decorated their tent with a Confederate flag, one soldier said.

Some of the same M.P.'s took a particular interest in an emotionally disturbed Afghan detainee who was known to eat his feces and mutilate himself with concertina wire. The soldiers kneed the man repeatedly in the legs and, at one point, chained him with his arms straight up in the air, Specialist Callaway told investigators. They also nicknamed him "Timmy," after a disabled child in the animated television series "South Park." One of the guards who beat the prisoner also taught him to screech like the cartoon character, Specialist Callaway said.

Eventually, the man was sent home.

The Defiant Detainee

The detainee known as Person Under Control No. 412 was a portly, well-groomed Afghan named Habibullah. Some American officials identified him as "Mullah" Habibullah, a brother of a former Taliban commander from the southern Afghan province of Oruzgan.

He stood out from the scraggly guerrillas and villagers whom the Bagram interrogators typically saw. "He had a piercing gaze and was very confident," the provost marshal in charge of the M.P.'s, Maj. Bobby R. Atwell, recalled.

Documents from the investigation suggest that Mr. Habibullah was captured by an Afghan warlord on Nov. 28, 2002, and delivered to Bagram by C.I.A. operatives two days later. His well-being at that point is a matter of dispute. The doctor who examined him on arrival at Bagram reported him in good health. But the intelligence operations chief, Lt. Col. John W. Loffert Jr., later told Army investigators, "He was already in bad condition when he arrived."

What is clear is that Mr. Habibullah was identified at Bagram as an important prisoner and an unusually sharp-tongued and insubordinate one.

Page 5 of 8)

One of the 377th's Third Platoon sergeants, Alan J. Driver Jr., told investigators that Mr. Habibullah rose up after a rectal examination and kneed him in the groin. The guard said he grabbed the prisoner by the head and yelled in his face. Mr. Habibullah then "became combative," Sergeant Driver said, and had to be subdued by three guards and led away in an armlock.

He was then confined in one of the 9-foot by 7-foot isolation cells, which the M.P. commander, Capt. Christopher M. Beiring, later described as a standard procedure. "There was a policy that detainees were hooded, shackled and isolated for at least the first 24 hours, sometimes 72 hours of captivity," he told investigators.

While the guards kept some prisoners awake by yelling or poking at them or banging on their cell doors, Mr. Habibullah was shackled by the wrists to the wire ceiling over his cell, soldiers said.

On his second day, Dec. 1, the prisoner was "uncooperative" again, this time with Specialist Willie V. Brand. The guard, who has since been charged with assault and other crimes, told investigators he had delivered three peroneal strikes in response. The next day, Specialist Brand said, he had to knee the prisoner again. Other blows followed.

A lawyer for Specialist Brand, John P. Galligan, said there was no criminal intent by his client to hurt any detainee. "At the time, my client was acting consistently with the standard operating procedure that was in place at the Bagram facility."

The communication between Mr. Habibullah and his jailers appears to have been almost exclusively physical. Despite repeated requests, the M.P.'s were assigned no interpreters of their own. Instead, they borrowed from the interrogators when they could and relied on prisoners who spoke even a little English to translate for them.

When the detainees were beaten or kicked for "noncompliance," one of the interpreters, Ali M. Baryalai said, it was often "because they have no idea what the M.P. is saying."

By the morning of Dec. 2, witnesses told the investigators, Mr. Habibullah was coughing and complaining of chest pains. He limped into the interrogation room in shackles, his right leg stiff and his right foot swollen. The lead interrogator, Sergeant Leahy, let him sit on the floor because he could not bend his knees and sit in a chair.

The interpreter who was on hand, Ebrahim Baerde, said the interrogators had kept their distance that day "because he was spitting up a lot of phlegm."

"They were laughing and making fun of him, saying it was 'gross' or 'nasty,' " Mr. Baerde said.

Though battered, Mr. Habibullah was unbowed.

"Once they asked him if he wanted to spend the rest of his life in handcuffs," Mr. Baerde said. "His response was, 'Yes, don't they look good on me?' "

By Dec. 3, Mr. Habibullah's reputation for defiance seemed to make him an open target. One M.P. said he had given him five peroneal strikes for being "noncompliant and combative." Another gave him three or four more for being "combative and noncompliant." Some guards later asserted that he had been hurt trying to escape.

When Sgt. James P. Boland saw Mr. Habibullah on Dec. 3, he was in one of the isolation cells, tethered to the ceiling by two sets of handcuffs and a chain around his waist. His body was slumped forward, held up by the chains.

Sergeant Boland told the investigators he had entered the cell with two other guards, Specialists Anthony M. Morden and Brian E. Cammack. (All three have been charged with assault and other crimes.) One of them pulled off the prisoner's black hood. His head was slumped to one side, his tongue sticking out. Specialist Cammack said he had put some bread on Mr. Habibullah's tongue. Another soldier put an apple in the prisoner's hand; it fell to the floor.

When Specialist Cammack turned back toward the prisoner, he said in one statement, Mr. Habibullah's spit hit his chest. Later, Specialist Cammack acknowledged, "I'm not sure if he spit at me." But at the time, he exploded, yelling, "Don't ever spit on me again!" and kneeing the prisoner sharply in the thigh, "maybe a couple" of times. Mr. Habibullah's limp body swayed back and forth in the chains.

When Sergeant Boland returned to the cell some 20 minutes later, he said, Mr. Habibullah was not moving and had no pulse. Finally, the prisoner was unchained and laid out on the floor of his cell.

The guard who Specialist Cammack said had counseled him back in New Jersey about the dangers of peroneal strikes found him in the room where Mr. Habibullah lay, his body already cold.

"Specialist Cammack appeared very distraught," Specialist William Bohl told an investigator. The soldier "was running about the room hysterically."

An M.P. was sent to wake one of the medics.

"What are you getting me for?" the medic, Specialist Robert S. Melone, responded, telling him to call an ambulance instead.

When another medic finally arrived, he found Mr. Habibullah on the floor, his arms outstretched, his eyes and mouth open.

"It looked like he had been dead for a while, and it looked like nobody cared," the medic, Staff Sgt. Rodney D. Glass, recalled.

Not all of the guards were indifferent, their statements show. But if Mr. Habibullah's death shocked some of them, it did not lead to major changes in the detention center's operation.

(Page 6 of 8)

Military police guards were assigned to be present during interrogations to help prevent mistreatment. The provost marshal, Major Atwell, told investigators he had already instructed the commander of the M.P. company, Captain Beiring, to stop chaining prisoners to the ceiling. Others said they never received such an order.

Senior officers later told investigators that they had been unaware of any serious abuses at the B.C.P. But the first sergeant of the 377th, Betty J. Jones, told investigators that the use of standing restraints, sleep deprivation and peroneal strikes was readily apparent.

"Everyone that is anyone went through the facility at one time or another," she said.

Major Atwell said the death "did not cause an enormous amount of concern 'cause it appeared natural."

In fact, Mr. Habibullah's autopsy, completed on Dec. 8, showed bruises or abrasions on his chest, arms and head. There were deep contusions on his calves, knees and thighs. His left calf was marked by what appeared to have been the sole of a boot.

His death was attributed to a blood clot, probably caused by the severe injuries to his legs, which traveled to his heart and blocked the blood flow to his lungs.

The Shy Detainee

On Dec. 5, one day after Mr. Habibullah died, Mr. Dilawar arrived at Bagram.

Four days before, on the eve of the Muslim holiday of Id al-Fitr, Mr. Dilawar set out from his tiny village of Yakubi in a prized new possession, a used Toyota sedan that his family bought for him a few weeks earlier to drive as a taxi.

Mr. Dilawar was not an adventurous man. He rarely went far from the stone farmhouse he shared with his wife, young daughter and extended family. He never attended school, relatives said, and had only one friend, Bacha Khel, with whom he would sit in the wheat fields surrounding the village and talk.

"He was a shy man, a very simple man," his eldest brother, Shahpoor, said in an interview.

On the day he disappeared, Mr. Dilawar's mother had asked him to gather his three sisters from their nearby villages and bring them home for the holiday. But he needed gas money and decided instead to drive to the provincial capital, Khost, about 45 minutes away, to look for fares.

At a taxi stand there, he found three men headed back toward Yakubi. On the way, they passed a base used by American troops, Camp Salerno, which had been the target of a rocket attack that morning.

Militiamen loyal to the guerrilla commander guarding the base, Jan Baz Khan, stopped the Toyota at a checkpoint. They confiscated a broken walkie-talkie from one of Mr. Dilawar's passengers. In the trunk, they found an electric stabilizer used to regulate current from a generator. (Mr. Dilawar's family said the stabilizer was not theirs; at the time, they said, they had no electricity at all.)

The four men were detained and turned over to American soldiers at the base as suspects in the attack. Mr. Dilawar and his passengers spent their first night there handcuffed to a fence, so they would be unable to sleep. When a doctor examined them the next morning, he said later, he found Mr. Dilawar tired and suffering from headaches but otherwise fine.

Mr. Dilawar's three passengers were eventually flown to Guant�namo and held for more than a year before being sent home without charge. In interviews after their release, the men described their treatment at Bagram as far worse than at Guant�namo. While all of them said they had been beaten, they complained most bitterly of being stripped naked in front of female soldiers for showers and medical examinations, which they said included the first of several painful and humiliating rectal exams.

"They did lots and lots of bad things to me," said Abdur Rahim, a 26-year-old baker from Khost. "I was shouting and crying, and no one was listening. When I was shouting, the soldiers were slamming my head against the desk."

For Mr. Dilawar, his fellow prisoners said, the most difficult thing seemed to be the black cloth hood that was pulled over his head. "He could not breathe," said a man called Parkhudin, who had been one of Mr. Dilawar's passengers.

Mr. Dilawar was a frail man, standing only 5 feet 9 inches and weighing 122 pounds. But at Bagram, he was quickly labeled one of the "noncompliant" ones.

(Page 7 of 8)

When one of the First Platoon M.P.'s, Specialist Corey E. Jones, was sent to Mr. Dilawar's cell to give him some water, he said the prisoner spit in his face and started kicking him. Specialist Jones responded, he said, with a couple of knee strikes to the leg of the shackled man.

"He screamed out, 'Allah! Allah! Allah!' and my first reaction was that he was crying out to his god," Specialist Jones said to investigators. "Everybody heard him cry out and thought it was funny."

Other Third Platoon M.P.'s later came by the detention center and stopped at the isolation cells to see for themselves, Specialist Jones said.

It became a kind of running joke, and people kept showing up to give this detainee a common peroneal strike just to hear him scream out 'Allah,' " he said. "It went on over a 24-hour period, and I would think that it was over 100 strikes."

In a subsequent statement, Specialist Jones was vague about which M.P.'s had delivered the blows. His estimate was never confirmed, but other guards eventually admitted striking Mr. Dilawar repeatedly.

Many M.P.'s would eventually deny that they had any idea of Mr. Dilawar's injuries, explaining that they never saw his legs beneath his jumpsuit. But Specialist Jones recalled that the drawstring pants of Mr. Dilawar's orange prison suit fell down again and again while he was shackled.

"I saw the bruise because his pants kept falling down while he was in standing restraints," the soldier told investigators. "Over a certain time period, I noticed it was the size of a fist."

As Mr. Dilawar grew desperate, he began crying out more loudly to be released. But even the interpreters had trouble understanding his Pashto dialect; the annoyed guards heard only noise.

"He had constantly been screaming, 'Release me; I don't want to be here,' and things like that," said the one linguist who could decipher his distress, Abdul Ahad Wardak.

The Interrogation

On Dec. 8, Mr. Dilawar was taken for his fourth interrogation. It quickly turned hostile.

The 21-year-old lead interrogator, Specialist Glendale C. Walls II, later contended that Mr. Dilawar was evasive. "Some holes came up, and we wanted him to answer us truthfully," he said. The other interrogator, Sergeant Salcedo, complained that the prisoner was smiling, not answering questions, and refusing to stay kneeling on the ground or sitting against the wall.

The interpreter who was present, Ahmad Ahmadzai, recalled the encounter differently to investigators.

The interrogators, Mr. Ahmadzai said, accused Mr. Dilawar of launching the rockets that had hit the American base. He denied that. While kneeling on the ground, he was unable to hold his cuffed hands above his head as instructed, prompting Sergeant Salcedo to slap them back up whenever they began to drop.

"Selena berated him for being weak and questioned him about being a man, which was very insulting because of his heritage," Mr. Ahmadzai said.

When Mr. Dilawar was unable to sit in the chair position against the wall because of his battered legs, the two interrogators grabbed him by the shirt and repeatedly shoved him back against the wall.

"This went on for 10 or 15 minutes," the interpreter said. "He was so tired he couldn't get up."

"They stood him up, and at one point Selena stepped on his bare foot with her boot and grabbed him by his beard and pulled him towards her," he went on. "Once Selena kicked Dilawar in the groin, private areas, with her right foot. She was standing some distance from him, and she stepped back and kicked him.

"About the first 10 minutes, I think, they were actually questioning him, after that it was pushing, shoving, kicking and shouting at him," Mr. Ahmadzai said. "There was no interrogation going on."

The session ended, he said, with Sergeant Salcedo instructing the M.P.'s to keep Mr. Dilawar chained to the ceiling until the next shift came on.

The next morning, Mr. Dilawar began yelling again. At around noon, the M.P.'s called over another of the interpreters, Mr. Baerde, to try to quiet Mr. Dilawar down.

"I told him, 'Look, please, if you want to be able to sit down and be released from shackles, you just need to be quiet for one more hour."

"He told me that if he was in shackles another hour, he would die," Mr. Baerde said.

Half an hour later, Mr. Baerde returned to the cell. Mr. Dilawar's hands hung limply from the cuffs, and his head, covered by the black hood, slumped forward.

"He wanted me to get a doctor, and said that he needed 'a shot,' " Mr. Baerde recalled. "He said that he didn't feel good. He said that his legs were hurting."

Mr. Baerde translated Mr. Dilawar's plea to one of the guards. The soldier took the prisoner's hand and pressed down on his fingernails to check his circulation.

"He's O.K.," Mr. Baerde quoted the M.P. as saying. "He's just trying to get out of his restraints."

Page 8 of 8)

By the time Mr. Dilawar was brought in for his final interrogation in the first hours of the next day, Dec. 10, he appeared exhausted and was babbling that his wife had died. He also told the interrogators that he had been beaten by the guards.

"But we didn't pursue that," said Mr. Baryalai, the interpreter.

Specialist Walls was again the lead interrogator. But his more aggressive partner, Specialist Claus, quickly took over, Mr. Baryalai said.

"Josh had a rule that the detainee had to look at him, not me," the interpreter told investigators. "He gave him three chances, and then he grabbed him by the shirt and pulled him towards him, across the table, slamming his chest into the table front."

When Mr. Dilawar was unable to kneel, the interpreter said, the interrogators pulled him to his feet and pushed him against the wall. Told to assume a stress position, the prisoner leaned his head against the wall and began to fall asleep.

"It looked to me like Dilawar was trying to cooperate, but he couldn't physically perform the tasks," Mr. Baryalai said.

Finally, Specialist Walls grabbed the prisoner and "shook him harshly," the interpreter said, telling him that if he failed to cooperate, he would be shipped to a prison in the United States, where he would be "treated like a woman, by the other men" and face the wrath of criminals who "would be very angry with anyone involved in the 9/11 attacks." (Specialist Walls was charged last week with assault, maltreatment and failure to obey a lawful order; Specialist Claus was charged with assault, maltreatment and lying to investigators. Each man declined to comment.)

A third military intelligence specialist who spoke some Pashto, Staff Sgt. W. Christopher Yonushonis, had questioned Mr. Dilawar earlier and had arranged with Specialist Claus to take over when he was done. Instead, the sergeant arrived at the interrogation room to find a large puddle of water on the floor, a wet spot on Mr. Dilawar's shirt and Specialist Claus standing behind the detainee, twisting up the back of the hood that covered the prisoner's head.

"I had the impression that Josh was actually holding the detainee upright by pulling on the hood," he said. "I was furious at this point because I had seen Josh tighten the hood of another detainee the week before. This behavior seemed completely gratuitous and unrelated to intelligence collection."

"What the hell happened with that water?" Sergeant Yonushonis said he had demanded.

"We had to make sure he stayed hydrated," he said Specialist Claus had responded.

The next morning, Sergeant Yonushonis went to the noncommissioned officer in charge of the interrogators, Sergeant Loring, to report the incident. Mr. Dilawar, however, was already dead.

The Post-Mortem

The findings of Mr. Dilawar's autopsy were succinct. He had had some coronary artery disease, the medical examiner reported, but what caused his heart to fail was "blunt force injuries to the lower extremities." Similar injuries contributed to Mr. Habibullah's death.

One of the coroners later translated the assessment at a pre-trial hearing for Specialist Brand, saying the tissue in the young man's legs "had basically been pulpified."

"I've seen similar injuries in an individual run over by a bus," added Lt. Col. Elizabeth Rouse, the coroner, and a major at that time.

After the second death, several of the 519th Battalion's interrogators were temporarily removed from their posts. A medic was assigned to the detention center to work night shifts. On orders from the Bagram intelligence chief, interrogators were prohibited from any physical contact with the detainees. Chaining prisoners to any fixed object was also banned, and the use of stress positions was curtailed.

In February, an American military official disclosed that the Afghan guerrilla commander whose men had arrested Mr. Dilawar and his passengers had himself been detained. The commander, Jan Baz Khan, was suspected of attacking Camp Salerno himself and then turning over innocent "suspects" to the Americans in a ploy to win their trust, the military official said.

The three passengers in Mr. Dilawar's taxi were sent home from Guant�namo in March 2004, 15 months after their capture, with letters saying they posed "no threat" to American forces.

They were later visited by Mr. Dilawar's parents, who begged them to explain what had happened to their son. But the men said they could not bring themselves to recount the details.

"I told them he had a bed," said Mr. Parkhudin. "I said the Americans were very nice because he had a heart problem."

In late August of last year, shortly before the Army completed its inquiry into the deaths, Sergeant Yonushonis, who was stationed in Germany, went at his own initiative to see an agent of the Criminal Investigation Command. Until then, he had never been interviewed.

"I expected to be contacted at some point by investigators in this case," he said. "I was living a few doors down from the interrogation room, and I had been one of the last to see this detainee alive."

Sergeant Yonushonis described what he had witnessed of the detainee's last interrogation. "I remember being so mad that I had trouble speaking," he said.

He also added a detail that had been overlooked in the investigative file. By the time Mr. Dilawar was taken into his final interrogations, he said, "most of us were convinced that the detainee was innocent."

###

MUST SEE WEBSITE

2005-05-19T19:07:00.000-07:00

http://filmstripinternational.com/

PASTOR SAYS ONLY BUSH SUPPORTS MAY ATTEND CHURCH

2005-05-08T05:07:00.000-07:00

http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=44152

A Baptist pastor in North Carolina has touched off an exodus in his church by declaring Democrats are not welcome as members.

The Rev. Chan Chandler of East Waynesville Baptist Church in Waynesville ex-communicated nine members who refuse to support President Bush, according to WLOS-TV in Asheville, N.C.

Another 40 have left in protest in a controversy that began before the election last November and came to a head Sunday.

Chandler insists he's acting according to the Word of God, acknowledging in a sermon Sunday he has upset church members by calling them out for their political loyalties.

But WLOS said Chandler, who could not be reached for comment, has insisted his actions are not politically motivated.

Church member Lewis Inman said to the Asheville station: "[Chandler] told us that if we didn't support George Bush we needed to resign our position and get out, or go to the altar and repent, and support George Bush."

Among the ex-communicated were leaders who had been in the church 30 or 40 years.

"The members that were there even stood up and applauded that we left," an outgoing church member said.

Former member Frank Lowe told WLOS: "He says if we supported John Kerry, we have supported abortion and homosexuality."

But Lowe and other departed members insist they don't agree to those stances.

Responding to the news, the Rev. Dr. C. Welton Gaddy, president of The Interfaith Alliance, a left-leaning group, issued a statement.

"This sad spectacle is the predictable consequence of the Religious Right's insistence on measuring a person’s religion by social-political litmus tests," Gaddy said.

"Not only does the pastor's reported action violate both the spirit and substance of the United States Constitution's provisions of religious liberty, it also offends the conscience of people who understand religion in terms of the realm of the spirit, not votes in a presidential election."

Addressing the Baptist pastor's call for repentance on the part of those who didn't vote for Bush, Gaddy said, "The screaming need is for repentance among those who would tie religion to partisan politics."

A contributor to the leading liberal weblog Daily Kos wrote: "For those that thought that there has not been a full scale war lanched against liberals; for those who didn't take the radical right's promise to "eradicate liberals" seriously, I present to you, Exhibit A: East Waynesville Baptist Church has just kicked out all its Democratic members."

In a later post, the contributor commented: "This isn't a 'culture' war, people. This isn't some sort of political game. This action merely foreshadows what is to come: the radical religious right seeking to impose a theocracy upon this nation. Purge the liberals from society.

"Welcome to the Blue Scare. Welcome to Grade-A, government-sanctioned McCarthyism against liberals and against anyone who doesn't embrace their distorted worldview. Here is the face of the American jihad."
===================================================
MORE...

Minister ex-communicates
Democrat church members
Baptist pastor reportedly insisted
supporting president is God's will

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/06/AR2005050601317.html

Dempcrats Booted From N.C. Church Over Politics

WAYNESVILLE, N.C. -- A pastor of a small Baptist church led an effort to kick out church members because they didn't support President Bush, members said

The nine members were voted out at a Monday meeting of the East Waynesville Baptist Church in this mountain town about 120 miles west of Charlotte. WLOS-TV in Asheville reported that 40 other members resigned in protest.

"It's all over politics," said Selma Morris, the church's treasurer. "We've never had a pastor like that before."

Pastor Chan Chandler had told the congregation before last year's presidential election that anyone who planned to vote for Democratic Sen. John Kerry should either leave the church or repent, said Lorene Sutton, who said she and her husband were voted out of the church this week.

"He's the kind of pastor who says do it my way or get out," she said. "He's real negative all the time."

Morris said some church members left after Chandler made his ultimatum in October.

Chandler didn't return a message left by The Associated Press at his home Friday, and several calls to the church went unanswered. He told WLOS that the actions were not politically motivated.

North Carolina Democratic Party Chairman Jerry Meek sharply criticized the pastor Friday, saying Chandler jeopardized his church's tax-free status by openly supporting a candidate for president.

"If these reports are true, this minister is not only acting extremely inappropriately by injecting partisan politics into a house of worship, but he is also potentially breaking the law," Meek said.

==========================================
more on this ...

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-0505080215may08,1,6246571.story?coll=chi-newsnationworld-hed&ctrack=1&cset=true"WAYNESVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA -- Some members of a small Baptist church say their pastor led a charge last week to kick out nine members because they don't support President Bush.

They said Pastor Chan Chandler told the congregation before last year's election that they should support Bush and that anyone who planned to vote for Democrat John Kerry should get up and leave.

Selma Morris, a member and treasurer of East Waynesville Baptist Church, said some members of the church left in October when Chandler first made his ultimatum.

Chandler told WLOS-TV in Asheville that the actions were not politically motivated, and then hung up."

HOMELAND SECURITY

2005-04-30T09:14:00.000-07:00

bush comes out of the closet

2005-04-26T18:37:00.000-07:00

BUSHY COMES OUT OF THE CLOSET

First, the Jeff Gannon Affair...now...well...make your

own decision on this one!

AN EAGLE WITH ONLY A RIGHT WING CAN'T FLY

2005-02-19T06:58:00.000-08:00

2005-02-19 09:01:06
http://enewsblog.com/codewarriorz/post/2005-02-19_09:01:06/
Texas has a problem with two particularly destructive insects which, although outwardly they LOOK like their productive, non-destructive cousins, are bellicose, and tend to kill off competitors, and in general, endanger the natural balance.

The first animal is the "FIRE ANT" (imported fire ants) Solenopsis invicta (http://uts.cc.utexas.edu/~gilbert/research/fireants/faqans.html.
Fire ants look very similar to other ants, but their aggressiveness and intensity of the venom they inject with an attack, makes them almost pathologically bellicose. When they move into an area, they attack other, more peaceful ants and kill them off, soon becoming the dominant ant in an area,.

The other is the so-called "KILLER BEE" or Africanized Bee.(Apis mellifera scutellata). As with the fire ant, the killer bee, although it looks outwardly very much like the European bees that are more docile and produce honey commercially, the warlike, territorially aggressive killer bee, tends to move into an area, kill or drive off the other bees, and become the dominant form of bee.

Interestingly, the country from which both of these insects came from to the USA, was South America..

The title of this article is "AN EAGLE WITH ONLY A RIGHT WING CAN'T FLY". The Eagle of course, is the United States. The Congress is now dominated by just one party, and the executive brance is rule by that same party.

Republicans often may look like democrats, like a killer bee may look like a European bee or a fire ant may look like another ant, but, like these aggressive, predatorial insects, seem to want to wipe out the opposition, and show little real interest in co-existing, or working in a truly bipartisan manner.

As with the EAGLE, the United States needs BOTH wings, Right AND Left, not only to fly at all, but certtainly to fly toward a forward destination.

Anyone paddling a boat only on the RIGHT, is never going to reach their destination on the other side, but will instead, merely go in a circle.

This country MUST head toward a positive destination, and for that, we need BOTH wings!
~CodeWarriorz Thoughts

The Bizarre State of the Union Event

2005-02-06T07:56:00.000-08:00

The Bizarre State of the Union Event
2005-02-06 10:49:56

I watched the State of the Union address old Bushy made again this morning....actually, am watching it as I write this. As usual, it was a surreal event, though it couldn't surpass that surreal of the surreal, the mother of all surreal parades, that Inauguaral Big Brother event.

I am watching the Repubs hopping up clapping, sitting again, hopping up and clapping like glorified Jacks-in-the-Box.

Watching the Repubs clapping in approbation to the bizarre things he says, gives new meaning to the term, Folie à deux (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Folie_%E0_deux ). In the case of Bushy, it should technically be called "Folie imposée " which is " where a dominant person (known as the 'primary', 'inducer' or 'principal') initially forms a delusional belief during a psychotic episode and imposes it on another person or persons (known as the 'secondary', 'acceptor' or 'associate') with the assumption that the secondary person might not have become deluded if left to their own devices. If the parties are admitted to hospital separately then the delusions in the person with the induced beliefs usually resolve without the need of medication. "

As usual, he rants and includes his little agenda buzz words like "a culture of life". Wanna know more on this "culture of life"?

The Culture of Life Foundation & Institute

http://www.christianity.com/cultureoflife

This is the kind of vile crap they spew there...

"Reintroduced Fetal Pain Bill Garners Unlikely Supporter

Kansas Senator Sam Brownback reintroduced a bill on Wednesday that requires abortionists to notify women who want abortions after 20 weeks of pregnancy that their unborn baby can likely experience extreme pain. Following the bill's introduction came mystifying news that pro-abortion advocate Frances Kissling, president of "Catholics" for a Free Choice (CFFC), was offering conditional support for the proposed legislation.

The Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act requires the abortionist to verbally inform and to provide a brochure to the woman seeking an abortion about the medical evidence of pain experienced by an unborn child 20 weeks after fertilization. The proposed law also requires that the pregnant woman be given the option of providing anesthesia for the unborn baby."

The other buzzwords he likes is "faith based"...which is a euphemism for right wing religious zealots who want nothing less than a theocracy it seems, and that that theocracy would install THEIR version of fundamentalist Christianity as the state religion.

And, without further waiting, here is the transcript from CSPAN of this "Resident's Ramblings"...

"PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH'S ADDRESS BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS ON THE STATE OF THE UNION

February 2, 2005

9:10 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Speaker, Vice President Cheney, members of Congress, fellow citizens:

As a new Congress gathers, all of us in the elected branches of government share a great privilege: We've been placed in office by the votes of the people we serve. And tonight that is a privilege we share with newly-elected leaders of Afghanistan, the Palestinian Territories, Ukraine, and a free and sovereign Iraq. (Applause.)

Two weeks ago, I stood on the steps of this Capitol and renewed the commitment of our nation to the guiding ideal of liberty for all. This evening I will set forth policies to advance that ideal at home and around the world.

Tonight, with a healthy, growing economy, with more Americans going back to work, with our nation an active force for good in the world -- the state of our union is confident and strong. (Applause.)

Our generation has been blessed -- by the expansion of opportunity, by advances in medicine, by the security purchased by our parents' sacrifice. Now, as we see a little gray in the mirror -- or a lot of gray -- (laughter) -- and we watch our children moving into adulthood, we ask the question: What will be the state of their union? Members of Congress, the choices we make together will answer that question. Over the next several months, on issue after issue, let us do what Americans have always done, and build a better world for our children and our grandchildren. (Applause.)

First, we must be good stewards of this economy, and renew the great institutions on which millions of our fellow citizens rely. America's economy is the fastest growing of any major industrialized nation. In the past four years, we provided tax relief to every person who pays income taxes, overcome a recession, opened up new markets abroad, prosecuted corporate criminals, raised homeownership to its highest level in history, and in the last year alone, the United States has added 2.3 million new jobs. (Applause.) When action was needed, the Congress delivered -- and the nation is grateful.

Now we must add to these achievements. By making our economy more flexible, more innovative, and more competitive, we will keep America the economic leader of the world. (Applause.)

America's prosperity requires restraining the spending appetite of the federal government. I welcome the bipartisan enthusiasm for spending discipline. I will send you a budget that holds the growth of discretionary spending below inflation, makes tax relief permanent, and stays on track to cut the deficit in half by 2009. (Applause.) My budget substantially reduces or eliminates more than 150 government programs that are not getting results, or duplicate current efforts, or do not fulfill essential priorities. The principle here is clear: Taxpayer dollars must be spent wisely, or not at all. (Applause.)

To make our economy stronger and more dynamic, we must prepare a rising generation to fill the jobs of the 21st century. Under the No Child Left Behind Act, standards are higher, test scores are on the rise, and we're closing the achievement gap for minority students. Now we must demand better results from our high schools, so every high school diploma is a ticket to success. We will help an additional 200,000 workers to get training for a better career, by reforming our job training system and strengthening America's community colleges. And we'll make it easier for Americans to afford a college education, by increasing the size of Pell Grants. (Applause.)

To make our economy stronger and more competitive, America must reward, not punish, the efforts and dreams of entrepreneurs. Small business is the path of advancement, especially for women and minorities, so we must free small businesses from needless regulation and protect honest job-creators from junk lawsuits. (Applause.) Justice is distorted, and our economy is held back by irresponsible class-actions and frivolous asbestos claims -- and I urge Congress to pass legal reforms this year. (Applause.)

To make our economy stronger and more productive, we must make health care more affordable, and give families greater access to good coverage -- (applause) -- and more control over their health decisions. (Applause.) I ask Congress to move forward on a comprehensive health care agenda with tax credits to help low-income workers buy insurance, a community health center in every poor country, improved information technology to prevent medical error and needless costs, association health plans for small businesses and their employees -- (applause) -- expanded health savings accounts -- (applause) -- and medical liability reform that will reduce health care costs and make sure patients have the doctors and care they need. (Applause.)

To keep our economy growing, we also need reliable supplies of affordable, environmentally responsible energy. (Applause.) Nearly four years ago, I submitted a comprehensive energy strategy that encourages conservation, alternative sources, a modernized electricity grid, and more production here at home -- including safe, clean nuclear energy. (Applause.) My Clear Skies legislation will cut power plant pollution and improve the health of our citizens. (Applause.) And my budget provides strong funding for leading-edge technology -- from hydrogen-fueled cars, to clean coal, to renewable sources such as ethanol. (Applause.) Four years of debate is enough: I urge Congress to pass legislation that makes America more secure and less dependent on foreign energy. (Applause.)

All these proposals are essential to expand this economy and add new jobs -- but they are just the beginning of our duty. To build the prosperity of future generations, we must update institutions that were created to meet the needs of an earlier time. Year after year, Americans are burdened by an archaic, incoherent federal tax code. I've appointed a bipartisan panel to examine the tax code from top to bottom. And when their recommendations are delivered, you and I will work together to give this nation a tax code that is pro-growth, easy to understand, and fair to all. (Applause.)

America's immigration system is also outdated -- unsuited to the needs of our economy and to the values of our country. We should not be content with laws that punish hardworking people who want only to provide for their families, and deny businesses willing workers, and invite chaos at our border. It is time for an immigration policy that permits temporary guest workers to fill jobs Americans will not take, that rejects amnesty, that tells us who is entering and leaving our country, and that closes the border to drug dealers and terrorists. (Applause.)

One of America's most important institutions -- a symbol of the trust between generations -- is also in need of wise and effective reform. Social Security was a great moral success of the 20th century, and we must honor its great purposes in this new century. (Applause.) The system, however, on its current path, is headed toward bankruptcy. And so we must join together to strengthen and save Social Security. (Applause.)

Today, more than 45 million Americans receive Social Security benefits, and millions more are nearing retirement -- and for them the system is sound and fiscally strong. I have a message for every American who is 55 or older: Do not let anyone mislead you; for you, the Social Security system will not change in any way. (Applause.) For younger workers, the Social Security system has serious problems that will grow worse with time. Social Security was created decades ago, for a very different era. In those days, people did not live as long. Benefits were much lower than they are today. And a half-century ago, about sixteen workers paid into the system for each person drawing benefits.

Our society has changed in ways the founders of Social Security could not have foreseen. In today's world, people are living longer and, therefore, drawing benefits longer. And those benefits are scheduled to rise dramatically over the next few decades. And instead of sixteen workers paying in for every beneficiary, right now it's only about three workers. And over the next few decades that number will fall to just two workers per beneficiary. With each passing year, fewer workers are paying ever-higher benefits to an ever-larger number of retirees.

So here is the result: Thirteen years from now, in 2018, Social Security will be paying out more than it takes in. And every year afterward will bring a new shortfall, bigger than the year before. For example, in the year 2027, the government will somehow have to come up with an extra $200 billion to keep the system afloat -- and by 2033, the annual shortfall would be more than $300 billion. By the year 2042, the entire system would be exhausted and bankrupt. If steps are not taken to avert that outcome, the only solutions would be dramatically higher taxes, massive new borrowing, or sudden and severe cuts in Social Security benefits or other government programs.

I recognize that 2018 and 2042 may seem a long way off. But those dates are not so distant, as any parent will tell you. If you have a five-year-old, you're already concerned about how you'll pay for college tuition 13 years down the road. If you've got children in their 20s, as some of us do, the idea of Social Security collapsing before they retire does not seem like a small matter. And it should not be a small matter to the United States Congress. (Applause.) You and I share a responsibility. We must pass reforms that solve the financial problems of Social Security once and for all.

Fixing Social Security permanently will require an open, candid review of the options. Some have suggested limiting benefits for wealthy retirees. Former Congressman Tim Penny has raised the possibility of indexing benefits to prices rather than wages. During the 1990s, my predecessor, President Clinton, spoke of increasing the retirement age. Former Senator John Breaux suggested discouraging early collection of Social Security benefits. The late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan recommended changing the way benefits are calculated. All these ideas are on the table.

I know that none of these reforms would be easy. But we have to move ahead with courage and honesty, because our children's retirement security is more important than partisan politics. (Applause.) I will work with members of Congress to find the most effective combination of reforms. I will listen to anyone who has a good idea to offer. (Applause.) We must, however, be guided by some basic principles. We must make Social Security permanently sound, not leave that task for another day. We must not jeopardize our economic strength by increasing payroll taxes. We must ensure that lower-income Americans get the help they need to have dignity and peace of mind in their retirement. We must guarantee there is no change for those now retired or nearing retirement. And we must take care that any changes in the system are gradual, so younger workers have years to prepare and plan for their future.

As we fix Social Security, we also have the responsibility to make the system a better deal for younger workers. And the best way to reach that goal is through voluntary personal retirement accounts. (Applause.) Here is how the idea works. Right now, a set portion of the money you earn is taken out of your paycheck to pay for the Social Security benefits of today's retirees. If you're a younger worker, I believe you should be able to set aside part of that money in your own retirement account, so you can build a nest egg for your own future.

Here's why the personal accounts are a better deal. Your money will grow, over time, at a greater rate than anything the current system can deliver -- and your account will provide money for retirement over and above the check you will receive from Social Security. In addition, you'll be able to pass along the money that accumulates in your personal account, if you wish, to your children and -- or grandchildren. And best of all, the money in the account is yours, and the government can never take it away. (Applause.)

The goal here is greater security in retirement, so we will set careful guidelines for personal accounts. We'll make sure the money can only go into a conservative mix of bonds and stock funds. We'll make sure that your earnings are not eaten up by hidden Wall Street fees. We'll make sure there are good options to protect your investments from sudden market swings on the eve of your retirement. We'll make sure a personal account cannot be emptied out all at once, but rather paid out over time, as an addition to traditional Social Security benefits. And we'll make sure this plan is fiscally responsible, by starting personal retirement accounts gradually, and raising the yearly limits on contributions over time, eventually permitting all workers to set aside four percentage points of their payroll taxes in their accounts.

Personal retirement accounts should be familiar to federal employees, because you already have something similar, called the Thrift Savings Plan, which lets workers deposit a portion of their paychecks into any of five different broadly-based investment funds. It's time to extend the same security, and choice, and ownership to young Americans. (Applause.)

Our second great responsibility to our children and grandchildren is to honor and to pass along the values that sustain a free society. So many of my generation, after a long journey, have come home to family and faith, and are determined to bring up responsible, moral children. Government is not the source of these values, but government should never undermine them.

Because marriage is a sacred institution and the foundation of society, it should not be re-defined by activist judges. For the good of families, children, and society, I support a constitutional amendment to protect the institution of marriage. (Applause.)

Because a society is measured by how it treats the weak and vulnerable, we must strive to build a culture of life. Medical research can help us reach that goal, by developing treatments and cures that save lives and help people overcome disabilities -- and I thank the Congress for doubling the funding of the National Institutes of Health. (Applause.) To build a culture of life, we must also ensure that scientific advances always serve human dignity, not take advantage of some lives for the benefit of others. We should all be able to agree -- (applause) -- we should all be able to agree on some clear standards. I will work with Congress to ensure that human embryos are not created for experimentation or grown for body parts, and that human life is never bought and sold as a commodity. (Applause.) America will continue to lead the world in medical research that is ambitious, aggressive, and always ethical.

Because courts must always deliver impartial justice, judges have a duty to faithfully interpret the law, not legislate from the bench. (Applause.) As President, I have a constitutional responsibility to nominate men and women who understand the role of courts in our democracy, and are well-qualified to serve on the bench -- and I have done so. (Applause.) The Constitution also gives the Senate a responsibility: Every judicial nominee deserves an up or down vote. (Applause.)

Because one of the deepest values of our country is compassion, we must never turn away from any citizen who feels isolated from the opportunities of America. Our government will continue to support faith-based and community groups that bring hope to harsh places. Now we need to focus on giving young people, especially young men in our cities, better options than apathy, or gangs, or jail. Tonight I propose a three-year initiative to help organizations keep young people out of gangs, and show young men an ideal of manhood that respects women and rejects violence. (Applause.) Taking on gang life will be one part of a broader outreach to at-risk youth, which involves parents and pastors, coaches and community leaders, in programs ranging from literacy to sports. And I am proud that the leader of this nationwide effort will be our First Lady, Laura Bush. (Applause.)

Because HIV/AIDS brings suffering and fear into so many lives, I ask you to reauthorize the Ryan White Act to encourage prevention, and provide care and treatment to the victims of that disease. (Applause.) And as we update this important law, we must focus our efforts on fellow citizens with the highest rates of new cases, African American men and women. (Applause.)

Because one of the main sources of our national unity is our belief in equal justice, we need to make sure Americans of all races and backgrounds have confidence in the system that provides justice. In America we must make doubly sure no person is held to account for a crime he or she did not commit -- so we are dramatically expanding the use of DNA evidence to prevent wrongful conviction. (Applause.) Soon I will send to Congress a proposal to fund special training for defense counsel in capital cases, because people on trial for their lives must have competent lawyers by their side. (Applause.)

Our third responsibility to future generations is to leave them an America that is safe from danger, and protected by peace. We will pass along to our children all the freedoms we enjoy -- and chief among them is freedom from fear.

In the three and a half years since September the 11th, 2001, we have taken unprecedented actions to protect Americans. We've created a new department of government to defend our homeland, focused the FBI on preventing terrorism, begun to reform our intelligence agencies, broken up terror cells across the country, expanded research on defenses against biological and chemical attack, improved border security, and trained more than a half-million first responders. Police and firefighters, air marshals, researchers, and so many others are working every day to make our homeland safer, and we thank them all. (Applause.)

Our nation, working with allies and friends, has also confronted the enemy abroad, with measures that are determined, successful, and continuing. The al Qaeda terror network that attacked our country still has leaders -- but many of its top commanders have been removed. There are still governments that sponsor and harbor terrorists -- but their number has declined. There are still regimes seeking weapons of mass destruction -- but no longer without attention and without consequence. Our country is still the target of terrorists who want to kill many, and intimidate us all -- and we will stay on the offensive against them, until the fight is won. (Applause.)

Pursuing our enemies is a vital commitment of the war on terror -- and I thank the Congress for providing our servicemen and women with the resources they have needed. During this time of war, we must continue to support our military and give them the tools for victory. (Applause.)

Other nations around the globe have stood with us. In Afghanistan, an international force is helping provide security. In Iraq, 28 countries have troops on the ground, the United Nations and the European Union provided technical assistance for the elections, and NATO is leading a mission to help train Iraqi officers. We're cooperating with 60 governments in the Proliferation Security Initiative, to detect and stop the transit of dangerous materials. We're working closely with the governments in Asia to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and nine other countries have captured or detained al Qaeda terrorists. In the next four years, my administration will continue to build the coalitions that will defeat the dangers of our time. (Applause.)

In the long-term, the peace we seek will only be achieved by eliminating the conditions that feed radicalism and ideologies of murder. If whole regions of the world remain in despair and grow in hatred, they will be the recruiting grounds for terror, and that terror will stalk America and other free nations for decades. The only force powerful enough to stop the rise of tyranny and terror, and replace hatred with hope, is the force of human freedom. (Applause.) Our enemies know this, and that is why the terrorist Zarqawi recently declared war on what he called the "evil principle" of democracy. And we've declared our own intention: America will stand with the allies of freedom to support democratic movements in the Middle East and beyond, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. (Applause.)

The United States has no right, no desire, and no intention to impose our form of government on anyone else. That is one of the main differences between us and our enemies. They seek to impose and expand an empire of oppression, in which a tiny group of brutal, self-appointed rulers control every aspect of every life. Our aim is to build and preserve a community of free and independent nations, with governments that answer to their citizens, and reflect their own cultures. And because democracies respect their own people and their neighbors, the advance of freedom will lead to peace. (Applause.)

That advance has great momentum in our time -- shown by women voting in Afghanistan, and Palestinians choosing a new direction, and the people of Ukraine asserting their democratic rights and electing a president. We are witnessing landmark events in the history of liberty. And in the coming years, we will add to that story. (Applause.)

The beginnings of reform and democracy in the Palestinian territories are now showing the power of freedom to break old patterns of violence and failure. Tomorrow morning, Secretary of State Rice departs on a trip that will take her to Israel and the West Bank for meetings with Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas. She will discuss with them how we and our friends can help the Palestinian people end terror and build the institutions of a peaceful, independent, democratic state. To promote this democracy, I will ask Congress for $350 million to support Palestinian political, economic, and security reforms. The goal of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace, is within reach -- and America will help them achieve that goal. (Applause.)

To promote peace and stability in the broader Middle East, the United States will work with our friends in the region to fight the common threat of terror, while we encourage a higher standard of freedom. Hopeful reform is already taking hold in an arc from Morocco to Jordan to Bahrain. The government of Saudi Arabia can demonstrate its leadership in the region by expanding the role of its people in determining their future. And the great and proud nation of Egypt, which showed the way toward peace in the Middle East, can now show the way toward democracy in the Middle East. (Applause.)

To promote peace in the broader Middle East, we must confront regimes that continue to harbor terrorists and pursue weapons of mass murder. Syria still allows its territory, and parts of Lebanon, to be used by terrorists who seek to destroy every chance of peace in the region. You have passed, and we are applying, the Syrian Accountability Act -- and we expect the Syrian government to end all support for terror and open the door to freedom. (Applause.) Today, Iran remains the world's primary state sponsor of terror -- pursuing nuclear weapons while depriving its people of the freedom they seek and deserve. We are working with European allies to make clear to the Iranian regime that it must give up its uranium enrichment program and any plutonium reprocessing, and end its support for terror. And to the Iranian people, I say tonight: As you stand for your own liberty, America stands with you. (Applause.)

Our generational commitment to the advance of freedom, especially in the Middle East, is now being tested and honored in Iraq. That country is a vital front in the war on terror, which is why the terrorists have chosen to make a stand there. Our men and women in uniform are fighting terrorists in Iraq, so we do not have to face them here at home. (Applause.) And the victory of freedom in Iraq will strengthen a new ally in the war on terror, inspire democratic reformers from Damascus to Tehran, bring more hope and progress to a troubled region, and thereby lift a terrible threat from the lives of our children and grandchildren.

We will succeed because the Iraqi people value their own liberty -- as they showed the world last Sunday. (Applause.) Across Iraq, often at great risk, millions of citizens went to the polls and elected 275 men and women to represent them in a new Transitional National Assembly. A young woman in Baghdad told of waking to the sound of mortar fire on election day, and wondering if it might be too dangerous to vote. She said, "Hearing those explosions, it occurred to me -- the insurgents are weak, they are afraid of democracy, they are losing. So I got my husband, and I got my parents, and we all came out and voted together."

Americans recognize that spirit of liberty, because we share it. In any nation, casting your vote is an act of civic responsibility; for millions of Iraqis, it was also an act of personal courage, and they have earned the respect of us all. (Applause.)

One of Iraq's leading democracy and human rights advocates is Safia Taleb al-Suhail. She says of her country, "We were occupied for 35 years by Saddam Hussein. That was the real occupation. Thank you to the American people who paid the cost, but most of all, to the soldiers." Eleven years ago, Safia's father was assassinated by Saddam's intelligence service. Three days ago in Baghdad, Safia was finally able to vote for the leaders of her country -- and we are honored that she is with us tonight. (Applause.)

The terrorists and insurgents are violently opposed to democracy, and will continue to attack it. Yet, the terrorists' most powerful myth is being destroyed. The whole world is seeing that the car bombers and assassins are not only fighting coalition forces, they are trying to destroy the hopes of Iraqis, expressed in free elections. And the whole world now knows that a small group of extremists will not overturn the will of the Iraqi people. (Applause.)

We will succeed in Iraq because Iraqis are determined to fight for their own freedom, and to write their own history. As Prime Minister Allawi said in his speech to Congress last September, "Ordinary Iraqis are anxious to shoulder all the security burdens of our country as quickly as possible." That is the natural desire of an independent nation, and it is also the stated mission of our coalition in Iraq. The new political situation in Iraq opens a new phase of our work in that country.

At the recommendation of our commanders on the ground, and in consultation with the Iraqi government, we will increasingly focus our efforts on helping prepare more capable Iraqi security forces -- forces with skilled officers and an effective command structure. As those forces become more self-reliant and take on greater security responsibilities, America and its coalition partners will increasingly be in a supporting role. In the end, Iraqis must be able to defend their own country -- and we will help that proud, new nation secure its liberty.

Recently an Iraqi interpreter said to a reporter, "Tell America not to abandon us." He and all Iraqis can be certain: While our military strategy is adapting to circumstances, our commitment remains firm and unchanging. We are standing for the freedom of our Iraqi friends, and freedom in Iraq will make America safer for generations to come. (Applause.) We will not set an artificial timetable for leaving Iraq, because that would embolden the terrorists and make them believe they can wait us out. We are in Iraq to achieve a result: A country that is democratic, representative of all its people, at peace with its neighbors, and able to defend itself. And when that result is achieved, our men and women serving in Iraq will return home with the honor they have earned. (Applause.)

Right now, Americans in uniform are serving at posts across the world, often taking great risks on my orders. We have given them training and equipment; and they have given us an example of idealism and character that makes every American proud. (Applause.) The volunteers of our military are unrelenting in battle, unwavering in loyalty, unmatched in honor and decency, and every day they're making our nation more secure. Some of our servicemen and women have survived terrible injuries, and this grateful country will do everything we can to help them recover. (Applause.) And we have said farewell to some very good men and women, who died for our freedom, and whose memory this nation will honor forever.

One name we honor is Marine Corps Sergeant Byron Norwood of Pflugerville, Texas, who was killed during the assault on Fallujah. His mom, Janet, sent me a letter and told me how much Byron loved being a Marine, and how proud he was to be on the front line against terror. She wrote, "When Byron was home the last time, I said that I wanted to protect him like I had since he was born. He just hugged me and said, 'You've done your job, Mom. Now it is my turn to protect you.'" Ladies and gentlemen, with grateful hearts, we honor freedom's defenders, and our military families, represented here this evening by Sergeant Norwood's mom and dad, Janet and Bill Norwood. (Applause.)

In these four years, Americans have seen the unfolding of large events. We have known times of sorrow, and hours of uncertainty, and days of victory. In all this history, even when we have disagreed, we have seen threads of purpose that unite us. The attack on freedom in our world has reaffirmed our confidence in freedom's power to change the world. We are all part of a great venture: To extend the promise of freedom in our country, to renew the values that sustain our liberty, and to spread the peace that freedom brings.

As Franklin Roosevelt once reminded Americans, "Each age is a dream that is dying, or one that is coming to birth." And we live in the country where the biggest dreams are born. The abolition of slavery was only a dream -- until it was fulfilled. The liberation of Europe from fascism was only a dream -- until it was achieved. The fall of imperial communism was only a dream -- until, one day, it was accomplished. Our generation has dreams of its own, and we also go forward with confidence. The road of Providence is uneven and unpredictable -- yet we know where it leads: It leads to freedom.

Thank you, and may God bless America. (Applause.)

END 10:03 P.M. EST "

From http://www.c-span.org/executive/transcript.asp?cat=current_event&code=bush_admin&year=2005

====SNIP=============

...HMMM...DO TELL !

Marine General Says 'It's Fun to Kill'

2005-02-05T09:26:00.000-08:00

http://www.capitolhillblue.com/artman/publish/article_6133.shtml
Marine General Says 'It's Fun to Kill'
By JOHN J. LUMPKIN
Feb 4, 2005, 08:15

A decorated Marine Corps general said, "It's fun to shoot some people" and poked fun at the manhood of Afghans as he described the wars U.S. troops are fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.

His boss, the commandant of the Marine Corps, said Thursday that the comments reflected "the unfortunate and harsh realities of war" but that the general has been asked to watch his words in public.

Lt. Gen. James Mattis, a career infantry officer who is now in charge of developing better ways to train and equip Marines, made the comments Tuesday while speaking to a forum in San Diego.

According to an audio recording, he said, "Actually, it's a lot of fun to fight. You know, it's a hell of a hoot. ... It's fun to shoot some people. I'll be right up front with you, I like brawling."

He added, "You go into Afghanistan, you got guys who slap women around for five years because they didn't wear a veil. You know, guys like that ain't got no manhood left anyway. So it's a hell of a lot of fun to shoot them."

His comments were met with laughter and applause from the audience. Mattis was speaking during a panel discussion hosted by the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association, a spokeswoman for the general said.

Thursday, Gen. Mike Hagee, commandant of the Marine Corps, issued a statement saying, "Lt. Gen. Mattis often speaks with a great deal of candor. I have counseled him concerning his remarks and he agrees he should have chosen his words more carefully."

Hagee also said, "While I understand that some people may take issue with the comments made by him, I also know he intended to reflect the unfortunate and harsh realities of war."

Among Marines, Mattis is regarded as a fighting general and an expert in the art of warfare. Among his decorations are the Bronze Star with a combat distinguishing device and a combat action ribbon, awarded for close-quarters fighting.

He is currently the commanding general of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command in Quantico, Va., and deputy commandant for combat development.

Marine Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said it was up to Mattis to address his own comments, but he added, "All of us who are leaders have a responsibility in our words and our actions to provide the right example all the time for those who look to us for leadership."

Pace spoke to a Pentagon press conference. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said he had not read Mattis' words and deferred to Pace.

The Council on American-Islamic Relations, a Muslim civil liberties group, called on the Pentagon to discipline Mattis for the remarks.

"We do not need generals who treat the grim business of war as a sporting event," said the council's executive director, Nihad Awad. "These disturbing remarks are indicative of an apparent indifference to the value of human life."

Pace and Hagee praised the general's service.

"His actions and those of his troops clearly show that he understands the value of proper leadership and the value of human life," Pace said.

Hagee called him "one of this country's bravest and most experienced military leaders."

He said the commitment of Marines "helps to provide us the fortitude to take the lives of those who oppress others or threaten this nation's security. This is not something we relish, yet we accept it as a reality in our profession of arms."

Hagee said he was confident Mattis would continue to serve with distinction.

Mattis' comments were reported by the television station KNSD in San Diego, and the audio recording was posted on its Web site www.nbcsandiego.com .

As a lieutenant colonel, Mattis led an assault battalion into Kuwait during the first war with Iraq. During the war in Afghanistan, he commanded the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade and subsequently Task Force 58, which fought in southern Afghanistan as the Taliban fell.

During the second war in Iraq, he commanded the 1st Marine Division during the invasion and also when the unit returned to Iraq for counterinsurgency operations last year.

In a letter to his troops before they redeployed to Iraq last March, Mattis warned them of "hard, dangerous work."

"The enemy will try to manipulate you into hating all Iraqis," he wrote. "Do not allow the enemy that victory. With strong discipline, solid faith, unwavering alertness, and undiminished chivalry to the innocent, we will carry out this mission."

He is not the first senior military officer since the Sept. 11 attacks to stir controversy with his comments.

Lt. Gen. William Boykin, a senior military intelligence officer, was criticized for speeches he made at evangelical Christian churches. He said that America's enemy was Satan, that God had put President Bush in the White House and that one Muslim Somali warlord was an idol-worshipper.

Boykin later issued a written statement apologizing and saying he did not mean to insult Islam.

A Pentagon investigation concluded that Boykin violated regulations by failing to make clear he was not speaking in an official capacity in the speeches beginning in January 2002.

The Inaugural Parade

2005-01-21T04:08:00.000-08:00

The 2005 Coronation of King George the Cowardly.

Well, our national trip down the Rabbithole of Alice in Wonderland was made complete with the Coronation of King George the Cowardly. As I watched the "parade", it was bizarre to say the least. There were vehicles moving in a V formation like the flying phalanx of ancient Sparta...there were Matrix like guys in dark sunglasses and long, black overcoats flanking the "Presidential limo", and at one point, there was a truck that came rolling along that had armed thugs hanging on the side that a friend watching the procession remarked to me, looked like the Mob, much like something you would see from the Al Capone era, when armed thugs would be festooning a vehicle's exterior, with their feet implanted on the running boards of the truck or car.

It looked less like a Presidential inauguration parade (I've never seen one of them), and more like Hitler's triumphant march into Poland or Paris. Actually, if some of the Men in Black had been sporting the traditional silver SS pins or Death's Head pins, the picture would have been complete....all Bushy would need would be a tiny little moustache (but perhaps, he cannot muster enough testosterone to generate one).

In another portion of the program, Hitler...er, uh, BUSHY, was addressing / commanding people from a large white podium, which was reminiscent of something you saw Il Duce (Mussolini) or Hitler do, in old film reels. His Effete Foppishness was. for all the world, an effeminate version of Big Brother re-enacted for all the world to see.

To say that the Inauguration Parade looked like the New World Order in all its "glory" would be to understate the matter.

As the tanks and troops marched down the road, even the commentators on ABC said it looked like something you would see in a Banana republic, at the direction of some dictator. As they say..."TRUE DAT".

Along the parade route, it was teeming with people, held behind great fences which, for some reason, looked like the fences at Auschwitz . And, we saw the police running along the fences, often spraying pepper spray into the eyes of these law abiding citizens whose only crime was exercising their right of free speech.

While our own citizens are starving, and troops don't have what they need, Marie Antoinette...er...Mrs. Bush, was prancing around in a solid white Oscar de la Renta that costs TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS. Talk about letting them eat cake and fiddling while Rome burned...surely, their little pageant needs to reserve a rank in the history books as at least as outrageous as these. Estimates of forty to forty four MILLION dollars for this little debacle, are said to be low.

To me, it certainly adds up to a new definition of an obscene waste of money...but of course, the money is from "private" sources, which is the easy way of saying it oozes from the teats of the Pigopolists, each vying for the ability to muzzle in on the treasure trove which will be available to Bushy's toadies.

So, as Alex in Clockwork Orange might say in Nadsat, "Yes my little droogies, even the melodies of the Glorious Ludwig von....were soured by that scene. Bushy is a baddiwad chelloveck!".

During one scene, the "Presidential Limo" rolled through a tremendous cloud of smoke/fog, coming from a heating vent or something in the road. As it emerged eerily from the grey cloud, it looked like Dracula tooling around Transylvania, with his black coated, black sunglassed Familiars in attendance.

And so, the New Nightmare Begins.

~CodeWarriorz Thoughts

What planet is CONDOLEEZA From?

2005-01-19T04:45:00.000-08:00

Capitol Hill Blue: Big Brother is Alive, Well and Watching Your Travel Habits

2005-01-16T06:06:00.000-08:00

Capitol Hill Blue: Big Brother is Alive, Well and Watching Your Travel Habits
Big Brother is Alive, Well and Watching Your Travel Habits
By Staff and Wire Reports
Jan 15, 2005, 10:40
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If you're among the millions of Americans who took airline flights in the months before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the FBI probably knows about it - and possibly where you stayed, whom you traveled with, what credit card you used and even whether you ordered a kosher meal.
The bureau is keeping 257.5 million records on people who flew on commercial airlines from June through September 2001 in its permanent investigative database, according to information obtained by a privacy group and made available to The Associated Press.

Privacy advocates say they're troubled by the possibility that the FBI could be analyzing personal information about people without their knowledge or permission.

"The FBI collected a vast amount of information about millions of people with no indication that they had done anything unlawful," said Marcia Hofmann, attorney with the Electronic Privacy Information Center, which learned about the data through a Freedom of Information Act request.

"The fact that they're hanging on to the information is inexcusable," Hofmann said on Friday.

FBI spokesman Bill Carter said the bureau was required to retain its records.

"There are rules that have been set by the National Archives with regard to the retention of records by government agencies," Carter said.

Hofmann, though, said the FBI still had a legal responsibility to tell people that it had obtained information about them and to let them have access to it.

As part of its investigation into the terrorist attacks, the FBI asked for, and got, the records from a number of airlines shortly after Sept. 11. The FBI also got one set of data through a federal grand jury subpoena.

The privacy center in May requested records of the FBI's acquisition of the data. The bureau last week turned over 12 pages of information, much of it blanked out for security reasons.

The 12 pages do show that the bureau obtained 82.1 million passenger manifests, or lists of people who flew on planes, between January and September 2001, in addition to the 257.5 million passenger name records.

Citing privacy concerns, the FBI didn't reveal which airlines turned over the information, which airline employees turned it over and which FBI special agents got it.

The data are called passenger name records, or PNR, and can include a variety of information such as credit card numbers, travel itineraries, addresses, telephone numbers and meal requests.

David Hardy, the FBI's chief of the record/information dissemination section of the records management division, said in a legal document dated Jan. 5 that the data were being stored and combined with other information from the Sept. 11 investigation, dubbed PENTTBOMB.

"I have been advised that the Airline Data Sets have been entered by the Cyber Division into a 'Data Warehouse' and have been intertwined for analytical purposes with the information from several other PENTTBOMB Data Sets," Hardy wrote in a statement to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, where the privacy center filed its suit.

Hofmann, the attorney for the privacy group, said the FBI had a legitimate reason for collecting information to get a better picture of the hijackers' travel patterns and possible associates.

But, she said, "it wouldn't seem that there's any reason to keep that information now."

The FBI's Carter said he couldn't comment on what may be happening to the data because the bureau is involved in a lawsuit by the privacy center.

Daniel Solove, a George Washington University Law School professor and author of a book on privacy, said not enough is known about what the FBI is doing with the data to determine if there is a problem.

"Data just sits around and who knows what people are doing with it?" Solove said. "The public is left completely out of the loop, not told what this data is for. The agency is basically saying 'Trust us.'"

Solove suggested there was irony in Congress last year ordering the FBI to more quickly purge information obtained in background checks of gun buyers. That, he said, can be useful in tracking down criminals.

"Congress wants to protect guns at great cost, but when it comes to privacy and civil liberties generally, it doesn't register on the same level," Solove said

Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., No. 981564, Filed October 19, 2001, 2001 UT 89

2005-01-15T18:26:00.000-08:00

Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., No. 981564, Filed October 19, 2001, 2001 UT 89
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----oo0oo----

Curtis B. Campbell and Inez
Preece Campbell,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
and Cross-Appellants,

v.

State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company,
Defendant, Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee.

No. 981564

F I L E D
October 19, 2001

2001 UT 89

---
Third District, Salt Lake
The Honorable William B. Bohling

Attorneys:
L. Rich Humpherys, Roger P. Christensen, Karra J. Porter, Salt Lake City, Laurence H. Tribe, Kenneth J. Chesebro, Cambridge, MA, W. Scott Barrett, Logan, for plaintiffs
Glenn C. Hanni, Paul M. Belnap, Stuart H. Schultz, Salt Lake City, Evan M. Tager, Adam C. Sloane, Washington DC, for defendant
George C. Harris, Salt Lake City, amici National Association of Independent Insurers, National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, United Services Automobile Association, Farmers Group of Insurance Companies, SAFECO Insurance Company of America.

---
DURHAM, Justice:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 On August 24, 1989, plaintiffs Curtis B. and Inez Preece Campbell, sued State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for damages arising from State Farm's decision to try a third-party automobile accident case in which Mr. Campbell was the defendant, rather than accepting offers to settle for the policy limits of Mr. Campbell's insurance policy. The jury found in plaintiffs' favor, awarding them $911.25 in out-of-pocket costs, $2.6 million in compensatory damages, and $145 million in punitive damages. State Farm filed several post-verdict motions challenging the jury verdict, which the trial court rejected. As a condition of denying State Farm's motion for a new trial, however, the trial court remitted the compensatory damage award from $2.6 million to $1 million and the punitive damage award from $145 million to $25 million. The Campbells also received a judgment from the trial court for attorney fees and litigation expenses in the amount of $801,582.48. State Farm has appealed from the judgment and the Campbells have cross-appealed the trial court's remittitur ruling on punitive damages.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On May 22, 1981, while driving north on Highway 89-91 near Logan, Utah, Mr. Campbell unsafely passed a car driven by Robert Slusher (Slusher).(1) Slusher, 777 P.2d at 438-39. This unsafe maneuver forced a southbound car, driven by Todd Ospital, to veer onto the shoulder of the road and collide with Slusher's car a split second later. Id. at 439. The accident killed Todd Ospital at the scene and left Slusher disabled. Id. Although the initial investigation of the accident supported differing conclusions as to who caused the accident, a consensus was reached early on by the investigators and witnesses that Mr. Campbell's unsafe pass had indeed caused the crash.

¶3 In September 1981, Slusher filed an action against Mr. Campbell, Ospital's estate (Ospital), and Kenneth Brooks (the owner of the car driven by Todd Ospital) for damages resulting from the collision. Slusher, 777 P.2d at 439. Ospital filed a cross-claim against Mr. Campbell for wrongful death. Id. Mr. Campbell cross-claimed against Ospital for contribution. Id.

¶4 During discovery, State Farm collected evidence that blamed Mr. Campbell for the accident. At various stages throughout discovery, including as late as a month before trial, Slusher and Ospital invited State Farm to settle for the policy limits of the Campbell policy.(2) On April 23, 1983, Ospital's counsel even sent a letter to State Farm stating that State Farm "should tender its limits" because "[a] limit of $25,000 is too low to risk excess exposure by exposing its insured to personal liability." This letter also stated that if State Farm continued to oppose settlement, Ospital would seek a separate agreement with Slusher that "may not likely be favorable to [Mr.] Campbell's interests." However, State Farm never departed from its original "no settlement" stance, continuing to reject offers made following the commencement of the trial.

¶5 In choosing not to settle, State Farm superintendent Bob Noxon (Noxon) and divisional superintendent Bill Brown (Brown) rejected a report of State Farm investigator Ray Summers (Summers) that stated there was evidence of fault on Mr. Campbell's part. In particular, Brown ordered Summers to change the portion of his report describing the facts of the accident and his analysis of liability "wherein [he] had indicated an exposure [for Mr. Campbell], and that there could be a high settlement value on it." Additionally, after hearing from Bill Brown, Noxon told Summers that Noxon had "screwed up" by agreeing with Summers' initial analysis regarding Mr. Campbell's fault and demanded that Summers return to Noxon the letter Noxon had written indicating his approval. Subsequently, State Farm discontinued Summers' involvement in the case. State Farm hired Wendell Bennett (Bennett), an attorney who had done a considerable amount of work for State Farm, to represent the Campbells.

¶6 In June 1983, Ospital's estate did in fact enter into a separate settlement agreement with Slusher. Ospital had $130,000 of combined liability insurance.(3) Under the settlement agreement, Ospital's estate paid Slusher $65,000 dollars and the Ospitals promised to assist Slusher in prosecuting claims against Mr. Campbell and his insurer, State Farm. In exchange, Slusher released all claims he had against Ospital's estate. Id.

¶7 Shortly thereafter, the case against Mr. Campbell went to trial. The jury found Mr. Campbell 100% at fault for the accident and a judgment for $135,000 was entered. Slusher, 777 P.2d at 439. The jury also awarded Ospital damages in the amount of $50,849. In light of Bennett's numerous reassurances to both Mr. and Mrs. Campbell that their assets were safe, that they had no liability for the accident, that he would represent their interests, and that they did not need to procure separate counsel, the Campbells were utterly dismayed. To their expressions of dismay, Bennett responded by telling the Campbells that "[y]ou may want to put for sale signs on your property to get things moving," making it clear that State Farm did not intend to pay the excess judgment against the Campbells. Furthermore, State Farm declined to post a supersedeas bond on appeal in excess of their $25,000 policy limit. The Campbells immediately acquired other counsel and learned that their situation was indeed grave.

¶8 In late 1984, Slusher, Ospital, and Mr. Campbell entered into an agreement in which Mr. Campbell agreed that: (1) he would pursue a bad faith action against State Farm; (2) Ospital's and Slusher's attorneys would represent him in that action; (3) Slusher and Ospital would have the right to be part of all major decisions relating to that action; (4) no settlement of any claim against State Farm could be made without Slusher's and Ospital's approval; and (5) in the event Mr. Campbell recovered any monies, Ospital and Slusher would receive 90% of the sum remaining after certain agreed-upon obligations were paid. In exchange, Slusher and Ospital agreed to not seek satisfaction of their judgment from Mr. Campbell and to inform anyone checking on Mr. Campbell's credit that their judgments were not personal obligations. Id.

¶9 In 1989, this court affirmed the 1983 verdict against Mr. Campbell. Slusher v. Ospital, 777 P.2d 437, 438-39 (Utah 1989). State Farm then paid all of the damages awarded in the 1983 action, both its policy limits and Mr. Campbell's personal liability. Shortly thereafter, the Campbells filed this action against State Farm alleging, among other things, bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary judgment to State Farm on the ground that because it had ultimately paid all of the damages awarded, there had been no bad faith as a matter of law. Plaintiffs appealed to this court, which transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded, stating that although State Farm had paid the debt, the Campbells had the right to pursue their claim that there had been bad faith in the previous dealings. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130, 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1992).

¶10 On remand, the trial court denied State Farm's motion to introduce the settlement agreement entered into by Slusher and Ospital before the original trial in Logan, Utah. However, over the Campbells' resistance, the trial court did grant State Farm's motion to bifurcate the trial. In phase I of the trial, the jury was to determine whether State Farm acted in bad faith. Id. Only if the jury found such bad faith would phase II, setting the compensatory damages award for State Farm's bad faith and addressing the Campbells' claims for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages, occur.

¶11 In phase I, the jury found that State Farm had acted unreasonably and in bad faith in its decision to take the case to trial because there was a substantial likelihood of an excess judgment against Mr. Campbell. Notwithstanding this finding of bad faith, State Farm argued during phase II that its decision to take the case to trial was an "honest mistake" that did not warrant punitive damages. In contrast, the Campbells introduced evidence that State Farm's decision to take the case to trial was a result of a national scheme to meet corporate fiscal goals by capping payouts on claims company wide. This scheme was referred to as State Farm's "Performance, Planning and Review," or PP&R, policy. To prove the existence of this scheme, the trial court allowed the Campbells to introduce extensive expert testimony regarding fraudulent practices by State Farm in its nation-wide operations. Although State Farm moved prior to phase II of the trial for the exclusion of such evidence and continued to object to it at trial, the trial court ruled that such evidence was admissible to determine whether State Farm's conduct in the Campbell case was indeed intentional and sufficiently egregious to warrant punitive damages.

¶12 At the close of the evidence, the jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million(4) in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages. State Farm made several post-verdict motions, including motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, for a new trial, and for remittitur of the damage awards. Ultimately, the trial court denied all of State Farm's motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. However, the trial court did order a remittitur of the damage awards to $1 million in compensatory damages(5) and $25 million in punitive damages.(6) In addition, the trial court awarded the Campbells $400,834.70 (forty percent of the compensatory damages award) for attorney fees and $400,747.78 for litigation expenses, totaling $801,582.48.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW(7)

¶13 We list the issues and applicable standards of review in the order of their treatment in the analysis portion of this opinion.

1. Did the trial court commit reversible error in permitting an award of $25 million in punitive damages to stand?
a. In particular, State Farm argues that the $25 million punitive damages award is excessive under both Utah and federal law.
Standard of Review:
Under Utah law, seven factors must be analyzed to determine whether the amount of a punitive damage award is excessive. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 808 (Utah 1991) (Crookston I). We have heretofore reviewed the trial court's findings of fact regarding all but the seventh Crookston I factor under a clearly erroneous standard. See State v. Peña, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). Because the seventh Crookston I factor involves the trial court's application of the law to the facts, we have in the past reviewed the trial court's determination for correctness, while at the same time affording the trial court some discretion as to the underlying facts. Seeid. at 936-39. Recently, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has imposed a new standard of review as a matter of federal constitutional law in punitive damages cases.(8) In Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S.Ct 1678, 532 U.S. 424 (2001), the Supreme Court held that federal due process requires federal appellate courts to review punitive damage awards de novo when they are challenged on constitutional grounds. Id. at 1682-83. In view of the applicability of fourteenth amendment standards to state courts, we adopt the de novo standard for reviewing jury and trial court conclusions under the Crookston I factors.

2. Did the trial court commit reversible error by admitting "other acts" evidence in violation of Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b)?
Standard of Review:

"[W]e review a trial court's decision to admit evidence under rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. We review the record to determine whether the admission of other bad acts evidence was 'scrupulously examined' by the trial judge 'in the proper exercise of that discretion.'" State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ¶ 16, 6 P.3d 1120 (quoting State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, ¶ 18, 993 P.2d 837) (footnote omitted).
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error by allowing the Campbells' experts to testify because they "usurp[ed] the function of the jury, g[a]ve irrelevant testimony, evade[ed] the hearsay rules, and testif[ied] without a proper foundation?"

Standard of Review:
A trial court's decision to admit expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Patey v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, ¶ 33, 977 P.2d 1193; State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). Furthermore, a trial court will not be reversed for an abuse of discretion unless "there is a reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different if the trial court had [excluded] the expert testimony." Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993).
4. Did the trial court commit reversible error in excluding evidence relating to the settlement agreement between Slusher and Ospital?
Standard of Review:

We review a trial court's decision regarding the relevancy of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976) ("The trial court is given considerable discretion in deciding whether or not evidence submitted is relevant."); State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (same).
5. Did the trial court commit reversible error by ruling that Mrs. Campbell has standing to pursue a bad faith claim?
Standard of Review:

This is a legal issue, and is reviewed for correctness. Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989).
6. Did the trial court commit reversible error by allowing Mrs. Campbell to recover for fraud when the evidence was insufficient to support her claim?
Standard of Review:

When considering challenges to jury verdicts based on insufficiency of the evidence, "we view the evidence in the light most supportive of the verdict, and assume that the jury believed those aspects of the evidence which sustain its findings and judgment." Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 467 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the verdict supports the verdict, we will affirm." Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995).
7a. Did the trial court commit reversible error by allowing both Mr. and Mrs. Campbell to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress when the evidence was insufficient to support such claims?
Standard of Review:

See the standard of review for the previous issue.

7b. Are the remitted emotional distress awards of $600,000 to Mr. Campbell and $400,000 to Mrs. Campbell excessive?

Standard of Review:

We consider whether there is a "reasonable basis" to support the trial court's decision. Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 805.

8. Did the trial court commit reversible error in awarding attorney fees to the Campbells?

Standard of Review:

Whether attorney fees should be awarded is a legal issue that we review for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). The amount of attorney fees awarded is reviewed for abuse of discretion in making such an award. Id.
9. Did the trial court commit reversible error in awarding more than $400,000 in litigation expenses without requiring the Campbells to specifically demonstrate that such expenses were reasonable and necessary to their claim for compensatory damages?
Standard of Review:

The question of whether litigation expenses may be awarded in a bad faith action by an insured against an insurer is one of law, which we review for correctness. The standard of review as to the amount of such expenses is abuse of discretion. Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 460 (Utah 1993); City Consumer Servs., Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 240 (Utah 1991).
ANALYSIS
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES

¶14 State Farm argues that the punitive damage award is excessive under both Utah and federal law. The Campbells cross-appeal, arguing that the trial court's remittitur of the amount of the punitive damages awarded was not required under Utah law. We consider the application of both the Utah and federal standards separately below.

¶15 At the outset, we note the guidelines for trial courts contained in Crookston I, 817 P.2d 789, 811-12 (Utah 1991). In upholding a punitive damages award, "the trial judge must make a detailed and reasoned articulation of the grounds for concluding that the award is not excessive in light of the law and the facts," thereby "permit[ting] more effective and reasoned appellate review of the decision to uphold the award and to enable the appellate court to more carefully consider the various factors that may warrant punitives and the weight to be accorded them, while giving adequate deference to the advantaged position of the trial judge to appraise the witnesses and the evidence." Id. at 811. We note that pursuant to Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001), we now review the factors de novo and do not defer to the trial court. When reducing an award of punitive damages, a trial court "should also explain its action" because "[t]he articulation of grounds for a remittitur . . . should serve the same salutary purpose on appeal" furthered by requiring trial courts to articulate their grounds for upholding a punitive damages award. Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 811-12.

¶16 We commend the trial judge in this case for his exemplary compliance with these guidelines, and indeed for his meticulous, extensive, and very thorough written findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues. This work by the trial judge has greatly enhanced our ability to review and organize a lengthy and complex record.

A. Utah Law

¶17 Both parties agree that the Utah law governing punitive damages was outlined in Crookston I, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), and Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993) (Crookston II). In Crookston I, the court announced the following factors to consider when awarding punitive damages:

(i) the relative wealth of the defendant; (ii) the nature of the alleged misconduct; (iii) the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct; (iv) the effect thereof on the lives of the plaintiff and others; (v) the probability of future recurrence of the misconduct; (vi) the relationship of the parties; and (vii) the amount of actual damages awarded.
Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 808.
¶18 In analyzing the appropriateness of the jury's punitive damage award, the trial court applied the seven factors outlined in Crookston I and remitted the award based solely upon the seventh factor, believing that the damage ratio in that case created a legal limitation. Thus, although he required remittitur of the award, the trial judge observed that $25 million "may be viewed as artificially low in that it does not capture the full amount of harm done to the Campbells as a result of State Farm's misconduct." Id. at ¶ 92.

¶19 On appeal, State Farm objects to both the jury verdict and the remitted punitive damage award, citing the following language from Crookston I: "punitive damages awards beyond a 3 to 1 ratio to actual damages have seldom been upheld and . . . where the award is in excess of $100,000, we [the Utah Supreme Court] have indicated some inclination to overturn awards having ratios of less than 3 to 1." Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 810. Further, State Farm relies on the following elaboration from Crookston II:

[i]t is certainly true that the punitive award here is without precedent in Utah, either as to the amount or as to the high ratio of punitive damages to hard compensatory damages. The presumption, therefore, is that the award is excessive. However, . . . , this presumption may be overcome if the trial court explains why the case is unique in terms of one of the traditional seven factors or in terms of some other compelling factor.
Crookston II, 860 P.2d at 940 (citing Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 811).
¶20 According to State Farm, this language limits punitive damage awards to three times the amount of compensatory damages, unless the other Crookston I factors justify a higher ratio--which in this case, State Farm argues they do not. Thus, State Farm asserts that the trial court erred in not ordering a new trial or remitting the punitive damage award to an amount within the 3:1 ratio. Id.

¶21 Conversely, the Campbells argue that the trial court placed undue emphasis on the seventh Crookston I factor. Because the other factors support a large punitive damage award, they assert that the seventh factor does not mandate a remittitur. Id. Instead, awards with higher than normal ratios of punitive to compensatory damages are simply cause for heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure that other factors support the large award. Id.

¶22 To determine whether the trial court erred, we consider all of the Crookston I factors. As discussed in the issues and standards of review section, we review the trial court's conclusions under the Crookston I factors pursuant to a de novo standard. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. 424.

1. The Relative Wealth of State Farm

¶23 The defendant's wealth is the first factor for consideration. "Punitive damages . . . should be sufficient to discourage . . . [the defendant], or anyone similarly situated, from repeating such conduct in the future." Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1983), superceded by statute on other grounds. To calculate an award sufficient to punish and deter companies from future egregious behavior, some courts have compared the amount of punitive damages to the company's net worth. For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a typical punitive damage award may be around one percent of the defendant's net worth. Cash v. Beltman N. Am. Co., 900 F.2d 109, 111 n.3 (7th Cir. 1990). Although such guidelines are helpful in reviewing punitive damage awards, we emphasize that in Utah there is no pre-established mathematical formula for such awards.

¶24 State Farm argues that Utah courts have considered a corporation's wealth only to mitigate large punitive awards, and that it is not aware of "any Utah appellate decision upholding a presumptively excessive punitive exaction on the ground that the defendant happened to be wealthy." In defense of this proposition, State Farm cites to Cruz and VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Machine Distrib., Inc., 758 P.2d 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), two cases in which the appellate courts did in fact reduce the punitive damage award based on the defendant's wealth. However, neither of these cases holds that the wealth of a company can be considered only to mitigate a punitive damage award. To the contrary, they indicate that a fact finder should consider the defendant's relative wealth when calculating a punitive damage award, and that such awards should have a proportional relationship to the defendant's wealth. See Cruz, 660 P.2d at 726-27; VanDyke, 758 P.2d at 965-66.

¶25 Additionally, State Farm relies on two federal court cases, Continental Trend Resources., Inc. v. OXY USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 641 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1241 (1997), and Utah Foam Prod. Co. v. Upjohn Co., 930 F. Supp. 513, 531 (D. Utah 1996). These cases likewise do not support State Farm's position. In particular, while stating that a defendant's wealth "cannot alone" justify a large punitive damage award, Utah Foam indicates that a defendant's wealth may be taken into account. Utah Foam, 930 F. Supp. at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, Continental Trend specifically states that "wealth must remain relevant" when determining punitive damage awards. Cont'l Trend, 101 F.3d at 641.

¶26 State Farm's wealth is enormous. As the trial court found, "[t]he evidence indicates that State Farm's surplus increased from $2.65 billion in 1977 to $25 billion in 1995. Its assets increased from $6.3 billion in 1977 to $54.75 billion in 1995, at an average increase of $4.3 million per working day in surplus, and $9.3 million per working day in assets. . . . A punitive damages award equal to one percent of State Farm's wealth would be $547.5 million. The remitted amount of $25 million in punitive damages represents less that 1/20th of one percent of State Farm's wealth (.0457 per cent)." Moreover, the jury's punitive damage award of $145 million is only 0.26 of one percent of State Farm's wealth as computed by the trial court, to whose judgment on this factual matter we defer. In our view, neither percentage is unreasonable, given the need to sufficiently deter and punish State Farm. See Crookston II, 860 P.2d at 940-41 (upholding punitive damage award that was 0.5 of one percent of defendant's net worth). Furthermore, the evidence showed that a larger than normal punitive damage award is necessary to attract the attention of State Farm officials and deter the company from further bad conduct because, as the trial court specifically found: (1) State Farm's corporate headquarters had never learned of, much less acted upon, a punitive damage award of $100 million in a previous case; and (2) State Farm's Regional vice-president for Utah testified that there was no system in place to inform the company's national headquarters of any punitive damage award, and that he did not plan to report the award in this case.

2. The Nature of State Farm's Misconduct

¶27 This factor specifically analyzes the nature of the defendant's conduct in terms of its maliciousness, reprehensibility, and wrongfulness. It mirrors the "reprehensibility" factor described by the United States Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). There, the Supreme Court stated that the defendant's misconduct is "[p]erhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award." Id. at 575, 576. Repeated "trickery and deceit" targeted at people who are "financially vulnerable" is especially reprehensible and worthy of greater sanctions. Id. Moreover, "deliberate false statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or concealment of evidence of improper motive" also warrant larger awards. Id. at 579.

¶28 With these standards clearly in mind, the trial court made nearly twenty-eight pages of extensive findings concerning State Farm's reprehensible conduct. We summarize here three examples from those findings of State Farm's most egregious and malicious behavior.

¶29 First, State Farm repeatedly and deliberately deceived and cheated its customers via the PP&R scheme. See Court's Findings, Conclusions and Order Regarding Punitive Damages and Evidentiary Rulings, Campbell, at 17-27. For over two decades, State Farm set monthly payment caps and individually rewarded those insurance adjusters who paid less than the market value for claims. Id. at 18-19. Agents changed the contents of files, lied to customers, and committed other dishonest and fraudulent acts in order to meet financial goals. Id. at 17-27. For example, a State Farm official in the underlying lawsuit in Logan instructed the claim adjuster to change the report in State Farm's file by writing that Ospital was "speeding to visit his pregnant girlfriend." Id. at 35. There was no evidence at all to support that assertion. Ospital was not speeding, nor did he have a pregnant girlfriend. Id. The only purpose for the change was to distort the assessment of the value of Ospital's claims against State Farm's insured. As the trial court found, State Farm's fraudulent practices were consistently directed to persons--poor racial or ethnic minorities, women, and elderly individuals--who State Farm believed would be less likely to object or take legal action. Id. at 26-27.

¶30 Second, State Farm engaged in deliberate concealment and destruction of all documents related to this profit scheme. Id. at 31-33. State Farm's own witnesses testified that documents were routinely destroyed so as to avoid their potential disclosure through discovery requests. Id. at 29-30. Such destruction even occurred while this litigation was pending. Id. at 30. Additionally, State Farm, as a matter of policy, keeps no corporate records related to lawsuits against it, thus shielding itself from having to disclose information related to the number and scope of bad faith actions in which it has been involved. Id. at 30.

¶31 Third, State Farm has systematically harassed and intimidated opposing claimants, witnesses, and attorneys. Id. at 33-37. For example, State Farm published an instruction manual for its attorneys mandating them to "ask personal questions" as part of the investigation and examination of claimant in order to deter litigation. Id. at 34. Several witnesses at trial, including Gary Fye and Ina DeLong, testified that these practices had been used against them. Id. at 34-35. Specifically, the record contains an eighty-eight page report prepared by State Farm regarding DeLong's personal life, including information obtained by paying a hotel maid to disclose whether DeLong had overnight guests in her room. Id. at 35. There was also evidence that State Farm actually instructs its attorneys and claim superintendents to employ "mad dog defense tactics"--using the company's large resources to "wear out" opposing attorneys by prolonging litigation, making meritless objections, claiming false privileges, destroying documents, and abusing the law and motion process. Id. at 36-37.

¶32 Taken together, these three examples show that State Farm engaged in a pattern of "trickery and deceit," "false statements," and other "acts of affirmative misconduct" targeted at "financially vulnerable" persons. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575, 576. Moreover, State Farm has strategically concealed "evidence of [its] improper motive" to shield itself from liability, which was furthered by State Farm's treatment of opposing witnesses and counsel. BMW, 517 U.S. at 579. Such conduct is malicious, reprehensible, and wrong.

¶33 State Farm responds by arguing in its brief that even if its conduct was wrong, it does not "after all, involve murder, torture, or deliberate poisoning of the environment," and thus cannot warrant millions of dollars in punitive damages. Additionally, State Farm argues that under Crookston II, willful calculated fraud was not sufficient to justify a higher than ordinary ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. Crookston II, 860 P.2d at 940.

¶34 State Farm fails to realize that, while Crookston II held that fraudulent conduct alone was insufficient to justify a large punitive damage award, it also observed that fraud combined with other factors justifies a higher award. Id. at 940-41. Specifically, Crookston II stated that "an additional unique factor justifying the punitive award, both in its dollar amount and in its proportion to the hard compensatory damages [is] . . . the company's 'calculated and calloused attitude' toward settling valid claims." Id. at 941 (citation omitted). In this case, the jury was convinced, and the evidence shows, that State Farm engaged in a widespread pattern of fraud. Moreover, the evidence of its PP&R scheme demonstrates that State Farm specifically calculated and planned to avoid full payment of claims, regardless of their validity. Thus, the nature of State Farm's conduct supports the imposition of a higher than normal punitive damage award.

3. Facts and Circumstances Surrounding State Farm's Misconduct

¶35 This factor looks to the circumstances surrounding the illegal conduct, particularly with respect to what the defendant knew and what was motivating his or her actions. See Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984). Discussing this point, the trial court referred to its previous analysis of State Farm's conduct and stated "those facts speak for themselves with respect to the type of insensitive and callous behavior exhibited by State Farm." In addition to the trial court's findings, we note that State Farm refuses in its brief on appeal to concede any error or impropriety in the handling of the Campbell case. Rather, testimony at trial indicated that State Farm was "proud" of the way it treated the Campbells. Id. Further, State Farm asserts that it is in fact a "victim" in this case because it is the target of a secret "conspiracy" perpetrated by the Campbells, Ospital, Slusher, and their attorneys to bring this bad faith lawsuit and to share any recovery obtained.

¶36 Even if we agreed with State Farm's characterization of the agreement between the plaintiffs and Ospital and Slusher, we are unable to comprehend State Farm's logic. No behavior by those parties operates to excuse State Farm's dishonest and illicit practices over the course of many years, nor its treatment of the Campbells. In fact, without this so-called "conspiracy," which contains no illegal elements whatever, State Farm's wrongdoing would have remained unexamined and unpunished, and the direct harm to the Campbells, the indirect harm to the other parties, and the harmful effect on the larger community of all those who deal with the company, would have had no remedy. The facts and circumstances surrounding State Farm's misconduct all point to a scheme motivated by the goal of making a profit by any means necessary. We agree entirely with the trial court's conclusion that this factor supports the imposition of a higher than normal punitive damages award.

4. Effect of State Farm's Misconduct on the Campbells and Others

¶37 This factor examines how the defendant's conduct affected other people as well as the Campbells. The larger the number of people affected, the greater the justification for higher punitive damages.

¶38 Here, the effect of State Farm's conduct on the Campbells is well-documented. In particular, the Campbells lived for nearly eighteen months under constant threat of losing everything they had worked for their whole lives. This threat led to sleeplessness, heartache, and stress in the Campbells' marriage and family relationships. Id. State Farm argues that these were relatively minor impacts, and were not as severe as those punished in Crookston II, and additionally, that the alleged harms suffered by other State Farm customers cannot be considered in this case.

¶39 Even if the harm to the Campbells can be appropriately characterized as minimal, the trial court's assessment of the situation is on target: "The harm is minor to the individual but massive in the aggregate." Moreover, State Farm's assertion that the trial court erred in considering alleged harms suffered by other customers is incorrect; Crookston II specifically allows courts to consider the effect of the defendant's conduct on others. Crookston II, 860 P.2d at 941. In fact, the Crookston II court justified a high punitive damage award based on the fact that the insurance company's fraudulent practices were inflicted on countless customers. Id.

¶40 In the present case, State Farm's conduct seriously affected the Campbells, as indicated previously, as well as many others. In particular, State Farm's conduct corrupted its employees by forcing them to engage in deceptive practices or lose their jobs. Moreover, State Farm's continuing illicit practice created market disadvantages for other honest insurance companies because these practices increased profits. As plaintiffs' expert witnesses established, such wrongfully obtained competitive advantages have the potential to pressure other companies to adopt similar fraudulent tactics, or to force them out of business. Thus, such actions cause distortions throughout the insurance market and ultimately hurt all consumers. Id. Because State Farm's actions have such potentially widespread effects, this factor supports a high punitive damages award.

5. Probability of Future Recurrences

¶41 This factor analyzes the likelihood that the defendant will repeat or continue engaging in its wrongful behavior. A high probability of recidivism justifies a higher than normal punitive damage award. BMW, 517 U.S. at 577. In light of State Farm's decades-long policy of fraudulent and dishonest practices in its handling of claims, it is difficult to imagine how such ingrained policies of corporate culture can be easily or quickly changed. This would be true even in a case where the perpetrator was fully aware of and remorseful for its conduct. State Farm has not exhibited any such self-awareness in this case. Instead, State Farm asserted at trial that its PP&R policy was "obsoleted" in 1992 and again in 1994. However, the Campbells' evidence showed that the policy was still being followed at the time of trial. Id.

¶42 State Farm challenged the Campbells' evidence by pointing out at trial that State Farm's regional vice president for Utah testified that he had sent "peace of mind" letters to customers assuring them that State Farm would protect them against personal exposure in third-party suits. However, as the trial court noted, "[t]he Court does not find it surprising that the jury apparently was not particularly persuaded that this repentance was genuine," especially in light of the fact that the vice president did not decide to send such letters until he "was in the office of trial counsel preparing for his trial testimony . . . not long before the jury was to decide punitive damages."

¶43 In short, we are persuaded, as was the trial court, that "[g]iven the absence of credible evidence that, in fact, State Farm's policies have changed, and that the misconduct carried out toward Utah consumers during the past two decades has ended, the probability of recurrence of State Farm's misconduct appears extremely high."

6. Relationship of the Parties

¶44 This factor analyzes the relationship between the parties, specifically, the degree of confidence and trust placed in the defendant. The greater the trust placed in the defendant, the more appropriate the imposition of a large punitive damage award for a breach of that trust. A breach of a fiduciary relationship also supports a large punitive damage award.

¶45 In Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., we noted that a fiduciary relationship exists between insurers and insureds like the Campbells because

[i]n a third-party situation, the insurer controls the disposition of claims against its insured, who relinquishes any right to negotiate on his own behalf . . . . In essence, the contract itself creates a fiduciary relationship because of the trust and reliance placed in the insurer by its insured. The insured is wholly dependent upon the insurer to see that, in dealing with claims by third parties, the insured's best interests are protected.
701 P. 2d 795, 799 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted). Because State Farm breached its duty in this fiduciary relationship, the trial court ruled that State Farm's actions warranted high punitive damages. See Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (holding that punitive damages are particularly appropriate when fiduciary duty is disregarded and exploited for gain).
¶46 State Farm argues that, although a fiduciary relationship exists, it is not an adequate basis for imposing a multi-million dollar penalty. Its argument is that because its breach of its fiduciary duty is the reason it is liable in tort in the first place, the breach cannot be "double-counted" as a justification for a large award. Id. at 86.

¶47 We disagree. The facts show that the Campbells trusted in and relied on State Farm's promises of protection and aid. For example, State Farm affirmatively promised the Campbells that it "would look out for their best interests" and that they should not procure their own counsel because State Farm would take care of them. Also, State Farm convinced the Campbells that "they had absolutely no risk," and even on the chance that they were found liable, they had adequate insurance to cover any potential liability. The Campbells relied on these promises: Inez Campbell actually transferred some of her separate property into joint ownership with her husband after the accident upon being told that there was no risk to Mr. Campbell of an excess judgment. The relationship of trust between State Farm and the Campbells, and the breach of that trust, warrants a substantial punitive damage award.

7. Ratio of Punitive to Compensatory Damages

¶48 As noted above, the trial court reduced the jury's punitive damage award from $145 million to $25 million based solely on this factor. State Farm argues that this number is still grossly disproportionate to the harm suffered and should be reduced further according to the Crookston I ratio.

¶49 Applying the rationale and the language of both Crookston cases to this case, we reject State Farm's interpretation. First, contrary to State Farm's arguments, the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is not determinative. It is simply one of the factors to be considered, none of which is more important or conclusive than another. See Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 808. Crookston I specifically stated that: "No relative weights have been assigned them [the factors], and no standards or formulas have been established for properly evaluating them." Id. A large award triggers a more searching judicial analysis of the situation to ensure the defendant's conduct warrants large punitive damages. However, if the other six factors support a large punitive damages award, a judge should not decrease the amount solely because of the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. Crookston II, 860 P.2d at 940.

¶50 Second, both Crookston I and Crookston II rejected the idea of establishing a specific ratio or capping punitive damages, and emphasized that the guidelines for punitive damages need to be flexible enough to accomplish both the punishment and deterrent purposes of punitive damages. See Crookston II, 860 P.2d at 941; Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 809. In support of this reasoning, the Crookston II court noted that

[i]f a company could predict that its systematic fraudulent conduct would evade detection in many instances and on those few occasions where it was discovered, would never result in punitive damages greater than the ratios we have historically upheld, it could carefully calculate the cost/benefit ratio of its wrongful conduct and avoid the deterrent potential of punitive damages.
Crookston II, 860 P.2d at 941.
¶51 Finally, Crookston II itself was a case where the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages was higher than three to one. We upheld that award because of the willful, malicious, and fraudulent conduct of the insurance company towards the Crookstons and other similarly situated Utahns. Crookston II, 860 P.2d at 941. Since State Farm's conduct is of a similar nature, we hold that a ratio of greater than three to one is permissible here, and that the trial court erred in remitting the jury award. As long as the other factors sustain a high punitive damage award, as they do here, neither Crookston I nor Crookston II bars courts from imposing punitive damage awards greater than three times the amount of compensatory damages.(9)

¶52 Based on the foregoing review of the seven Crookston I factors, we hold that, with the exception of its analysis of the seventh factor, the trial court's analysis is fully corroborated by our own. However, we conclude that the trial court erred in deciding that the seventh factor required remittitur as a matter of state law.

B. Federal Law

¶53 State Farm asserts that the standards set forth in BMW v. Gore of North America, Inc., 517 U.S. 559 (1996), prohibit imposing the large amount of punitive damages awarded in this case. To "illuminate 'the character of the standard that will identify unconstitutionally excessive awards' of punitive damages," the BMW Court stated:

Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition. . . . States necessarily have considerable flexibility in determining the level of punitive damages that they will allow in different classes of cases and in any particular case. . . . Only when an award can fairly be categorized as "grossly excessive" in relation to these interests does it enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 568 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court then identified "[t]hree guideposts" for consideration: "[1] the degree of reprehensibility of the [conduct]; [2] the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered . . . and [the] punitive damages award; and [3] the difference between this remedy [the punitive damage award] and the . . . penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases." Id. at 574-575. Since the reprehensibility guidepost of the BMW test mirrors the second and third factors in Crookston I, relating to the nature and circumstances surrounding defendant's misconduct, we incorporate here our earlier analyses of these Crookston I factors, and conclude for the reasons discussed therein that the reprehensibility guidepost is met.(10) We analyze the second and third "guideposts" separately below.
1. Disparity Between the Harm and the Punitive Award (Ratio)

¶54 The most common means of determining whether a punitive damage award is excessive under federal law is to look at the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 580. However, when conducting such an analysis, there is no "simple mathematical formula," "categorical approach," or "constitutional line" for determining an appropriate punitive to compensatory damage ratio. Id. at 582. In fact,

low awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages. A higher ratio may also be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine.
Id. Overall, the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages needs to be reasonable considering the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 583; see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458-62 (1993) (upholding punitive damage award that was 526 times amount of compensatory damage award because of potential harm that could have occurred had defendant's fraudulent scheme worked); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991) (upholding punitive damage award that was 200 times amount of plaintiff's out-of-pocket expenses based on reprehensibility of conduct and wealth of defendant).
¶55 Based on the language cited above, the trial court found that this BMW factor "does not impose a rigid cap on punitive damages awards" because in the Campbells' case, as in TXO, "the injury is hard to detect" and the potential for large harm is substantial. Specifically, the trial court relied on the following facts to justify the high punitive damage award: (1) State Farm never reported previous punitive damage awards to headquarters, even though prior awards included a Texas judgment of $100 million; (2) State Farm is an enormous company with massive wealth; (3) State Farm's actions, because of their clandestine nature, will be punished at most in one out of every 50,000 cases as a matter of statistical probability; and (4) State Farm's policies have affected vast numbers of other Utah customers.

¶56 While not contesting the validity of the finding that it is likely to be punished at most in one out of 50,000 cases, State Farm does challenge the other three justifications. Because State Farm's objections to considering relative wealth and the effects on other Utah customers are identical to its arguments against the punitive damage award under Crookston I, we again incorporate by reference our previous analysis of Crookston I factors one and four in section "IA" 1 and 4 of this opinion.

¶57 Turning to the remaining justification relied on by the trial court, we note that the court found that a prior $100 million punitive damage award against State Farm had not been reported to its national headquarters. State Farm argues that the award in this case need not be more severe than that award, citing Johansen v. Combustion Engineering., Inc., for the proposition that "a punitive award does not need to be large enough to 'make the company newsletter' and need 'not attract the attention of the board of directors' in order to have a deterrent effect." 170 F.3d 1320, 1338 & n.36 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Combustion Eng'g. Inc. v. McGill, 120 S. Ct. 329 (1999). State Farm's reliance on Johansen is unfounded. First, unlike this case, Johansen did not involve punishing a company that had previously been assessed punitive damages for its illicit conduct. Rather, the punitive damage award issued in Johansen against the mining company was the first and only punishment imposed for its misconduct. Id. at 1336.

¶58 More importantly, State Farm misconstrues the holding of Johansen, which in fact stands for the proposition that larger awards are necessary for large corporations, and that company executives should be aware of imposed punitive sanctions. Seeid. at 1338-39. Specifically, Johansen states that

in promoting deterrence, the economic wealth of a tortfeasor may be considered. A bigger award is needed to "attract the . . . attention" of a large corporation. . . . It is not unlikely that having to pay . . . punitive damages would not make the company newsletter. It should, however, attract the attention of whomever is in charge of the corporation's daily decisions . . . and would, no doubt, bear heavily upon regional or local managers where failure to regard consequences would be expected to subject their employer to loss.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
¶59 Many large corporations are "entities too powerful to be constrained" by remedies provided by "criminal and civil law." Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1269, 1329-30 & n.299 (1993). In many cases, the public's only protection against exposure to fraudulent harmful conduct by such large, powerful corporations is the threat that sanctions imposed for misconduct will be sufficiently severe. Id. If such a threat is unavailable, punitive damage awards against large entities will not serve their deterrent and punitive purposes. See Crookston II, 860 P.2d at 941.

¶60 State Farm points out that in the wake of BMW, many lower courts have held unconstitutional far lower ratios of punitive to compensatory damages than exist here. State Farm cites eighteen cases where courts have reduced punitive damage awards after conducting a BMW analysis. Id. at 77-78. In contrast, the Campbells cite nine other cases upholding punitive damage awards where the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is larger than or the same as the ratio in this case.

¶61 All the cases agree, however, that each court must analyze the facts of each case to ensure that the defendant's acts warrant the punitive damage award imposed.(11) In fact, the BMW court made it clear that the initial punitive damage award in that case (500 times the amount of plaintiff's damages) was not automatically invalid, but that it was unconstitutional because of the specific facts of the case--i.e. the fraud was perpetrated without "trickery or deceit," the available criminal and regulatory sanctions for comparable misconduct were minor, and some of the conduct for which BMW was being punished was legal in states other than Alabama. BMW, 517 U.S. at 582-84, 576-78, 572.(12)

¶62 Like BMW, this case contains exceptional facts and circumstances. Here, however, they support a higher rather than a lower punitive damage award. State Farm's fraudulent conduct has been a consistent way of doing business for the last twenty years, directed specifically at some of society's most vulnerable groups. The likelihood of further misconduct by State Farm is great, given the fact that it has not changed its conduct despite a previous $100 million punitive damage award. Moreover, the effect on the Campbells warrants a large award, given that they had to live in fear of complete financial ruin for over eighteen months because of State Farm's refusal to settle their claim. Finally, the harm propagated by State Farm is extreme when compared to the statistical probability that State Farm is likely to be required to pay damages only once in 50,000 cases. Thus, because there are reasonable justifications for the large punitive damage award based upon the specific facts of this case, the ratio factor in BMW does not require the award to be reduced simply because the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is high.

2. Civil or Criminal Penalties Authorized in Comparable Cases

¶63 The final factor for determining whether a punitive award is excessive under federal law is to "[c]ompar[e] the punitive damages award and the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct." BMW, 517 U.S. at 583. Possible imprisonment for such conduct is a strong indication that the conduct warrants high punitive damages. Id.

¶64 The trial court found that this factor "does not require reduction of the punitive damage award" because the "penalties that could be imposed under Utah law for the fraudulent scheme that has been pursued by State Farm are enormous." Specifically, the trial court found that State Farm could be forced: (1) to pay a $10,000 fine for each act of fraud under Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-26-301 et seq.; (2) to renounce its business license or have its Utah operations dissolved under Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-26-213, 76-3-201(2) and (3), 76-10-1602(ppp), and 76-10-1603.5(5); (3) to disgorge all the illicit profits gained by the scheme, plus pay a fine of twice the value of those profits, under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1602 et seq.; and (4) to publically acknowledge that its officers had been convicted of fraud under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-303. Moreover, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-303, State Farm's officers could be imprisoned or removed for up to five years, an extremely important consideration for the BMW court. BMW, 517 U.S. at 584.

¶65 State Farm disputes these findings, arguing that since this case is the "only bad faith action against it in the last fifteen years," there is no evidence that it has defrauded customers or gained illicit profits. Moreover, State Farm argues that even if it could be punished for its practices, permissible punishment is limited by the "actual fining practice" of the Insurance Commission. Id. at 83.

¶66 State Farm's logic is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, such an interpretation runs contrary to the clear language of BMW indicating the Court was examining "the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct," not other punishments already issued against the defendant. BMW, 517 U.S. at 583 (emphasis added).

¶67 Second, State Farm's argument that there is no evidence of fraud is contrary to the trial court's findings and to the evidence that we have reviewed supporting those findings. It is difficult to understand how State Farm can argue that there is no evidence that it committed fraud or acted illicitly when the record contains volumes of such evidence. The evidence was so extensive and convincing that it took the trial court nearly twenty-eight pages to summarize it in his findings on the post-trial motions.

¶68 Finally, State Farm's argument that the Insurance Commission's practices in assessing fines are applicable, rather than the maximum statutory penalties, is contrary to BMW. The BMW court clearly indicated that the punitive award was to be compared to legislatively set penalties, not administrative agency practices. BMW, 517 U.S. at 584. For example, the Supreme Court stated that it was examining "the statutory fines" and "[t]he maximum civil penalty authorized by the Alabama Legislature." Id. Moreover, BMW also stated that a "reviewing court engaged in determining whether an award of punitive damages is excessive should accord substantial deference to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue." Id. at 583 (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added). We conclude that the trial court correctly found that a large punitive damage award was justifiable under this third guidepost.

¶69 In conclusion, we hold that the trial court's analysis of the punitive damage award under BMW was correct. In light of the foregoing analysis of state and federal law, we vacate the trial court's remittitur order and reinstate the jury's verdict awarding $145 million in punitive damages.

II. OTHER ACTS EVIDENCE

¶70 State Farm argues that large quantities of "other acts" evidence were admitted in violation of the Utah Rules of Evidence because such evidence had nothing to do with State Farm's handling of third-party claims in general, or State Farm's conduct toward the Campbells in particular, and therefore had no probative value. State Farm catalogs a long list of allegedly inadmissible evidence on which it bases its argument that the evidentiary process in the trial court was tainted.(13) In contrast, the Campbells argue that State Farm did not properly preserve its evidentiary objections and that, even if it had, the trial court did not exceed its discretion in admitting the "other acts" evidence.

¶71 We decline State Farm's invitation to take a piecemeal approach to the analysis of the admissibility of the "other acts" evidence in this complex and lengthy litigation. Just as any able litigator must have a "theory of the case" if he or she hopes to convince a fact finder of the merits of a particular action, it is crucial for a trial judge confronting a case with so many issues and opportunities for mistake to have an overall view of the necessary balance for fairness to the parties in the conduct of the trial, particularly as this relates to the admission and exclusion of evidence. The trial court in this case had such a vision, and we believe it achieved balance and fairness.

¶72 First and foremost, the trial court granted State Farm's request, over the Campbells' strenuous objections, to take the unusual step of bifurcating the trial.(14) The trial court imposed stringent evidentiary restrictions on the Campbells during phase I of the trial, so that only State Farm's treatment of the Campbells was at issue in establishing its bad faith in handling their claim. Id. In a post-trial ruling, the trial court stated that it "understood that the purpose of [the] bifurcation order was to separate the so-called 'bad-faith phase' (phase I) from what the parties termed the 'institutional phase' of this trial (phase II)." The trial court continued: "State Farm prevailed in its bifurcation arguments largely by pointing out that phase II, covering the institutional evidence, would involve a very lengthy trial, as it would deal with State Farm's corporate policies and practices--so that bifurcation would save substantial resources in the event that the jury found no bad-faith claim handling." (Emphasis added.)

¶73 The other major decision that the trial court made, on which State Farm's arguments regarding error in the admission of "other acts" evidence largely succeed or fail, was the admission of evidence related to its PP&R policy. This policy, initiated in 1979 by the company's highest executives, set fixed ceilings on the payment of claims in order to increase corporate profits. After phase I established that State Farm had handled the Campbells' claim in bad faith and had breached its fiduciary duty to them, State Farm defended itself in phase II by claiming that its actions were only the result of an "honest mistake" or an isolated lapse in judgment. Based on this defense, the trial court denied State Farm's request to exclude all evidence from which the jury could infer that the Campbells were the victims of an extensive, intentional scheme to defraud State Farm's policyholders. All of the other categories of evidence State Farm challenges as being erroneously admitted during phase II of the trial, from the practice of office competitions to lower average claims paid, to the discriminatory treatment of insureds based on gender, race, economic status, educational background, and age, were part and parcel of its PP&R policy.

¶74 In this context, we conclude that we must consider the evidence in an integrated fashion and analyze whether the trial court erred in admitting the "other acts" evidence in general. State Farm's challenge to the trial court's admission of such evidence is controlled by Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b), which states:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403.
Thus, "in deciding whether evidence of other crimes is admissible under rule 404(b), the trial court must determine (1) whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and (3) whether this evidence meets the requirement of rule 403." State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, ¶ 20, 993 P.2d 837. When reviewing such decisions, we apply "an abuse of discretion standard . . . [and consider] the record to determine whether the admission of other bad acts evidence was 'scrupulously examined by the trial judge 'in the proper exercise of [his or her] discretion.'" State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ¶ 16, 6 P.3d 1120 (quoting DeCorso, 1999 UT 57 at ¶ 18).
A. Noncharacter Purpose

¶75 "Under the first part of this analysis, the proponent must demonstrate that the evidence is actually being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as those specifically listed in . . . rule [404(b)]." DeCorso, 1999 UT 57 at ¶ 21. Although the list of noncharacter purposes found in rule 404(b) is helpful, it is not exclusive. See Edward L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 4-41 (1996).

¶76 Phase II of the trial involved the Campbells' claims of fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages, and State Farm's defense that its mistreatment of the Campbells was unintentional and simply the result of an honest mistake. In this context, the trial court found that the Campbells' evidence, which State Farm now challenges on appeal, was offered for many noncharacter purposes, including establishing State Farm's intent, reckless disregard, absence of mistake, plan, and outrageous conduct, as well as rebutting State Farm's defense. Comparing the elements necessary to establish the Campbells' claims and to rebut State Farm's defenses with the evidence State Farm finds objectionable, we conclude that the trial court was entirely correct in finding that such evidence was offered for noncharacter purposes. Moreover, based on our review of the record, which indicates that the trial court made its conclusions only after reviewing numerous motions in limine made by State Farm and conducting at least ten pretrial hearings that consumed more than fifteen days, we are satisfied that the trial court scrupulously examined the "other acts" evidence ultimately admitted at trial. Once again, we have been greatly assisted in our review by the trial court's extended written findings in his orders on the pretrial motions. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not exceed the permitted range of discretion in finding that the "other acts" evidence was offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose.(15)

B. Rule 402

¶77 Under rule 402, "other acts" evidence, like all evidence, must be relevant or it is not admissible. Utah R. Evid. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible . . . . Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."). Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. Thus, to be admissible, "other acts" evidence must tend to prove some fact that is material to the cause of action alleged--other than the defendant's propensity to engage in actions in conformity therewith. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57 at ¶ 22.

¶78 After careful consideration, the trial court specifically concluded that the "other acts" evidence to which State Farm presently objects was "relevant," "helpful," and "of high probative value" because such evidence was necessary to establish several elements of the Campbells' claims and to rebut State Farm's defenses. Our review of the record makes it clear that the trial court's statement regarding the necessity of the "other acts" evidence is amply supported therein. Notably, one of the chief concerns of rule 402 is not even present in this case, namely the need to ensure that fact-finders will not infer wrong-doing in a present scenario because an actor has done wrong in the past. Phase I of this trial conclusively established that State Farm acted in bad faith; its wrong-doing was thus determined without any reliance on past deeds or general practices. The only issue in Phase II was the nature of appropriate compensatory and punitive damages to be imposed in response to the wrong-doing. For that purpose, State Farm's intent, motive, and rationale for its wrong-doing was extremely relevant, and the evidence of its long-established methods of doing business were, as the trial court found, highly probative.

¶79 Surprisingly, even in the face of the trial court's detailed findings and analysis, State Farm asserts on appeal that the "other acts" evidence had no probative value. We find this assertion troubling. State Farm's failure to acknowledge the probative value of the "other acts" evidence is of a piece with its inability to acknowledge that it engaged in a wide-spread corporate scheme to defraud its insureds, a scheme that had far-reaching negative effects on both its insureds and society in general. Because the trial court had a reasonable basis in the evidence for its decision, we reject State Farm's assertion, and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding evidence of State Farm's "other acts" relevant. See Crookston II, 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993) ("[W]e reverse only if we find an abuse of discretion, i.e., no reasonable basis for the decision.")

C. Rule 403 Analysis

¶80 Rule 403 requires that "we weigh the probative value of the evidence with the potential for creating prejudice in the minds of the jurors." State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, ¶ 29, 8 P.3d 1025. The rule states:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 403. In assessing whether prior acts evidence satisfies the requirements of rule 403,
a variety of matters must be considered, including the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.
Reed, 2000 UT 68 at ¶ 29.
¶81 In ruling upon State Farm's various evidentiary motions, the trial court found that in light of the phase I jury verdict against State Farm, "the pattern and practice evidence is of high probative value and importance to plaintiffs' claims, and that serious prejudice to plaintiffs would result if such evidence were excluded. The court further finds that the probative value is not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion." The trial court made it clear, however, that it was not precluding further rule 403 objections to exclude specific evidence. Rather, it found only that objections to specific evidence based on the "general issues of wrongful pattern and practice evidence" would be improper.

¶82 We find compelling reasons under rule 403 to uphold the trial court's denial of State Farm's request to generally exclude all "other acts" evidence related to its patterns and practices. As discussed above, the alleged wide-ranging effects of State Farm's PP&R policy were crucial to the Campbells' ability to prove their fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damage claims. State Farm attacks the trial court's evidentiary rulings repeatedly for allowing evidence that was "dissimilar" from the facts in the Campbells' case; this once again misses the mark. The underlying purpose of rule 403 is to assure a careful consideration of prior acts and, in the event that the evidence passes the rule 404(b) threshold, to continue to evaluate the evidence in light of its potentially prejudicial effect. Although the "similarity" language of Reed and earlier cases is not particularly apt in this case, we think that its general concerns were accounted for in the trial court's reasoning underlying his determinations of the admissibility of the "other acts" evidence. State Farm's PP&R policy exposed the Campbells to an excess judgment and the accompanying risk of losing all their assets. Thus, cause and effect became very important. In other words, the relevant inquiry in phase II was: What caused the Campbells' harm? Without the evidence of State Farm's PP&R policy, and evidence of practices flowing from that policy, the Campbells would have been unable to prove the real cause of their harm. The establishment of this cause and effect link was highly dependant on the "other acts" evidence of State Farm's methods of doing business.

¶83 State Farm also contends that the time interval factor was not met here because some of the evidence detailed behavior remote in time. However, inasmuch as there was affirmative evidence adduced tending to show that State Farm's practices were ongoing at the time of the trial (which evidence was explicitly believed by the trial court and apparently by the jury), we find that contention without merit. In light of these considerations, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the probative value of the "other acts" evidence was not outweighed by any potential prejudice.

III. EXPERT TESTIMONY

¶84 State Farm objects that the testimony by the Campbells' experts "went far beyond the realm of permissible expert testimony, instead crossing the line into rank advocacy," and thus violated rules 702 and 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Conversely, the Campbells argue that, at most, only two of State Farm's objections were preserved for appeal and that, in any case, the trial court did not commit reversible error. "It is well established that trial courts have wide discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony." State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ¶ 11, 1 P.3d 546. Moreover, unless "there is a reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different if the trial court had [excluded] the expert testimony," we will not reverse the trial court's decision. Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1347 (Utah 1993). While there appears to be merit to the Campbells' argument that State Farm failed to preserve many of its objections to the experts' testimony, we deem it more efficient to analyze the substance of State Farm's challenges generally, first under rule 702, and then under rule 703.

¶85 To rebut State Farm's "honest mistake" defense, the Campbells called experts Stephen Prater and Gary Fye. These men were intimately acquainted with the intricacies of the insurance industry and with State Farm's practices in particular. Their qualifications as experts were not challenged by State Farm. Their testimony focused upon explaining State Farm's PP&R policy and demonstrating its far-reaching effects. State Farm now argues that much of this testimony was without foundation and was prejudicial. In particular, State Farm challenges the experts' testimony concerning the company's excess liability handbook, its failure to maintain statistics on excess verdicts, the profits it derived from improper claims handling, and the effects of its PP&R policy and related practices on the insurance industry in general. State Farm also argues that Mr. Prater impermissibly testified to legal conclusions.

¶86 Utah Rule 702 states:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
"[T]he question that must be posed prior to the admission of any expert evidence is whether, on balance, the evidence will be helpful to the finder of fact." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Helpfulness depends upon "whether the subject is within the knowledge or experience of the average individual." Id. However, "[i]t is not necessary that the subject of the testimony be so erudite or arcane that the jurors could not possibly understand it without the aid of expert testimony, nor is it a requirement that the subject be beyond the comprehension of each and every juror." Id. "This 'helpfulness standard' also implicates Rule 403 considerations, since if the evidence is confusing or unfairly prejudicial it will hinder rather than aid jury decision making." Edward L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 7-9 (1996) (clarifying that "Rule 403 is not being applied directly, so . . . the question is 'helpfulness,' not whether the probative value is greatly outweighed by confusion or prejudice"); see alsoLarsen, 865 P.2d at 1363 n.12; State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 398 n.8 (Utah 1989). We have reviewed the entire transcript of both Prater's and Fye's trial testimony. With the exception of the argument concerning legal conclusions, we find it unnecessary to address with particularity State Farm's specific challenges.
¶87 That the experts' testimony was helpful is evident. State Farm conceded the witness' qualifications. Although the rule does not require that the issue to which an expert testifies be arcane, the issues raised in this case were in fact quite difficult for the average person to understand. The experts' familiarity with the insurance industry in general, and State Farm in particular, must have greatly aided the jury's understanding of the issues. Moreover, our review of the record satisfies us that the experts' testimony, given its relevance and its helpfulness, did not raise any concerns under rule 403 sufficient to warrant exclusion. Thus, because the experts' testimony was helpful to the jury, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under rule 702.

¶88 We now turn to State Farm's specific challenge under rule 702 which argues that Prater usurped the trial court's role of instructing the jury by impermissibly offering legal conclusions while testifying. Most of State Farm's objections address Prater's testimony concerning industry standards. In several instances he described "duties" and "standards" of behavior or of "care" that should dictate the practice of insurance companies generally. In every instance, and sometimes following objections by State Farm, it was made very clear to the jury by the phrasing of the question and/or by comments from counsel and the court, that the witness was testifying only to prevailing standards of conduct in the industry, and not to legal standards or rules of law. In at least one instance, the trial court clarified for the jury the role of the court in instructing them on the law, the limited role of the experts, and properly instructed the jury at the end of the trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the testimony in question.

¶89 Finally, State Farm objects because Prater pointed to boxes of documents in the courtroom and testified that those documents supported his conclusion that State Farm engaged in a pattern of cheating on claims. This challenge is governed by rule 703, which states

The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
This court has held
"[O]nce the expert is qualified by the court, the witness may base his [or her] opinion on reports, writings, or observations not in evidence which were made or compiled by others, so long as they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in that particular field. The opposing party may challenge the suitability or reliability of such materials on cross-examination, but such challenge goes to the weight to be given the testimony, not to its admissibility."
Patey v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, ¶ 30, 977 P.2d 1193 (quoting State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1982)) (emphasis added). The policy behind the current iteration of this rule is aimed at broadening the permissible bases of expert opinion. One justification driving this policy is to lessen "'the expenditure of substantial time in producing and examining various authenticating witnesses.'" Id. (quoting note of advisory committee to federal version of rule 703, which is identical to Utah's rule 703).
¶90 Applying rule 703, we find that Prater's testimony concerning the documents were not improper because such documents were "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." Utah R. Evid. 703; see also Am. Concept Ins. Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (finding that expert in licensed property and casualty claims properly relied upon his examination of adjuster's file, since this was "material[] of a type usually relied upon by experts in his field").

¶91 Prater described the nature of the documents in his files, the means by which he had obtained them, and the fact that he had reviewed and was familiar with their contents. He testified that the vast majority of the documents were original State Farm documents or copies thereof. He further testified that his conclusions and opinions in this trial were based in part on his study of the documents.

¶92 State Farm complains that cross-examining Prater on these documents would have entailed more time than it was allotted for trial. In our view, however, extra time was not the issue. Cross-examination of Prater on the documents in the boxes was not a relevant task for State Farm. On the contrary, State Farm had a duty to locate and produce documents critical to challenging Prater's testimony and to conduct an effective cross-examination within the known time constraints. Because State Farm had itself produced most of the documents, we presume (as did the trial judge) that it knew their contents. It cannot now claim error because its own trial strategy did not produce favorable results.(16) Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Prater's testimony.

IV. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

¶93 As described briefly in the background portion of this opinion, Slusher and Ospital entered into a settlement agreement prior to the trial of the initial lawsuit in Logan, Utah, to determine liability in the underlying accident. Their agreement was reflected in two separate documents, both dated June 3, 1983. In the first, entitled "Release of Claims," Slusher accepted $65,000 in return for a release of all claims against Ospital and Ospital's insurers. The release expressly preserved Slusher's claims against Campbell and his insurers (who were in any event not parties to the release). The second agreement, which we will refer to as the Bad Faith Agreement, required Ospital to "assist Slusher in the prosecution of his claim against any other party responsible for said injuries and damages, including any claim for bad faith against any insurer of the responsible party." It specifically required Ospital to remain as a party in the Logan case (in which Ospital had a cross-claim against Campbell in addition to Slusher's claims against Campbell) and provided for some sharing of any recovery over and above Slusher's damages as determined by the jury in that case. Id.

¶94 In the Logan trial and in both phase I and phase II of the trial at issue in this appeal, State Farm sought admission of the details of that agreement in evidence. State Farm's theory on all three occasions was that, because the settlement required Ospital to remain in the original lawsuit, Ospital and Slusher were permitted to "gang up" on Campbell in the liability determination process. State Farm wished to rely on the agreement as evidence of "collusion" in the Logan trial, which it wanted to argue to the jury in this trial had increased the severity of the liability percentage assigned to Campbell in the original lawsuit, and should therefore mitigate the evidence of bad faith in phase I and support its theory of "innocent mistake" in phase II. The trial judge rejected State Farm's rationale and precluded use of the settlement agreement. We agree with the trial judge.

¶95 The record in this case establishes that State Farm was informed, prior to the Logan lawsuit, that Slusher would seek a unilateral settlement with Ospital if State Farm continued to refuse to participate in a settlement. On the day the Logan trial began, counsel for Slusher told the trial court and State Farm counsel that the terms of the agreement included, in addition to a release of Slusher's claims against Ospital in return for a payment of $65,000, "cooperation" between Slusher and Ospital in the event of a future bad faith action against State Farm. State Farm's counsel immediately informed the trial court that he feared collusion at trial between Ospital and Slusher to place blame for the accident on Campbell. The trial court declined to admit evidence of the settlement agreement.

¶96 After verdict in the Logan trial, the trial court, on Campbell's motion for a new trial, explained at length its rationale for excluding the liability release agreement from the trial. The court's memorandum decision observed specifically that Campbell's counsel had requested admission of this agreement and an instruction to the jury that "Ospital and Slusher were no longer in an adversary position with one another," and that he would be "facing the position where counsel for Ospital and Slusher were in collusion against Campbell and the way they could now conduct trial would affect the outcome to the prejudice of Campbell." This is of course exactly the argument State Farm now raises about the Bad Faith Agreement (the basic terms of which had been disclosed at the outset of the liability trial even though it was not shown to the court or counsel). Responding to that argument, the trial judge wrote:

As to any collusion, this Court was present and observed the whole trial, observed no collusion between attorneys for Ospital and Slusher. In fact, Counsel for Slusher questioned all witnesses of both Campbell and Ospital as though adversary to his position that Slusher was not negligent, had no liability, and that he didn't know who was liable but it had to be one or the other defendant or both.
Memorandum Decision November 22, 1983
¶97 After reading the Bad Faith Agreement in its entirety for the first time, the trial court subsequently took the extraordinary step of executing an affidavit in May of 1996, containing the following assertions:

6. . . . I do not believe the second agreement [the Bad Faith Agreement] posed any risks or caused any alteration of the parties' positions at trial different from those already created by the first agreement [the Release of Claims].
7. Because of my awareness of the first agreement during the trial, I was careful to watch for any signs of improper collusion or other improper conduct by Slusher, Ospitals or their counsel at trial. I saw no such conduct. I also saw no signs of efforts by Slusher, Ospitals or their counsel to work together to gain unfair advantage over Campbell and his counsel.

8. The statements and finding I made after the trial in the Memorandum decision issued in November, 1983 . . . were and are accurate.

¶98 This court, on appeal of the Logan verdict in Slusher v Ospital, 777 P.2d 437, 438 (Utah 1989), concluded that the trial court erred in not "disclosing the settlement" to the jury. After analysis of the totality of circumstances at trial, however, we held that "the disclosure of the settlement agreement to the jury would not have had any effect on the outcome of trial." Id. at 445. While our reference to "the settlement agreement" arguably referred only to the Release of Claim document, there is nothing in the separate Bad Faith Agreement that would have differently affected the incentives of the parties or probabilities of collusion between Ospital and Slusher at trial.
¶99 Thus, the existence and/or prejudicial effect of alleged collusion between Ospital and Slusher at the Logan trial was effectively raised and decided in that case. Furthermore, State Farm explicitly disavowed in phase I of this trial any intent to rely on an argument that it had been the target of collusion in the Logan trial. It stipulated to the exclusion of the settlement evidence in phase I and cannot now complain of the trial judge's ruling in that regard.

¶100 As to phase II, the trial court relied on rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence to exclude the settlement agreement, finding that it had "little, if any, probative value," and "any probative value it may have is far outweighed by the unfair prejudice to plaintiffs that would result and the danger of confusion of the issues and misleading the jury." It having been conclusively established in the liability trial and subsequent appeal that there was in fact no evidence of actual collusion at the Logan trial, the settlement agreement between Slusher and Ospital simply had no relevance to the claims of Campbell against State Farm, and the trial judge was entirely correct in precluding its admission.(17)

V. MRS. CAMPBELL'S FRAUD CLAIM

¶101 State Farm argues that there was no basis for the jury to find by clear and convincing evidence that State Farm had an intent to defraud Mrs. Campbell. When considering challenges to jury verdicts based on insufficiency of the evidence, "we view the evidence in the light most supportive of the verdict, and assume that the jury believed those aspects of the evidence which sustain its findings and judgment." Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 467 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the verdict supports the verdict, we will affirm." Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995).

¶102 "To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." Crookston I, 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). Comparing the evidence State Farm marshals in its opening and reply briefs to the evidence the trial court summarizes in its order denying State Farm's motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial regarding Mrs. Campbell's fraud claim, it is clear that all State Farm has done in this appeal is to "argue selected evidence favorable to its position." Id. at 800. As we held in Crookston I, "[t]hat does not begin to meet the marshalling burden [State Farm] must carry." Id. State Farm's failure to meet its marshalling burden is "grounds to reject [its] attack on the fraud finding." Id.

¶103 The entirety of State Farm's summary of the evidence is contained in one paragraph of its brief. By contrast, the jury, having listened to weeks of trial testimony, and having been properly instructed on the elements of fraud, found in favor of both plaintiffs. Furthermore, in its Order Denying State Farm's Motions for Judgment NOV and New Trial Regarding Fraud, the trial judge noted: "The evidence at trial supporting each of the elements of fraud is extensive, and it is not practical to set forth all of the evidence in this Order. However, the following summary highlights some of the evidence." There follow in the Order fourteen paragraphs (four-and-a-half pages) of factual summary detailing the fraud evidence. The summary ends with this paragraph:

n. Most of the misrepresentations and non-disclosures were also made to Inez Campbell, with the intent that Mrs. Campbell would rely thereon, which she did. Even where misrepresentations were made only to Mr. Campbell, it was apparent that they would be passed on to and relied upon by Mrs. Campbell. The evidence also established that Mrs. Campbell was present with her husband, Curtis, when Wendell Bennett misrepresented that there was no need to hire separate counsel. Mr. Campbell testified that he would gladly have hired personal counsel if he had known of a risk of an excess judgment. There was ample evidence that the Campbells were working together in making decisions in the case, that Mrs. Campbell had strong influence on Curtis Campbell's decisions with respect to the case, and that had she appreciated that there was a substantial likelihood of losing the case, she would have insisted that it be settled and she would have had a terrific bearing on Curtis' demanding that the case be settled. There is ample evidence that the misrepresentations made in Mrs. Campbells' presence induced her inaction, to her detriment. Accordingly, there is ample evidence to support a claim of fraud by Mrs. Campbell.
¶104 We conclude that State Farm has entirely failed to meet its burden of marshalling the evidence on its challenge to the finding of fraud against Mrs. Campbell, and we sustain the jury's verdict and the trial court's denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial.
¶105 The trial court limited the judgment on the fraud count to $911.25, which the Campbells paid in attorney fees after the original verdict and which was the total pecuniary loss suffered by plaintiffs. It relied in doing so on Turner v. Gen. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert.denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992), which held that a fraud claim may not support emotional distress damages because fraud is an economic and not a dignitary tort. Id. at 68. We disagree with the holding in Turner, as is reflected by our opinion in Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), where we held that "all damages awarded by the jury can be sustained upon the finding of fraud." Id. at 798. We note that there is scholarly and caselaw support for this view that was apparently not considered when Turner was decided. See Nelson v. Progressive Corp., 976 P.2d 859, 867-68 (Alaska 1999) (holding that emotional distress damages are permitted under fraud theory if severe damages); Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478, 484-85 (Conn. 1991) ("[W]e concur with those jurisdictions that allow the recovery of emotional damages that are the natural and proximate result of fraud."); Osbourne v. Capital City Mort. Corp., 667 A.2d 1321, 1328 (D.C. 1995) ("We hold that, upon proof of intentional misrepresentation, a plaintiff may recover 'emotional damages that are the natural and proximate result' of the defendant's conduct." (citation omitted)); Andrew L. Merritt, Damages for Emotional Distress in Fraud Litigation: Dignitary Torts in a Commercial Society, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 10-12, 23-32 (1989) ("[A]s a general rule, emotional distress damages should be awarded in fraud actions.").

¶106We therefore overturn Turner's holding on the availability of general and emotional distress damages for fraud. In light of Crookston I and in view of the fact that we may sustain a trial court on a ground not relied on by the trial court, see Bell Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neeley Constr. Co., 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984)(citations omitted), we affirm not only the pecuniary damages assessed in this case, but also Mrs. Campbell's general damages, as well as the punitive damages, on the basis of the fraud verdict.

VI. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS

¶107 Once again, on this issue State Farm failed in its brief to adequately marshal the evidence, and its challenge is subject to rejection on that ground alone. Furthermore, it must be rejected on its merits.

¶108 To sustain a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, a party "must show that (i) the conduct complained of was outrageous and intolerable in that it offended against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality; (ii) [the defendant] intended to cause, or acted in reckless disregard of the likelihood of causing, emotional distress; (iii) [the plaintiff] suffered severe emotional distress; and (iv) [the defendant's] conduct proximately caused [the] emotional distress." Retherford v. AT&T Comm. of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 970-71 (Utah 1992).

¶109 First, State Farm challenges the jury's finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress claiming that the evidence was "exceedingly weak" and that the Campbells "failed to establish that they suffered severe emotional distress." When considering such challenges, "we view the evidence in the light most supportive of the verdict, and assume that the jury believed those aspects of the evidence which sustain its findings and judgment." Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 467 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the verdict supports the verdict, we will affirm." Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995).

¶110 In discussing when the statute of limitations begins to run for the claim of the intentional infliction of emotional distress, this court stated:

[T]he element of emotional distress is specific to the plaintiff in each case. Because the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires actual emotional distress, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965), this element is to be gauged subjectively. A particularly hardy or calloused plaintiff may never accrue a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, even though he or she is subjected to outrageous conduct that no reasonable person could be expected to bear. Consequently, our task is to determine when . . . [plaintiff] experienced severe emotional distress, not when an ordinarily sensitive person would have experienced such suffering.
Retherford, 844 P.2d at 975-76 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, the Campbells must only show that they subjectively experienced severe emotional distress regarding the situation they found themselves in, not that an "ordinary reasonable person" would have experienced it that way. State Farm's citation to cases involving the negligent infliction of emotional distress for the proposition that objective proof is required to show that mental or physical consequences have occurred is inapposite. See Harnicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 70-72 (Utah 1998); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 973-75 (Utah 1993).
¶111Second, State Farm argues that the general damages award for each of the Campbells was excessive. For an award of compensatory damages regarding the intentional infliction of emotional distress, the standard of review confronting State Farm is quite high. This court has stated:

While it is true . . . that soft compensatory damages, i.e., for pain and suffering, must be awarded with caution, "when the determination of the jury has been submitted to the scrutiny and judgment of the trial judge, his [or her] action thereon should be regarded as giving further solidarity to the judgment." Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980). Or, as we said in Geary v. Cain, 255 P. at 423, 69 Utah at 358, "In case of doubt, the deliberate action of the trial court should prevail. Otherwise, this court will sooner or later find itself usurping the functions of both the jury and the trial court." Id. These statements in Elkington and Geary are consistent with our statement of the appropriate appellate standard of review today.
Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 806. Despite the court noting in Crookston I that the trial judge's "statements could have been more specific," it found them adequate to support its decision to uphold the compensatory damage award, and therefore to support its denial of a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages. Id.
¶112 There is ample evidence in this record from which a jury could infer that each of the Campbells suffered severe emotional distress. These include: the financial ruin that they believed they faced after the jury in the underlying action rendered its verdict for more than five times the State Farm policy limit; being told by their lawyer that they could start dealing with their exposure by putting a "For Sale" sign on their house; State Farm's refusal to post a supersedeas bond to protect their home and other assets during the pendency of the appeal; and the numerous personal issues that made the Campbells, who had each experienced other traumatic events in their lives, particularly vulnerable to the stress created by State Farm's actions.(18)

¶113 Furthermore, with respect to the amount of the award, we note that the trial court did remit the amount of compensatory damages from $1,400,000 for Curtis Campbell and $1,200,000 for Inez Campbell to $600,000 and $400,000, respectively. It might be argued, given the subjective standard enunciated by this court, that the trial court should not have so drastically reduced the jury's initial awards. The Campbells, however, do not raise this issue on appeal. As pointed out above, the deferential nature of our review requires us to uphold a jury's verdict that has been scrutinized by a trial court unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Our review of the trial court's post-trial ruling on this issue reveals no such abuse. Therefore, we find that the award was not excessive, and note that it provides an independent basis for sustaining all of Mrs. Campbell's damages. See Part V, supra, and Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 798 ("[A]ll damages awarded by the jury can be sustained upon the finding of fraud."); see also Osbourne, 667 A.2d at 1328 (holding that plaintiff may recover emotional damages that are natural and proximate result of defendant's intentional misrepresentation).

VII. MRS. CAMPBELL'S STANDING TO SUE FOR BAD FAITH

¶114 In view of our holding that the jury verdicts on fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress should be sustained, and that they independently support all of the damages awarded in this case, see Parts V and VI, supra; Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 798; Osbourne, 667 A.2d at 1328, we need not address the question of Mrs. Campbell's right to sue State Farm for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Notwithstanding the dissent's lengthy advisory opinion on the subject, the question of standing on these facts remains an open question in Utah, awaiting attention from this court in a future case. The dissent apparently offers its views in support of its conclusion that the jury's verdict on damages was somehow prejudiced by having the bad faith claim intermingled with the fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. We conclude that this notion is entirely inconsistent with the record and the jury's verdict below. This jury responded to the factual conduct of State Farm, and, in our view, rightly so. Whether the basis for recovery bore the label of "bad faith," "fraud," or "intentional infliction of emotional distress," it was the same behavior by State Farm that the jury clearly intended to compensate for and to punish. We do not believe the jury was at all affected in its decision and verdict by the legal labels applied to describe the conduct. Thus, even if the dissent were correct in its view on this question, any error would have been harmless in its effect on damages.

¶115 In addition, we do not agree with the dissent that "the punitive damages award must fail because it was awarded jointly to Mr. and Mrs. Campbell rather than separately to each plaintiff." Punitive damages, "are, by nature, not to compensate but to punish and deter future egregious conduct." Crookston I, 817 P.2d 789, 807 (Utah 1991). Therefore, the award of punitive damages is determined by the defendant's conduct and need not be separated as to plaintiff. The dissent cites Crookston I, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991) for its claim that the punitive damages award should be remanded "due to its joint nature." Crookston I, however, does not support this proposition. In Crookston I, we reviewed the issue of whether punitive damages were excessive under the circumstances of that case. Id. at 793-94. The joint nature of the punitive damages award was never questioned. Id. at 811-12.

¶116 Furthermore, we do not believe that State Farm was prejudiced by the jury instructions, which referred to the Campbells jointly. The only case cited by the dissent in support of this assertion is Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hospital, 830 P.2d 270 (Utah 1992). That case, however, involved only one plaintiff and says nothing about separating plaintiffs in jury instructions. Rather, the instructions in Nielsen were erroneous because separate instructions were contradictory with regard to two alternate legal theories presented by plaintiff. See id. at 274. The instructions were faulty because the two theories required conflicting standards, and the jury could have found defendant liable on either theory. See id. In this case, there was no danger, as the dissent claims, of misperception that Mrs. Campbell's claims were "caused by [ ] State Farm's actions toward Mr. Campbell." As stated previously, the jury clearly awarded punitive damages based on State Farm's egregious conduct toward both Mr. and Mrs. Campbell. Just as we do not believe the jury's decision and verdict were affected by the legal labels applied to State Farm's conduct, neither do we believe that referring to the Campbells in the aggregate in the jury instructions had any effect on the damages awarded.

¶117 Finally, we note that the dissent has developed and espoused a theory requiring reversal in this case that was not raised below, briefed by the parties, or raised in oral argument before this court. That theory appears to rely on what the dissent terms a "faulty verdict" in phase I of the trial below, a verdict in favor of both plaintiffs. That verdict was not challenged at the time of its entry nor was it raised in this appeal. Our review of the record and of the briefs in this appeal demonstrate that the wording of the verdict was never mentioned or relied on as a ground for claimed error. It is a well-established rule that we will not reverse a trial court on the basis of claims and arguments not raised below, let alone those not even argued on appeal.(19)

VIII. ATTORNEY FEES

¶118 In its challenge to the trial court's award of attorney fees, State Farm raises two arguments. First, State Farm argues that fee shifting is not available under Utah law in third-party bad faith cases. Second, State Farm argues that even if some award of attorney fees is permissible in third-party cases, the amount awarded by the trial court is grossly inappropriate. We address each argument separately below.

A. Fee Shifting in Third-Party Cases

¶119 Whether attorney fees should be awarded in a particular case is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). "The general rule in Utah, and . . . the traditional American rule, subject to certain exceptions, is that attorney fees cannot be recovered by a prevailing party unless a statute or contract authorizes such an award." Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994). Because the Campbells do not argue here, nor did they below, that a statute or contract authorizes them to recover attorney fees, we turn our analysis to the "certain exceptions" to the general rule.

¶120 Under Utah law, plaintiffs may recover attorney fees if they are successful in pursuing a first-party bad faith suit against their insurer. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah 1996). Such actions fall within the rule that the damages available to plaintiffs "include both general damages, i.e., those flowing naturally from the breach, and consequential damages, i.e., those reasonably within the contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the contract was made." Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985). The rationale behind allowing recovery of both general and consequential damages in first-party, bad faith actions is "to remove any incentive for insurers to breach the duty of good faith by expanding their exposure to damages caused by such a breach beyond the predictable fixed dollar amount of coverage provided by the policy." Billings, 918 P.2d at 466. Consequential damages in first-party bad faith actions can be awarded for such things as attorney fees, loss of a home or business, damages flowing from bankruptcy, and mental anguish, provided such damages are foreseeable. Id. at 468; Beck, 701 P.2d at 802.

¶121 Extending the rationale advanced in the first-party bad faith cases to the third-party bad faith case before it, the trial court concluded that attorney fees should likewise be recoverable. The trial court offered the following in support of its conclusion:

a. An award of attorney's fees . . . removes some of the incentive for an insurer to breach the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
b. Such an award encourages insurers to act reasonably.

c. The award of "actual" attorney's fees is designed to assist in fully compensating the insured for the damages caused by the breach of good faith duties, whether such good faith duties arise from a first-party or a third-party situation.

d. For purposes of this issue, there is no reasonable basis to distinguish an insured's damages incurred in a first-party or third-party context[.]

e. The duties of good faith arising in a third-party context include fiduciary duties and are higher duties than the duties arising under the contract theory in a first-party context.

(Citations omitted.) Because we agree with the trial court's analysis, we affirm its conclusion that plaintiffs can recover foreseeable attorney fees if they successfully pursue a third-party bad faith action against their insurer. Although the foreseeability of damages test is generally limited to the contractual realm, we note that its use to determine damages in the context of tortious third-party, bad faith claims is justified since such "claims arise only because of the contractual relationship of the parties." Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862, 866 (Utah 1995) (holding that employee who had no contractual relationship with employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier could not sue carrier for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing since such actions are predicated upon parties' contractual relationship).(20)
¶122 Finally, we note that the existence of a fiduciary relationship between insurers and insureds in the context of third-party bad faith claims, which we recognized in Beck, supports an exception to the general rule that attorney fees are not recoverable in tort actions. State Farm relies on a 1996 Colorado case, Bernhard v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 915 P.2d 1285 (Colo. 1996), holding that such fees are not recoverable. However, Bernhard clearly recognized that "[a]ttorney fees may be recoverable in an action for breach of fiduciary duty as a recognized exception to the American rule." Id. at 1289 (citations omitted). The Colorado Supreme Court, however, concluded that insurers were only "quasi," and not "true," fiduciaries, and thus declined to apply the exception. We disagree with Bernhard's view of the relationship, which is contrary to the Utah position. We do, however, accept its assertion that breach of a fiduciary obligation is a well-established exception to the American rule precluding attorney fees in tort cases generally. We thus conclude that the trial court correctly held attorney fees to be a proper element of damages in this case.

¶123 Thus, the issue becomes whether, at the time State Farm issued the policy to the Campbells, State Farm could reasonably foresee that if a claim arose against it the Campbells would incur attorney fees in pursuing that claim. Review of the transcript discloses that, at a minimum, State Farm's Claims Vice-President, Frank Haynes, knew that insureds pursuing claims against State Farm typically retained attorneys on a contingency fee basis. Based on this, we hold that an award of attorney fees to the Campbells was indeed foreseeable by State Farm.

B. Amount of Attorney Fees Award to the Campbells

¶124 State Farm argues that the trial court erred in awarding the Campbells attorney fees equal to 40% of the compensatory damages award. Instead, State Farm suggests that the attorney fees awarded, if any, should be limited to $911.25, the amount the Campbells paid to its attorneys to obtain the benefits due them under the policy. Resolution of this issue requires application of the foreseeability test discussed in the previous section. In other words, could State Farm reasonably foresee that the Campbells would agree to a contingency attorney fee of 40% of the amount recovered for compensatory damages if they found it necessary to hire counsel to pursue a claim against State Farm?

¶125 At the hearing on the Campbells' motion for a directed verdict, the trial court concluded that such a fee agreement was foreseeable to State Farm. A trial court's conclusion as to what constitutes a reasonable attorney fee award is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). The record contains ample support for the trial court's conclusion. Perhaps most telling was State Farm's failure to present any evidence that it could not have foreseen that the Campbells would incur a contingency fee, combined with specific evidence from Vice President Haynes that contingency fees of up to 50% were common in suits by insureds against State Farm. Moreover, the Campbells presented evidence through several witnesses that contingency fees like this one have been around for decades, are well-known, and are in fact the most likely form of attorney fee arrangement, especially in a bad faith case against an insurance company. Such evidence is similar to that presented in Billings, where we found that the plaintiff's contingency fee arrangement was foreseeable. Billings, 918 P.2d at 468. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's finding that the contingency fee agreement was foreseeable and uphold its award of attorney fees in the amount of 40% of the total compensatory damages, or $400,834.70 plus 40% of post-judgment interest on the principal amount of compensatory damages.(21)

IX. LITIGATION EXPENSES

¶126 Finally, State Farm argues that the trial court's award of litigation expenses was manifestly unreasonable. According to its statement of the issue, State Farm challenges the legitimacy of any award for litigation expenses, as well as the actual amount awarded by the trial court.(22)

¶127 As to the legitimacy of an award of litigation expenses in a case, like this, where an insurer has breached its good-faith duties to pay third-party claims, we are asked to settle a question of law, and therefore review the trial courts' ruling for correctness. State Farm relies on the distinction this court made in Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) between first-party insurance claims, sounding in contract, and third-party claims, on which a tort action may be brought. It then argues that, like attorney fees, litigation expenses may not be awarded as damages in a tort action. For the same reasons detailed in the previous section regarding attorney fees, we conclude that litigation expenses are recoverable in this limited type of action; their availability will: (1) decrease incentives for insurers to act in bad faith; (2) encourage insurers to act reasonably; and (3) contribute to actual compensation for plaintiffs for financial cost to them of the breach. The trial court specifically found that "litigation expenses incurred by plaintiffs [were] . . . foreseeable to State Farm, particularly in light of State Farm's labored, vexatious and burdensome defense . . . ."; "State Farm knew or should have known that its oppressive defense raised against plaintiffs' claims would be extremely costly to plaintiffs . . . ." These observations underscore the policy reasons supporting our determination that litigation expenses may be awarded in bad faith insurance cases in which the defendant's litigation conduct has been largely responsible for them.

¶128 Because a challenge to the amount of litigation expenses awarded is similar to a challenge to the amount of attorney fees awarded or the amount of costs awarded under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), we review such awards under an abuse of discretion standard. Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 460 (Utah 1993) ("The determination to award taxable costs is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion."); City Consumer Servs., Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 240 (Utah 1991) ("The standard of review on appeal of a trial court's award of attorney fees is patent error or clear abuse of discretion." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, we note that the appropriate measure for awarding litigation expenses is whether such expenses are reasonable and necessary.

¶129 In determining that the litigation expenses awarded to Campbells were reasonable and necessary, the trial court made the following written findings:

a. The extensive evidence, from which the litigation expenses arose, was necessary to prove each of plaintiffs' causes of action (i.e. breach of good faith duties, intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud) as well as to refute State Farm's defenses to these causes of action.
b. In cases of corporate fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of good faith duties, there needs to be considerable latitude in presenting evidence to prove intent, reckless disregard, absence of mistake or innocent mistake, a plan or scheme, and outrageous conduct, and to address other elements of these causes of action and the defenses thereto such as those raised by State Farm in this case.

c. State Farm had a policy and practice to destroy historical documents . . . and therefore could not produce very substantial relevant documentation during the time period in question. Of plaintiffs' litigation expenses, much was incurred due to this policy and practice of State Farm.

d. At State Farm's request, the case was bifurcated, even though plaintiffs resisted upon the grounds that it would increase the expenses.

e. There were collateral issues of agency, notice, knowledge and general corporate practices that had to be proven by extensive circumstantial evidence, resulting in the large litigation expenses.

f. Compensatory damages, particularly soft damages, are best evaluated and assessed in the context of the totality of all of the circumstances surrounding the wrongful conduct.

g. Though there may have been some overlap in the evidence that was necessary to establish plaintiffs' causes of action for compensatory damages and punitive damages, and the other collateral issues in the case, the Court finds that all of the costs were reasonably and necessarily incurred and are justified for reasons other than those exclusively related to punitive damages.

h. In numerous evidentiary hearings and orders relating thereto, this Court has set forth in more detail the reasons why the extensive evidence was probative, reasonable and necessary to the plaintiffs' case, and the Court adopts its findings and conclusions set forth in [such orders].

¶130 From these findings, it is clear that the trial court carefully considered whether the costs requested by the Campbells were reasonably and necessarily incurred during their pursuit of this case. In addition, State Farm failed to present any affidavits or contradictory evidence refuting the evidence offered by the Campbells. Finally, the trial judge himself was present throughout this lengthy and complex trial, and was in a good position to gauge the accuracy of plaintiffs' evidence. We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in accepting the amounts proffered by the Campbells and awarding those amounts as litigation expenses.
CONCLUSION

¶131 In summary, we hold:

1. The trial court's analyses of the punitive damage award under both federal law and the first six Crookston I factors was correct. As to Crookston I factor seven, we reverse, and reinstate the jury's award of $145 million on the Campbells' cross-appeal.
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting "other acts" evidence relating to State Farm's claims handling practices.

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of the Campbells' expert witnesses.

4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding admission of the Slusher/Ospital settlement agreement.

5. The evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding of fraud by State Farm against Mrs. Campbell.

6. General compensatory and punitive damages may be awarded for fraud.

7. The evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress against both Mr. and Mrs. Campbell.

8. The remitted compensatory damage awards granted to Mr. and Mrs. Campbell are not excessive.

9. The trial court's award of attorney fees and litigation expenses are correct.

Therefore, we affirm the judgment against State Farm in all respects, except for the trial court's remittitur of the punitive damage award. On this issue, we reverse the trial court and reinstate the jury verdict awarding $145 million in punitive damages.
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¶132 Justice Wilkins, Judge Billings, and Judge Davis concur in Justice Durham's opinion.

¶133 Having recused themselves, Chief Justice Howe and Justice Durrant do not participate herein. Judge Judith M. Billings and Judge James Z. Davis from the Court of Appeals sat.

1. The facts as stated herein are drawn from the record on appeal and from the cases of Slusher v. Ospital, 777 P.2d 437 (Utah 1989), and Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840 P.2d 130 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1992).

2. Mr. Campbell's policy provided $25,000 of coverage for each person injured in an accident up to a maximum of $50,000 of coverage per accident. Campbell, 840 P.2d at 133.

3. Todd Ospital's policy provided $100,000 of coverage for each person injured in an accident up to a maximum of $300,000. Additionally, Brooks maintained $30,000 of liability coverage on the car Ospital was driving.

4. The jury awarded $1.4 million to Mr. Campbell and $1.2 million to Mrs. Campbell.

5. The reduction resulted in an award of $600,000 to Mr. Campbell and $400,000 to Mrs. Campbell.

6. The trial court initially granted State Farm a remittitur or, in the alternative, a new trial. The Campbells accepted the remittitur.

7. We note that, in discussing the applicable standards of review in this case, we found Judge Norman H. Jackson's article in the Utah Bar Journal, 12 Utah Bar J. 8 (1999), especially helpful, and we recommend it to all appellate practitioners.

8. Although State Farm indicates in its statement of issues section that it is challenging the punitive damage award under the Utah Constitution, it has not in fact made such an argument, and we do not discuss that issue.

9. It is worth noting that the trial court here issued a remittitur to $25 million, still twenty-five times the amount of the compensatory damages. Had the trial court complied with State Farm's interpretation of the Crookston I ratio factor, the remittitur would have been to an amount three times the amount of the compensatory damages--$3 million. It is apparent from the trial court's written findings that it would not have remitted the amount at all except for its mistaken belief that the jury's award exceeded proper limits as a matter of law under Crookston I.

10. Facts relevant to other Crookston I factors, such as factors four and six, may also satisfy the BMW reprehensibility guidepost.

11. The de novo standard of appellate review imposed by Cooper Industries underscores this principle.

12. That courts must analyze each case's facts to determine the appropriateness of the ratio is also demonstrated by the following cases, cited by State Farm: Denesha v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 161 F.3d 491, 504-05 (8th Cir. 1998) ("As an initial matter, the 24:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is not unsettling as a matter of due process. . . . [However,] the nature and extent of the [defendant's] conduct does not support the jury's award [and] . . . the effect on [the plaintiff] does not warrant" such an award); EEOC v. HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543, 557 (8th Cir. 1998) (reducing punitive damage award only "[a]fter considering the nature and extent of the misconduct, the impact on the individual plaintiffs, a reasonable relation between the compensatory and punitive damages, and an amount sufficient to punish and deter under all the circumstances"); Utah Foam Prods. Co. v. Upjohn Co., 930 F. Supp. 513, 532 (D. Utah 1996) (reducing punitive damage award because, upon review of evidence at trial, "the punitive damages award does not appropriately reflect the level of Upjohn's misconduct. Decidedly, no egregious conduct was presented which would justify the amount of the award based upon clear and convincing evidence"); Apache Corp. v. Moore, 960 S.W.2d 746, 749 (Tex. App. 1997) (noting that "the ratio that will pass constitutional muster will depend upon the facts in each case").

13. In particular, State Farm argues that the following evidence was not admissible:

Evidence relating to first-party property claims;
Unsubstantiated allegations in class action lawsuits;
Verdicts in first-party cases;
Evidence of the conduct of a non-party sister company;
Evidence that State Farm employed predictable experts;
Evidence that State Farm engaged in hard ball litigation tactics;
Evidence that State Farm strongly encouraged first-contact settlements; and
Evidence showing that State Farm discriminated on the basis of sex and race.
14. The trial judge was actually upholding an earlier bifurcation order by predecessor Judge John Rokich.
15. It is not entirely clear to us that the conceptual considerations related to "character" under rule 404 translate freely from the cases we have decided involving an individual's character to the "character" of a corporation. Both parties in this case have briefed the issue without any attention to potential distinctions, however, and so for purposes of this case, we assume (without deciding) that the analysis should be identical.

16. Additionally, we note that the trial court was very responsive to State Farm's request for additional time when it claimed the necessity of adding rebuttal witnesses regarding a different aspect of the trial. In fact, at that juncture, the trial court doubled the amount of trial time allotted. We are confident that the trial court would have done the same had State Farm convincingly presented such a need regarding these documents.

17. Oddly, despite the trial court's ruling on this issue, the jury did in fact see the Bad Faith Agreement in phase II. State Farm's counsel conducted the following inquiry of Campbells' expert James Crandall:

Q: . . . Just before the lunch break, I was asking you about your awareness through the documentation of an agreement in June of 1983 between Mr. Ospital, or the Ospitals, and Mr. Slusher about suing State Farm if they got an excess verdict.
A: Okay.

Q: And you're aware of that?

A: I have a general recollection of it.

Q: We have this document already in evidence, and it's on June 3rd of 1983, between Robert Slusher, Junior, and the estate of Todd Ospital and Allstate. And it said, it says here that, "Ospital and the attorneys currently retained by Ospital shall assist Slusher in the prosecution of his claim against any other party responsible for said injuries and damages, including any claim for bad faith against any insurer of the responsible party." Do you see that?

A: Yes.

Q: So before the case went to verdict, which was September of '83, Ospitals and Slushers agreed that they would go together and sue State Farm for bad faith.

A: Under certain circumstances. They agreed to settle as between each other, which is common, and under certain circumstances, to proceed further.

Q: But the important thing is, you're aware, as a law professor, that Ospital and Slusher didn't have a direct right to sue State Farm.

A: That's right. Not for the bad faith claim, that's right. Because it only runs to the Campbells.

Q: So when Ospital and Slusher got excess verdicts against Mr. Campbell, they needed Mr. Campbell to be the party to bring the lawsuit.

(Emphasis added).

Thus, the Bad Faith Agreement was admitted into evidence, and the jury was informed of its provisions. It came in without objection as Exhibit 41 during the cross-examination of Paul Brinkman, a witness for the plaintiffs, and its pertinent terms were read to the jury. After a subsequent objection by plaintiffs, based on the trial court's exclusion of the agreement in the pretrial motion in limine, State Farm agreed to the withdrawal of Exhibit 41; nevertheless, counsel for State Farm referenced the agreement in closing argument:

So they confirm that again and then in June of 1983, couple of weeks later, the agreement is signed on June 3rd, 1983, where Slusher, the Ospitals, their counsel and Allstate agree down here in paragraph three that they're going to assist in prosecuting a claim for bad faith against any insurer of the responsible party. And then you get down to paragraph four and they set out how this is going to happen, how this is going to work. And when you go over to paragraph four on page two they talk about splitting up the excess recovery half and half with respect to any general and punitive damages recovered in a bad-faith claim.

Now, this is an agreement, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, a contract, I guess you could call it, whereby Ospital and the Slushers agreed to pursue a bad-faith action against State Farm, which they couldn't pursue without Mr. Campbell giving them some kind of cooperation because by law they can't pursue it.
. . . .

And so what we have is a situation where the evidence shows that even before trial there was an agreement to pursue a bad-faith action by parties who can't pursue it without Campbell helping them. And I submit to you that for that agreement to be carried out, no execution could be pursued and there was no intent to ever do that.

18. Recently, we decided Schuurman v. Shingleton, 2001 UT 52, 26 P.3d 227, in which we held that "the alleged suffering that plaintiff has undergone in this case [severe pain and suffering and emotional distress] is not the type of distress that no reasonable person could be expected to endure." Id. at ¶ 25. We noted that plaintiff's alleged distress in that case was "indistinguishable from that commonly suffered by others when an intimate personal relationship fails." Id.
In this case, however, no reasonable person should be expected to endure the distress suffered by the Campbells at the hands of their insurer, in which they were led to believe they would lose their home and assets and be unable to enjoy their retirement, for which they had worked their entire lives.

19. It is of course true, as the dissent notes, that State Farm argued the issue of Mrs. Campbell's standing to sue for bad faith in Point IV. A of its appellate brief. It did not, however, challenge the phase I verdict in favor of Mrs. Campbell on the fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims on the same basis, since those claims were based in tort, not contract.

20. In Gibbs M. Smith, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 949 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997), this court implied the same result we reach here, by holding, in a third-party claim, that attorney fees were recoverable for a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Although the court observed that "a more accurate statement might be that this is a first-party action for third-party coverage," it is plain on the facts that the action involved what we described in Beck as a third-party claim. Thus our holding in that case, despite its scant analysis, stands for the proposition that fees are awardable in third-party bad faith claims by an insured against its insurer, a ruling we make explicit today.

21. We explicitly reject State Farm's proposal to limit the award of attorney fees to $911.25, the amount the Campbells paid to obtain the benefits of their insurance contract with State Farm. Because the very purpose of a bad faith claim is to recover extra-contractual damages--namely, the amount of the excess judgment and any compensatory damages suffered in connection with the insurer's bad faith--it would be entirely incongruent to limit attorney fee awards to those fees incurred to secure the benefits of the insurance contract.

We also reject State Farm's argument that Mr. Campbell's award of attorney fees should be limited to 4% of the total amount of compensatory damages awarded. Examination of the agreement between Mr. Campbell, Slusher, and Ospital reveals that Mr. Campbell is fully liable for all attorney fees unless there is no recovery or a recovery that is insufficient to cover the attorney fees and litigation expenses. Because the recovery here is sufficient, Mr. Campbell is obligated to pay the full contingency fee in the amount of 40% of the compensatory damages awarded.

22. With respect to State Farm's argument concerning the legitimacy of awarding any expenses, State Farm has failed to meet the requirements of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24. In particular, State Farm has failed to satisfy subsection (a)(5) of rule 24 which requires it to include in its brief "[a] statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard for appellate review with supporting authority." (Emphasis added.) Although State Farm's issue statement addresses both attorney fees and litigation expenses, State Farm only cites a case discussing the standard of review for attorney fee awards, not awards for litigation expenses, and makes no attempt to analogize awards of litigation expenses to awards for attorney fees.

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RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

¶134 Inez Campbell was never involved in the lawsuit underlying the action now before us, nor could she have been. She was not driving the car that caused the accident, she was never named as a defendant, and she never had any exposure to or became legally obligated to pay damages to any of the claimants. State Farm owed no duty to her under the insurance policy. Only her husband Curtis Campbell was potentially liable, was sued, and was subject to the judgment rendered in that case. State Farm's duty extended only to him.

¶135 Ignoring these crucial facts, the trial court in the second stage of the bifurcated trial in this case erroneously instructed the jury three times that State Farm had already been found liable to both Mr. and Mrs. Campbell for breaching its fiduciary duty and its duty of good faith and fair dealing. In fact, the jury in the prior stage of the trial never rendered a verdict extending liability for bad faith to Inez Campbell. As a result, the trial court's multiple jury instructions to the contrary misled the jury and, in the process, vitiated State Farm's right to a fair trial. This error was plain, and it tainted every aspect of the verdict now under review,(1) including Mrs. Campbell's independent claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The majority's attempt to nevertheless affirm on so-called "independent" grounds glosses over the fatal flaws explicit in the lower court's judgment and runs contrary to this court's own well-established case law.

I. INEZ CAMPBELL'S BAD FAITH CLAIM

¶136 Although the majority declines to address the issue, it is clear under Utah law that Inez Campbell never had standing to sue State Farm for bad faith. While this court has long recognized tort claims for an insurance company's breach of its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, see Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 19 Utah 2d 261, 266, 430 P.2d 576, 577-78 (1967), we have always required that plaintiffs wishing to bring such claims first demonstrate a contractual nexus through which their suits arise. As we unanimously held only two years ago in Sperry v. Sperry, "Utah law clearly limits the duty of good faith to first parties to insurance contracts. Consequently, only a first party can sue for breach of that duty." 1999 UT 101, ¶ 7, 990 P.2d 381. This conclusion is as natural as it is logical, for "both first- and third-party claims arise only because of the contractual relationship of the parties." Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862, 866 (Utah 1995).

¶137 In this case, Curtis Campbell was a party to the insurance contract with State Farm, and his wife Inez Campbell was not. The contract itself states:

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY . . . Agrees with the insured, named in the declarations made a part hereof, in consideration of the payment of the premium and in reliance upon the statements in the declarations and subject to all the terms of this policy . . . .
(Emphasis added.) The only person listed as a "named insured" on the declarations to which the contract refers is Curtis Campbell. In fact, Mr. Campbell is the only person listed on those declarations at all. Consequently, Mr. Campbell was the only one with whom State Farm "[a]gree[d] . . . in consideration of the payment of the premium" to provide insurance for those designated as covered by the policy. Mrs. Campbell was simply a beneficiary of the contract, an additional insured.
¶138 Importantly, we have explicitly held that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not extend to parties who are merely beneficiaries of an insurance policy. In Savage v. Educators Insurance Co., 908 P.2d 862 (Utah 1995), a school bus driver who was insured under an Educators policy purchased by her employer sued the insurance company for allegedly acting in bad faith by resisting to compensate her for medical expenses she had incurred. Recognizing that "the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual covenant, one that arises solely as an incident to contractual obligations owed by an insurer to its insured," Chief Justice Zimmerman's 4-1 opinion, from which Justice Durham dissented, flatly rejected the plaintiff's contention that she had standing to sue. Id. at 866. We held:

Because Savage has no contractual relationship with Educators, she has no cause of action against it for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This conclusion is consistent with the commentators and the great majority of courts in other jurisdictions . . . .
Id.(2) Nothing is different here. Just as the Jordan School District contracted with Educators for a policy that insured Pat Savage, in this case Mr. Campbell purchased his insurance policy from State Farm, a policy that also insured Mrs. Campbell. Consequently, the contract states by its own terms that it is an agreement between State Farm and Curtis Campbell--and no one else. Had Mrs. Campbell wished to be named as a party to the contract rather than merely as a beneficiary of it, she could have negotiated for that right. Because she did not do so, however, she had no right under Utah law to sue for bad faith. See Savage, 908 P.2d at 866.
¶139 To this degree, Justice Durham's assertion that any conclusion reached concerning whether Inez Campbell had standing to sue for bad faith is an "advisory" one constitutes nothing less than hyperbolic pretense. The claim for bad faith was the crux of the case against State Farm, and it was for this reason that the lower court bifurcated the trial in the first place. Moreover, our decision in Savage addressed precisely the issue in question here. Accordingly, any notion that the question of whether Mrs. Campbell had standing to sue for bad faith is "an open [one] in Utah" can be characterized only as a conclusion that recklessly throws all judicial restraint, particularly in the name of stare decisis, to the wind for the sake of achieving a desired result: a binding judgment against State Farm for its, admittedly, condemnable behavior.

¶140 Importantly, however, the law has long recognized that not all actions causing injury enjoy recourse in the courts. E.g., Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT 18, ¶ 140, 974 P.2d 1194 (Zimmerman, J., concurring) ("The law simply does not recognize that every harm suffered should be compensated."); Demman v. Star Broadcasting Co., 28 Utah 2d 50, 53, 497 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1972) (finding that lawsuits cannot be allowed "in every instance"); see also Black's Law Dictionary 398 (7th ed. 1999) ("'There are cases in which the law will suffer a man knowingly and wilfully to inflict harm upon another, and will not hold him accountable for it.'" (quoting John Salmond, Jurisprudence 372-73 (Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947))). This rule of damnum absque injuria applies regardless of how offensive or inappropriate society might find an actor's conduct to be, and this court has itself repeatedly barred recovery for conduct that could very well be considered condemnable but for which there is no cause of action. See, e.g., Sears v. Ogden City, 572 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Utah 1977) (holding that there is no recovery for government action making access to one's property difficult and inconvenient); Demman, 28 Utah 2d at 53, 497 P.2d at 1380 (denying recovery for slander to a losing political candidate after a radio station broadcasted "obnoxious" remarks by a caller who asserted that the candidate was unqualified and a felon); N.M. Long & Co. v. Cannon-Papanikolas Constr. Co., 9 Utah 2d 307, 310, 343 P.2d 1100, 1102 (1959) (affirming judgment for no recovery from defendants who had made unusable plaintiff's fish pond business by draining water from their property); Twenty-Second Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., 36 Utah 238, 255-56, 103 P. 243, 249-50 (1909) (disallowing recovery for disruption of worship services caused by operation of a railroad near a church on Sundays). Consequently, regardless of Justice Durham's assertion to the contrary, it absolutely does matter what legal theory plaintiffs hang their damages on, because failure to sufficiently prove all elements of a given cause of action makes the difference between an injury for which the law provides recourse and one for which there is no legal remedy at all. As such, the majority opinion's curious admission that the jury was not "at all affected in its decision and verdict by the legal labels applied to describe [State Farm's] conduct" in this case both undermines the logic of the opinion itself and emphasizes the importance of whether Mrs. Campbell had standing to sue for bad faith. For if, as the majority recognizes, the jury disregarded the appropriate legal standard in an attempt to "punish" State Farm for conduct the jury found offensive, that is unrefuted evidence of error in law, passion, and prejudice on the jury's part--necessitating a new trial on the court's own motion. See, e.g., Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Utah 1985); Paul v. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 3, 261 P.2d 670, 671 (1953); Utah R. Civ. P. 59. Moreover, the majority's recognition that the jury disregarded the applicable legal standards in this case actually helps explain the great extent to which the trial court's erroneous instruction that State Farm had committed bad faith against Mrs. Campbell confused and inflamed the jury. See infra part III.A.

¶141 Indeed, the majority's reluctance to recognize that Mrs. Campbell never had standing to sue for bad faith only highlights the problems created at the trial level when the lower court inappropriately allowed Mrs. Campbell standing. In fact, the trial court's failure to recognize that Mrs. Campbell did not have standing to pursue a bad faith claim for State Farm's failure to settle the lawsuit against Mr. Campbell eventually led to the court's rendering a faulty verdict in the first stage of the case, and then erroneously instructing the jury in the second stage that State Farm had already been found liable to Mrs. Campbell for bad faith when no such verdict had ever been rendered.

II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAULTY VERDICT AND ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION

¶142 This case was bifurcated, resulting in two different jury trials with verdicts. The jury in the first stage of the bifurcated trial was asked by the special verdict form only whether there was a likelihood of a judgment being entered in favor of various claimants against Curtis Campbell, and whether State Farm had "act[ed] unreasonably when it chose not to settle [the various claims] against Curtis B. Campbell for Mr. Campbell's policy limit." (Emphasis added.) Never was the jury in this first stage of the bifurcated trial asked to answer any question that pertained to Inez Campbell, and the jury accordingly never entered any such verdict in her favor.(3)

¶143 However, after reciting the jury's special verdict that addressed only State Farm's actions with respect to Curtis Campbell, the judgment entered in the first stage of the bifurcated trial stated, "Based on the above findings by the jury, . . . plaintiffs are granted judgment of liability against defendant State Farm . . . based on State Farm's breach of its duty to act in good faith in defending Curtis Campbell." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, with no further explanation, the court ordered that State Farm was liable to both Curtis and Inez Campbell solely on the basis of the jury's findings that State Farm had breached its duty to Curtis Campbell. This giant leap of faith and logic assumed that liability can arise out of the ether for one plaintiff if a jury finds it for another, a result wholly at odds with Utah procedure and law. See, e.g., Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 24 Utah 2d 292, 298, 470 P.2d 393, 397 (1970) (when special verdict submitted, jury finds facts and court applies law); Colovos v. Home Life Ins. Co. of New York, 83 Utah 401, 414, 28 P.2d 607, 612 (1934) (court enters judgment on the verdict); Utah R. Civ. P. 47(q) (jury declares verdict). To be sure, this failure to conform to the verdict was plain error, rendering the judgment void on its face and requiring our reversal of Mrs. Campbell's bad faith claim on appeal--especially given the unavoidable conclusion that Mrs. Campbell never had standing to sue for bad faith in the first place.

¶144 Moreover, the trial court's faulty judgment eventually resulted in severely misleading the jury in the second stage of the bifurcated trial. Indeed, in the second stage of the case, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury three times that the previous jury had found State Farm liable to Inez Campbell for bad faith even though no such determination had ever been made. State Farm objected to this instruction, but the court gave the erroneous instruction nevertheless. For instance, jury instruction 25 stated:

You are instructed that a previous jury in this case has found . . . that State Farm acted unreasonably in not settling [the] claims against Mr. Campbell before the Cache County verdicts. This means that State Farm breached its duties of good faith and fair dealing and its fiduciary duty to Campbells to settle the claims against Curtis Campbell within the policy limits.
(Emphasis added.) Likewise, jury instruction 28 informed the jury that "State Farm breached its fiduciary duties and duties of good faith and fair dealing to the Campbells," and thus, that the jury could award "compensatory damages . . . caused by State Farm's breaches of these duties." (Emphasis added.) Even the special verdict questions put to the jury were prefaced with the statement that
[i]t has previously been determined that State Farm breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing towards the Campbells.
(Emphasis added.) As noted, however, this statement simply was not true. The jury in the first stage of the trial never found liability toward Inez Campbell. The trial court's multiple instructions to the contrary in the second stage of the trial were misleading to the jury and constituted plain and prejudicial error, for the jury's erroneous assumption that State Farm was liable to Inez Campbell for bad faith permeated every aspect of the verdict rendered in the second stage of the trial.
III. THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECTS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR

¶145 Because the trial court erroneously instructed the jury in the second stage of the bifurcated trial that State Farm had been found liable to Mrs. Campbell for bad faith, the judgment from the trial's second stage must be vacated and remanded as to Inez Campbell's claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and as to the punitive damages award rendered jointly to Mr. and Mrs. Campbell. Those instructions tainted the jury's consideration of Mrs. Campbell's claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress, thus preventing any chance that State Farm would receive a fair trial on those issues or on the issue of punitive damages. Moreover, the erroneous instructions fundamentally altered the jury's consideration of punitive damages in contravention to our decision in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). Indeed, both independently and together, the trial court's severe missteps in this regard constituted plain error necessitating reversal on appeal--especially given that such errors occurred, not because the trial court mistakenly overlooked a matter of procedure or law, but as a result of the court's own affirmative actions in respect to the verdict in the first stage of the case and the jury instructions and special verdict form in the second.(4)

A. Right to a Fair Trial

¶146 All parties to litigation--plaintiff and defendant alike--are entitled to a fair trial. In Utah, this right to a fair trial has long included the right to "a presentation of the case to the jury under instructions that clearly, concisely and accurately state the issues and the law applicable thereto so that the jury will understand its duties." Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 12, 354 P.2d 564, 566 (1960); see also, e.g., Rowley v. Graven Bros. & Co., 26 Utah 2d 448, 451, 491 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1971); Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 368, 412 P.2d 451, 454 (1966); Williams v. Lloyd, 16 Utah 2d 427, 429, 403 P.2d 166, 167 (1965); Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 352, 366 P.2d 701, 702 (1961); Utah State Nat'l Bank v. Livingston, 74 Utah 456, 458-59, 280 P. 327, 327-28 (1929). In this case, however, the instructions given by the court to the jury were anything but "clear" or "accurate," and State Farm consequently never received a fair trial.

¶147 In fact, the instructions' multiple erroneous statements that State Farm had been found liable to Inez Campbell for bad faith possessed only the possibility to confuse the jury and the issues it was to decide. Perhaps most problematically, the court's erroneous statements "took the jury's mind from the real issue" of whether State Farm was liable under Mrs. Campbell's claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress by "emphasiz[ing] [a] situation[] . . . not supported" by the facts or law--that State Farm was already liable to Inez Campbell for bad faith. Taylor v. Johnson, 15 Utah 2d 342, 349-50, 393 P.2d 382, 387-88 (1964). We have previously held that such an effect violates a party's right to a fair trial, and nothing militates to the contrary here. See id. Likewise, the court's instructions created the misperception that Mrs. Campbell's claims were inextricably bound up in, and caused by, State Farm's actions toward Mr. Campbell. In so doing, the court impermissibly confused the jury by repeatedly referring to "the Campbells" in the aggregate, rather than by separating the two plaintiffs and their respective claims as required by law. Cf. Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah 1992) (holding that plaintiff had been denied her right to a fair trial when the court gave instructions confusing the two legal theories on which she was pursuing her claim); King v. Barron, 770 P.2d 975, 977 (Utah 1988) (finding severance appropriate where merging trial for plaintiff's legally unrelated claims "would invite error and confusion" by forcing jury to consider different evidence and theories in relation to separate defendants). Had the court specifically instructed the jury that Inez Campbell's claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress were entirely separate from those lodged by Curtis Campbell--or had it severed Mrs. Campbell's suit from Mr. Campbell's upon making the correct and appropriate determination that she had no standing to sue for bad faith--then the prejudicial effects of this statement arguably would have been avoided. But the court did not take such an action, and as a consequence both the entire verdict as to Mrs. Campbell and the punitive award, which was rendered jointly as to Mr. and Mrs. Campbell, were irreparably tainted by the court's denying State Farm its right to a fair trial.

¶148 Indeed, the lower court's violation of State Farm's right to a fair trial in this case is especially flagrant in view of the great care with which trial courts are required to select juries. The process of voir dire exists so that courts can ensure "a fair and impartial jury [is] chosen." 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury § 189, at 871 (1995). Likewise, partiality, prejudice, and bias all constitute reasons upon which a trial court may excuse a juror for cause, Utah R. Civ. P. 47(f)(6), and we have specifically held that trial "judges should err on the side of caution in ruling on for-cause challenges," as courts' discretion in this area is limited due to the "ease with which all issues of bias can be dispensed by the simple expedient of replacing a questionable juror with another whose neutrality is not open to question." State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ¶ 51, 992 P.2d 951. As a result, we have further held that where a jury considers in its deliberations evidence not introduced at trial, a new trial is required to ensure fairness and impartiality of the ultimate result. See State ex rel. Road Comm'n v. White, 22 Utah 2d 102, 103, 449 P.2d 114, 115 (1969).(5) Similarly, courts uniformly require dismissal of potential jurors who have prior knowledge of facts material to the dispute, and require a new trial where such jurors were not dismissed. See, e.g., Lewis v. State ex rel. Baxley, 70 So. 2d 790, 791-92 (Ala. 1954) (affirming trial court's decision to dismiss six jurors from a disciplinary proceeding because their animals had been treated by the veterinarian under review); Barker v. Commonwealth, 337 S.E.2d 729, 733 (Va. 1985) (reversing a conviction for rape, sodomy, and malicious wounding because juror who knew of defendant's prior conviction on the same charges, which had been overturned and was being readjudicated, was not excused). And in cases where media coverage is so "extensive" that it precludes a party from "receiv[ing] a fair and impartial trial," we have held that trial courts must take protective measures, such as allowing change of venue, to ensure a fair trial. See, e.g., State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 554 (Utah 1989). In fact, even in the face of countervailing constitutional concerns, we have allowed trial courts to issue temporary restraining orders restricting during-trial publicity so that the parties hold a greater chance of receiving a fair trial. See KUTV, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 686 P.2d 456, 461 (Utah 1984). It is for this same reason that trial judges examine potential jurors at length about any outside information they may have received concerning the case at issue and whether they have any preconceived notions about the parties or the subject matter in dispute. Upon finding that such partiality exists, a judge will properly excuse that potential juror from service, just as courts repeatedly and appropriately instruct the eventually impaneled jurors not to discuss the case with anyone or to consider any media coverage of the suit or other outside evidence. See Model Utah Jury Instructions, Civil 1.8 (Michie 1993). In this case, however, the trial court nullified any prior efforts it had made to impanel a fair and impartial jury by itself giving the jury erroneous information, namely, that State Farm had already been found liable to Mrs. Campbell for bad faith. Had a potential juror admitted to such an erroneous belief upon reporting for duty, he or she certainly would have been excused. But here, it was the trial court's own instruction that misled the jury and, thus, encroached on State Farm's right to a fair trial.

¶149 Accordingly, the majority opinion's bare assertion that Mrs. Campbell's fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims "provide[] an independent basis for sustaining all of Mrs. Campbell's damages" cannot support an affirmance of the lower court's judgment. Not only does Justice Durham fail to attempt to explain how those theories of liability account for the damages the jury actually awarded, but the judgments rendered to Mrs. Campbell on her claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress are void ab initio due to the court's breach of State Farm's right to a fair trial.

B. Punitive Damages

¶150 Apart from the problems created by the lower court's denying State Farm its right to a fair trial, the court's multiple erroneous instructions to the jury that liability had been found as to Inez Campbell for bad faith prejudiced State Farm further by skewing the fundamental considerations required for determining punitive damages.

¶151 The jury was asked in the second stage of the bifurcated trial to award damages to both Curtis Campbell and Inez Campbell, and in doing so awarded compensatory damages to Curtis Campbell in the amount of $1.4 million and to Inez Campbell in the amount of $1.2 million. The jury was also asked to award punitive damages, if any, which it did in the amount of $145 million but without designating which portion of the amount was awarded to Inez Campbell and which portion was awarded to Curtis Campbell.

¶152 In its determination of punitive damages, the jury had been specifically instructed by the trial court to consider, among other things, "the effect of defendant's misconduct on the lives of the Campbells," "the relationship between the parties," and "the amount of compensatory damages awarded." This jury instruction was given in compliance with our decision in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), which held that a jury awarding punitive damages must be charged with considering seven factors in order to determine the appropriate amount of the award. These factors include "(i) the relative wealth of the defendant; (ii) the nature of the alleged misconduct; (iii) the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct; (iv) the effect thereof on the lives of the plaintiff and others; (v) the probability of future recurrence of the misconduct; (vi) the relationship of the parties; and (vii) the amount of actual damages awarded." Crookston, 817 P.2d at 808 (emphasis added). However, because the jury was operating under the false assumption that State Farm was liable to Inez Campbell for bad faith, it could not possibly have given proper consideration to each of these factors, and the majority consequently sets dangerous precedent by reinstating the jury's original punitive award for $145 million rather than remanding to the trial court for further deliberations on punitive damages.

¶153 Indeed, the jury granted Mrs. Campbell $1.2 million in compensatory damages for her injury, and we can only assume that the jury followed the judge's instructions and based its punitive award, at least partially, on the effect of State Farm's alleged misconduct on Mrs. Campbell's life. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah 1992) ("[J]urors are sworn to follow the instructions as given by the court . . . ."). As instructed by the court, the jury understood a good portion of such misconduct to include State Farm's breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing, but as explained, State Farm did not owe Mrs. Campbell such a duty and no jury had ever found that State Farm had breached it to her. This is enough by itself to require a reassessment of the punitive award at the trial level, since the judgment rendered to punish State Farm is inexplicably tied to "misconduct" that State Farm did not--and could not--commit.

¶154 Moreover, the punitive award does not reflect an appropriate consideration of Crookston's sixth factor, the relationship of the parties. The analysis undertaken by any jury properly employing our seven factors for punitive damages will be fundamentally altered when informed that, as a matter of law, one of the plaintiffs in the case has no standing to sue for one of the claims lodged. Especially here, where Mrs. Campbell's claim for bad faith was her only assertion of a fiduciary relationship with State Farm, it is imperative that we remand the punitive damages award for further proceedings. To be sure, even if Inez Campbell's remaining claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress survived the problems created by the unfair trial given to State Farm in this case, which they do not, they neither create nor demonstrate any relevant legal relationship between Mrs. Campbell and State Farm. The precise effect such a revelation would have had on the jury falls only within the realm of pure speculation, but given our own mandate that the jury consider, not a fictional, but the actual "relationship of the parties" in determining punitive damages, this too requires that we remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

¶155 Finally, the punitive damages award must fail because it was awarded jointly to Mr. and Mrs. Campbell rather than separately to each plaintiff. Even if the trial court had properly severed Inez Campbell's claims from her husband's, which it did not, the punitive award would have to be remanded under Crookston due to its joint nature. Mrs. Campbell's claims were entirely independent from Mr. Campbell's, but because punitive damages were awarded jointly as to both these plaintiffs, we cannot now know what portion of the award the jury intended to be owed to Inez Campbell and what portion it intended to be owed to Curtis Campbell. Accordingly, because Mrs. Campbell's claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress must be remanded while Mr. Campbell's need not--and because, as explained, the jury was inappropriately instructed to commingle the two plaintiffs in its consideration of the fourth and sixth Crookston factors--the punitive damages award must be vacated and remanded for further proceedings.(6)

IV. CONCLUSION

¶156 Inez Campbell had no standing to sue State Farm for bad faith, and the jury never found that State Farm was liable to her in that regard. Her only actionable claims were for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. As a result, the trial court's multiple instructions that State Farm had been found liable to Mrs. Campbell for bad faith tainted both the entire verdict as to Mrs. Campbell and the punitive damages assessed against State Farm in behalf of Mr. Campbell. Accordingly, I would (1) reverse as to Mrs. Campbell's claim for bad faith, (2) vacate and remand for a new trial on Mrs. Campbell's claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress, (3) affirm on the issue of State Farm's liability to Mr. Campbell, and (4) vacate and remand for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages as to Mr. Campbell inasmuch as that award was rendered jointly to both Mr. Campbell and Mrs. Campbell.

---

1. State Farm raises the issue of Mrs. Campbell's standing to sue for bad faith in point IV.A of its appellate brief.

2. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions follow exactly the same rule Utah does: that "the duty of good faith and fair dealing derives from and exists solely because of the contractual relationship of the parties." Austero v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 133 Cal. Rptr. 107, 110 (Ct. App. 1976); see, e.g., Lowe v. Am. Med. Int'l, 494 So. 2d 413, 414 (Ala. 1986) ("The cause of action for the tort of bad faith refusal to pay was created to protect only the person for whose benefit the insurance payments should have been made."); Hatchwell v. Blue Shield of California, 244 Cal. Rptr. 249, 253 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Although [Mrs. Hatchwell] was eligible for health care benefits as a Dependent Subscriber [on Mr. Hatchwell's insurance policy], and as such may be termed a 'co-insured' or 'dependent beneficiary,' as she urges, this is not sufficient to establish standing to sue for breach of contract and bad faith based upon the denial of benefits to [Mr. Hatchwell]." (citations omitted)); Soto v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 229 Cal. Rptr. 192, 197 (Ct. App. 1986) ("One who is not a party to the insurance contract and the accompanying implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may not maintain an action for breach of the covenant."); Eastham v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 586 N.E.2d 1131, 1133 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a wife did not have standing to bring a bad faith claim against her automobile liability insurer for failing to timely pay the medical expenses of her deceased son, even though she was insured under the policy); United Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland, 780 P.2d 193, 197-98 (Nev. 1989) ("[A] wife's coverage as a dependent under her husband's health insurance policy does not give her standing to enforce her husband's contract rights for bad faith denial of health care benefits."); Vecchiarelli v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 628 N.Y.S.2d 892, 893 (App. Div. 1995) (upholding the dismissal of a spouse's claim for bad faith where no contractual nexus was present); see also Correa v. Pa. Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 618 F. Supp. 915, 929 (D. Del. 1985) (finding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing does not extend to the spouse of someone insured under a workers' compensation policy); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Archer, 832 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (disallowing a spouse's suit for bad faith when her husband was denied benefit payments from his workers' compensation carrier).

3. As explained above, there was good reason the jury in the first stage of the bifurcated trial was never asked questions as to breach of duty to Inez Campbell. State Farm did not owe a duty to Inez Campbell to settle the case in her behalf. Inez Campbell was not the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident and had no exposure of liability for claims arising from the accident. For the same reason, she was not named as a defendant in the underlying case in Cache County.

4. Justice Durham, in a single paragraph, apparently takes exception to the entire dissent on the ground that the parties failed to raise the "wording" of the trial court's faulty verdict from the first stage of the case below or on appeal. Despite this bald assertion, State Farm did specifically challenge on appeal the trial court's determination that Mrs. Campbell had standing to sue for bad faith. In fact, State Farm argued that "[t]he court below" should not have "concluded that Mrs. Campbell had standing" based "solely on her marital relationship to Curtis Campbell." Moreover, this court has repeatedly held that we "may consider issues raised for the first time on appeal if the trial court committed plain error." Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 258 (Utah 1998); see also, e.g., Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, ¶ 34, 426 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Durham, J.); State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70, ¶ 8, 9 P.3d 164 (Durham, J.); Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 51 n.1 (Utah 1996); Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994); State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 58 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J.); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 853-54 (Utah 1992) (Durham, J.). The trial court's actions in this case unequivocally constituted plain error, a point made repeatedly throughout the dissent. See supra ¶¶ 135, 140, 143, 144, 145, 149; infra ¶ 155.

5. Accord United States v. Castello, 526 F. Supp. 847, 848-50 (W.D. Tex. 1981) (granting a new trial where a juror conducted ballistic experiments and reported the results to the jury); Frede v. Downs, 428 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (remanding for a new trial a collision case in which the jury referred to a boating handbook not admitted as evidence); Brockie v. Omo Constr., Inc., 844 P.2d 61, 63-64 (Mont. 1992) (reversing trial court's decision not to grant a new trial where jury foreman researched physics questions at issue in the case and reported his findings to other jurors); Arthur v. Washington Iron Works, 587 P.2d 626, 629 (Wash. 1978) (ordering a new trial where jurors went to the public library "looking for handbooks" related to the case and "examin[ed] the yellow pages of the telephone book concerning" witnesses that had been called during trial).

6. Contending that Crookston does not question the legitimacy of joint punitive damage awards, the majority opinion assails the argument that the punitive award in this case must be vacated. However, the majority's contention must fail for at least two reasons. First, in characterizing the necessity for vacating the punitive award solely "due to its joint nature," Justice Durham oversimplifies the reasons stated above for why the award must fail. While Crookston did recognize the policy objectives of punitive damages to include "punish[ment] and deter[rence]," 817 P.2d at 807, we specifically held in Crookston that awards rendered for such purposes must be constrained by well established "parameters" that tether punitive damages to some sense of reasonableness in order to avoid "excessive awards." Id. at 808. Those parameters include the seven factors listed above, which "must be considered [by the jury] in assessing the amount of punitives." Id. (emphasis added). Because, as explained above, the jury was unable to properly consider two of those factors in this case due to the trial court's erroneous instruction that State Farm had been found liable to Mrs. Campbell for bad faith, the punitive award must be vacated and remanded. See id.; C.T. ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, ¶¶ 17-26, 977 P.2d 479 (upholding a punitive award only because the trial court's failure to instruct the jury to consider all of the seven Crookston factors was harmless since the jury did in fact fully and properly assess each factor); Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 458-59 (Utah 1993) (affirming a punitive award because the jury "made a detailed finding based on the seven factors enunciated in Crookston"). Indeed, nowhere in her opinion does Justice Durham even attempt to address this issue. Second, there is good reason why the "joint nature of the punitive damages award was never questioned" in Crookston. Unlike the case now before us, neither of the parties involved in Crookston ever had their standing to sue questioned, nor was the issue raised on appeal. Consequently, the problematic situation created here--where one party who was awarded punitives had every right to sue but the other party given the same award should have never been involved in the lawsuit--simply did not exist in Crookston. See 817 P.2d at 794 (recognizing that both Mr. and Mrs. Crookston were named as insureds in their homeowner's policy).

OPPOSE BUSHY

2005-01-15T07:37:00.000-08:00

OPPOSE BUSHY

Saturday, January 15, 2005
A Nation in CRISIS? Social Security Broke? BUSH AT FAULT
Before the election, it was fearmongering about the terrorists. After the election, they suddenly stop looking for WMD and castigate the "evil Sadaam" for telling the truth!

Now, suddenly, your favorite littel village idiot, King George the Cowardly, suddenly comes up with this idea that the Social Security system will be "flat broke"
if Congress doesn't lube up their virtual orifices, bend over, and let Bushy drive his pointed proposal home deep into the economy.

Bush is a liar, AND the village idiot. It's just that simple folks!

posted by CodeWarrior at 7:32 AM

MSNBC - Bush regrets language that hurt diplomacy

2005-01-15T07:28:00.000-08:00

MSNBC - Bush regrets language that hurt diplomacy
President says ‘Bring ’em on’ left wrong impression
=============-SNIP-===================
He's a village idiot..what do you expect from the
village idiot?